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INTRODUCTION
On July 1, 2004, Saddam Hussein and eleven of his co-defendants
were brought before Ra'id Juhi, an Iraqi investigative judge, who was se-
lected to preside over the initial hearing held in a specially designed court-
room in the U.S. military headquarters for Iraq, Camp Victory.' Millions of
Iraqi, Arab, and international viewers watched the televised proceedings as
the defendants were read indictments and instructed to submit a plea to the
investigative judge.2 The scene was reminiscent of an American television
legal drama. This first appearance of Hussein following his capture by U.S.
forces on December 13, 2003 established worldwide the strong and positive
impression that a judicial process to reckon with the crimes and atrocities of
the former regime had been launched. The Iraqi Criminal Procedure Law
was conspicuously displayed on the left side of the table in front of Judge
Juhi, symbolically asserting the Iraqi nature of the proceedings and their
grounding in Iraqi law, in spite of the fact that the proceedings were care-
fully choreographed and carried out in the fashion of an arraignment before
a U.S. court, a hearing wholly alien to the Iraqi legal system. While the le-
gal infrastructure that would later undertake and support the much-
anticipated and scrutinized al-Dujail3 and al-Anfal4 trials of Hussein and
1 For a description of the proceedings, see John F. Bums, Defiant Hussein Rebukes Iraqi
Court for Trying Him: Tells Judge He is Still Lawfil President, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2004, at Al.
2 See id.
3 The al-Dujail trial of former Iraqi leader, Saddam Hussein, and seven former Iraqi offi-
cials began on October 19, 2005. See Martin Asser, Opening Salvoes of Saddam Trial, BBC
NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middleeast/4356754.stm. The proceedings of the al-Dujail
trial were completed on July 27, 2006, and a verdict was announced on November 5, 2006.
Timeline: Saddam Hussein Dujail Trial, BBC NEWS, Dec. 4, 2006,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2hi/middleeast/4507568.stm. Saddam Hussein and Barzan al-Tikriti,
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the former intelligence chief and the half-brother of Hussein, were found guilty of willful
killing, forcible deportation and torture and were sentenced to two ten-year prison terms and
death by hanging; Awad Hamed al-Bandar, the head of the Revolutionary Court, was found
guilty of willful killing and was sentenced to death by hanging; Taha Yassin Ramadan, the
former vice president, was found guilty of willful killing, deportation, torture, and other
inhumane acts and was sentenced to life imprisonment and to three other prison terms; for-
mer Ba'ath party officials from the al-Dujail region, 'Abdallah al-Ruwaid and 'Ali Dayih
'Ali, were found guilty of willful killing and sentenced to fifteen years in prison; former
Ba'ath party official from the al-Dujail region, Mizher al-Ruwaid, was found guilty of willful
killing and torture and was sentenced to fifteen years' and seven years' imprisonment. These
crimes are crimes against humanity under the Iraqi High Criminal Court Statute. See Qanun
al-Mahkama al-Jina'iya al-'Iraqiya al-'Uliya [Statute of the Iraqi High Criminal Court], No.
10 art. 19 Oct. 18, 2005, available at www.law.case.edu/saddamtrial/documents/
ISTstatuteofficial-english.pdf (Iraq). The charges against Muhamad 'Azzawi 'Ali, a for-
mer Ba'ath party official from the region of al-Dujail, were dismissed due to a lack of evi-
dence. For a discussion of the verdicts and the trial, see Marieke Wierda & Miranda Sissons,
Dujail: Trial and Error," INT'L CENTER FOR TRANSITIONAL JUST., Nov. 2006, available at
http://www.ictj.org/images/content/5/9/597.pdf; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, JUDGING DUJAIL:
THE FIRST TRIAL BEFORE THE IRAQI HIGH TRIBUNAL (2006), available at
http://hrw.org/reports/2006/iraq1106/. The final written judgment of the trial court was re-
leased on November 22,2006. al-Mahkama al-Jina'iya al-'Iraqiya al-'Uliya [The Iraqi High
Criminal Court], al-Dujail Trial Opinion, available at http://www.iraq-
iht.org/ar/doc/finalcour.pdf, translated in Grotian Moment: The Saddam Hussein Trial Blog,
English Translation of the Dujail Judgment (Dec. 2006), available at
http://www.law.case.edu/saddamtrial/dujail/opinion.asp. An automatic appeal of the verdict
was initiated and heard by a nine-judge Cassation Panel, which issued its opinion on Decem-
ber 26, 2006. al-Hay'a al-Tamyiziya, al-Mahkama al-Jina'iya al-'Iraqiya al-'Uliya [Cassation
Panel, Iraqi High Criminal Court], al-Dujail Final Opinion, available at http://www.iraq-
iht.org/ar/doc/ihtco.pdf, translated in Grotian Moment: The Saddam Hussein Trial Blog,
Unofficial English Translation of the Dujail Trial IHT Appellate Chamber Opinion (Dec.
2006), available at http://www.law.case.edu/saddamtrial/documents/20070103_dujail
appellateschamberopinion.pdf. The Cassation Panel upheld the sentences issued by the trial
court except with respect to the life sentence issued to Taha Yassin Ramadan, which was
remanded to the trial court for reconsideration in an attempt to impose the death penalty. Id.
Hussein was handed over by U.S. authorities to the custody of the Iraqi National Police on
December 30, 2006, and was executed by hanging several hours later. Saddan Death 'Ends
Dark Chapter,' BBC NEWS, Dec. 30, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle-
east/6219861.stm. Following the outcry and controversy surrounding the execution of Hus-
sein, President Jalal Talabani, an opponent of the death penalty, publicly called for a delay in
the executions of Barzan al-Tikriti and Awad Hamed al-Bandar. Talabani Seeks Executions
Delay, BBC NEWS, Jan. 10, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middleeast/6248915.stm.
Notwithstanding these public comments, al-Tikriti and al-Bandar were executed by hanging
on January 15, 2007. See John F. Bums, Confusion in Baghdad After Reports 2 Hussein
Allies Were Hanged, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2007, at A7.
4 Proceedings against Hussein, Ali Hassan al-Majid, Hussein's cousin and the former
head of the Northern Bureau of the Ba'ath party, and five other defendants in connection
with the al-Anfal campaign began on August 21, 2006. See No Saddam Plea at Genocide
Trial, BBC NEWS, Aug. 21, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle-east/5268900.stm. At
the start of the proceedings, Hussein and al-Majid faced charges of genocide, war crimes,
and crimes against humanity; Sultan Hashem Ahmed, military commander of the campaign,
Sabir Abdul-Aziz al-Duri, director of military intelligence, Hussein Rashid al-Tikriti, deputy
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other former high-level Ba'athist leaders was still in the process of being
organized, these subtle and conflicting signs during the first public glimpse
of court proceedings were indicative of the tensions inherent in the ill-
advised attempt to blend two distinct legal systems in a single specialized
institution. The shortcomings of this blending process bedeviled the work of
the Iraqi High Criminal Court (IHCC),5 the successor of the Iraqi Special
Tribunal (IST).6
These shortcomings do not in any way diminish the valid justifica-
tions for prosecuting Hussein and other former high-level Ba'athist leaders.
The widespread and systematic violence and atrocities of the Ba'athist re-
gime, which resulted in an estimated five hundred thousand deaths and hun-
dreds of thousands of other victims of repression and abuse, necessitated
broad-based post-conflict justice.7 The discussions, debates and proposals
on this issue long predated the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in March of 2003,
evidencing the centrality of post-conflict justice to the future of Iraq. 8
of operations for the Iraqi forces, and Farhan Mutlak al-Jubouri, head of military intelligence
in Northern Iraq, faced charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity; Tahir Tawfiq al-
Ani, governor of Mosul, faced charges of crimes against humanity. See Human Rights
Watch, The Anfal Trial: Questions and Answers, http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/08/14/
iraq13982.htm (last visited May 18, 2007). Following Hussein's execution on December 30,
2006, trial court proceedings resumed on January 8, 2007, after a 21-day recess, at which
point the charges against Hussein were dropped. Timeline: Saddam Hussein Anfal Trial,
BBC NEws, Jan. 8, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/niddleeast/5272224.stm. For a descrip-
tion of the crimes and atrocities committed during the al-Anfal campaign of 1988, see
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, GENOCIDE IN IRAQ: THE ANFAL CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE KuRDs
(1993) [hereinafter HuMAN RIGHTS WATCH, GENOCIDE IN IRAQ: THE ANFAL CAMPAIGN
AGAINST THE KURDS], available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/1993/iraqanfal/.
5 While often referred to as the Iraqi High Tribunal by observers and U.S. government
officials, the precise translation of the official name of this tribunal from the Arabic, al-
Mahkama al-Jina'iya al- 'lraqiya al-'Uliya, is the Iraqi High Criminal Court.
6 See Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal art. 38, Dec. 10, 2003, 43 I.L.M. 231, reprinted
in Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 48, CPA/ORD/9 Dec. 2003/48 (Dec. 10, 2003)
[hereinafter CPA Order No. 48], available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/
20031210_CPAORD_48ISThandAppendixA.pdf.
7 See Justice for Iraq: A Human Rights Watch Policy Paper, HUMAN RTS. WATCH, Dec.
2002, http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/mena/iraql217bg.htm (describing the atrocities and
crimes of the Ba'athist regime, including attacks against Iraqi Kurds, the forced expulsion of
ethnic minorities from Kirkuk, repression of the Marsh Arabs and other Shi'a, general re-
pression, large scale disappearances and other crimes); see also HuMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
GENOCIDE IN IRAQ: THE ANFAL CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE KURDS, supra note 4; Press Release,
The White House Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: Past Repression and Atrocities
by Saddam Hussein's Regime (Apr. 4, 2003), available at http://www.
whitehouse.gov/infocus/iraq/news/20030404- 1.html.
8 For a discussion of the history of post-conflict justice proposals for Iraq from 1991 to
2004, see M. Cherif Bassiouni, Post-Conflict Justice in Iraq: An Appraisal of the Iraq Spe-
cial Tribunal, 38 CORNEL INT'L L. J. 327, 338-45 (2005) [hereinafter Bassiouni, Post-
Conflict Justice in Iraq].
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The symbolic importance of prosecuting Hussein and the senior
leaders of the Ba'ath party for genocide, crimes against humanity, war
crimes, and other crimes specified under Iraqi law cannot be underestimated
in light of the history of impunity for such crimes that has long plagued the
Arab world. At the very least, bringing Hussein to trial to answer for these
crimes must be considered a significant achievement, the implications of
which will likely be judged to be more significant in retrospect. However,
the intrinsic value of prosecuting Hussein and his fellow regime leaders
does not independently establish the legitimacy, credibility, and legacy of
the IHCC.
The IHCC has faced many hurdles not of its own making, not the
least of which have been a burgeoning insurgency and a nascent sectarian
civil war that escalated after the establishment of the tribunal.9 The further
fact that the tribunal was founded following a foreign invasion and turbulent
occupation meant that the establishment and work of the tribunal has been
scrutinized and has often been assessed based on the political convictions of
observers to the proceedings and their judgments regarding the propriety of
the Iraq war itself. Due to this highly politicized context, it was paramount
that the establishment of the tribunal and the statutory authority on which
the tribunal was established adhere to the rule of law and provide a basis for
carrying out prosecutions in a manner that accorded with domestic and in-
ternational legal standards and processes.
Many critics of the IHCC and its proceedings would never have
been satisfied with this type of judicial process regardless of the propriety in
which such an institution was established. However, even sympathetic ob-
servers who advocated prosecutions of former high-ranking Ba'athists have
been forced to acknowledge and address the technical and legal infirmities
associated with the IHCC and its statute (IHCC Statute). The historical im-
portance of the IHCC for Iraq and the Arab world demanded that the statu-
tory framework of the tribunal be established in a procedurally and substan-
tively proper fashion that could withstand the stringent scrutiny that it has
inevitably faced. While the IHCC Statute represents an improvement on its
predecessor, the statute of the IST (IST Statute), the IHCC Statute does not
9 For discussions of the various types of violence and conflict that have plagued Iraq
since March 2003, see NAT'L INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL, NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE,
PROSPECTS FOR IRAQ'S STABILITY: A CHALLENGING ROAD AHEAD (2007), available at
http://www.dni.gov/press-releases/20070202_release.pdf (noting that "the term 'civil war'
does not adequately capture the complexity of the conflict in Iraq" but also indicating that the
term does accurately describe "key elements of the Iraq conflict"); INT'L CRISIS GROUP, IN
THEIR OWN WORDS: READING THE IRAQI INSURGENCY (2006), available at
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3953&l=1; INT'L CRISIS GROUP, THE NEXT
IRAQI WAR? SECTARIANISM AND CIVIL CONFLICT (2006), available at
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3980&l=l; Nm ROSEN, IN THE BELLY OF THE
GREEN BIRD: THE TRIUMPH OF THE MARTYRS IN IRAQ (2005).
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address many of the major flaws that plagued the IST Statute. This is par-
ticularly troublesome in light of the fact that one of the authors of this arti-
cle personally briefed the Iraqi judges, investigative judges and prosecutors
on the IST Statute's flaws and potential solutions to address these infirmi-
ties-recommendations that most of the Iraqi participants agreed with at the
time.°
In assessing the shortcomings of the IHCC, some degree of blame
must be apportioned to the constant meddling, undue pressure, and interfer-
ence of certain Iraqi political actors. However, a much larger share of blame
must be assigned to the occupation authorities who have shaped the contents
and processes of post-conflict justice in Iraq.
All too often U.S. individuals assessing the situation in Iraq,
whether politically or in connection with the IHCC, have done so with a
limited perspective that never accounted for the realities of Iraqi culture and
society. During the period prior to the launch of military operations in Iraq,
officials in the White House and the Department of Defense (DOD) exhib-
ited little interest in the issues of post-conflict justice. The Department of
State's Future of Iraq Project's "Working Group on Transitional Justice"
dealt extensively with post-conflict justice in Iraq for more than a year prior
to the invasion. However, the National Security Council (NSC), ostensibly
at the request of senior DOD leadership, did not circulate its final report.
Thus, those in the administration who would later decide on post-conflict
justice in Iraq never had the opportunity to study the work product of many
thoughtful Iraqi expatriate jurists and other non-Iraqi experts on this vital
issue. The politics of inter-agency rivalry prevailed over sound legal judg-
ment. Instead, the NSC, in an unwise attempt to craft a Solomonic solution,
handed over Iraqi post-conflict justice to the Department of Justice (DOJ).
As a result, the Regime Crimes Liaison Office (RCLO), consisting of capa-
ble and dedicated U.S. prosecutors, was established to take over the task of
crafting a post-conflict justice strategy, a project that the senior DOD lead-
ership sought to keep out of the reach of the Department of State.
The DOJ staff, which had considerable experience in the American
criminal justice system, lacked the legal and practical expertise necessary to
deal with the realities of the Iraqi legal system. Those charged with dealing
with post-conflict justice issues in Iraq did not know Arabic and had limited
knowledge of the Iraqi legal system or its culture and traditions. The same
criticism must also be directed at many of the non-governmental organiza-
tions (NGOs) and academics whose expertise and opinion were solicited
with respect to post-conflict justice in Iraq. Almost all of those involved in
either creating or critiquing the post-conflict justice framework, within the
administration and in the non-governmental sector, were not well versed in
10 See infra note 91.
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the history of the Iraqi legal system, its performance over the past thirty
years, or the competency levels of those operating the criminal justice sys-
tem. This did not deter policy-makers and commentators from opining on
the proper course of action with respect to post-conflict justice and the
manner in which the tribunal should be structured and administered.
The IHCC represents a good-faith effort to grapple with the grim
legacy of Ba'athist rule and to carry out prosecutions through proper judi-
cial channels and procedures. The IHCC also represents the first serious
precedent in the Arab world for holding officials responsible for systematic
repression and abuse. However, the institutional flaws of the process have
needlessly compromised the courageous efforts of the many brave Iraqi
participants in the IHCC who have risked their lives to bring about post-
conflict justice and to help establish a rule of law culture in Iraq.
The critical appraisal that follows should not be read to support
those Ba'athist leaders who have so far been brought to trial. Indeed, they
deserve to be tried and punished for their crimes. It should also not be read
in a way that is deprecatory of the genuine, good faith efforts of those Iraqis
and Americans who have worked so hard to make post-conflict justice in
Iraq a reality. Instead, it should be read as an honest and sincere legal cri-
tique. For one of the authors of this article, who has spent a lifetime in-
volved in the evolution of international criminal justice and who sought to
assist the Iraqis in shaping their approach to post-conflict justice, it is par-
ticularly painful to write about mistakes that were predicted and could have
easily been avoided. In criticizing those whose ignorance and perhaps hu-
bris led to the outcomes discussed below, there is only the sadness of regret.
So much was at stake and so little was needed to put Iraqi post-conflict jus-
tice on par with the most successful historical precedents. A comprehensive
post-conflict justice scheme based on legal legitimacy that drew upon the
experiences and lessons of other international criminal prosecutions, war
crimes trials, and post-conflict justice institutions would have been a great
achievement in the history of international criminal justice. Along with ren-
dering a sense of justice, such a process could have imparted closure for
many of the victims and instilled hope for a future Iraqi society based on the
rule of law.
I. THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL STRUCTURES IN IRAQ FROM MARCH 19,2003
TO OCTOBER 15, 2005
On March 19, 2003, following months of furious diplomatic ma-
neuvering that created a substantial degree of acrimony and discord in the
international community and among many of the United States' allies, the
United States commenced military strikes against Iraqi regime targets, lead-
2006-2007]
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ing to an invasion of Iraq by the United States and its coalition partners.
The initial phase of the invasion proceeded rapidly and resulted in the disin-
tegration of the Ba'athist regime of Saddam Hussein. 12 The overwhelming
U.S. military success led to the precipitous fall of the regime, but thereafter
the Bush administration failed to implement a comprehensive plan to meet
the needs of nation-building. President George W. Bush declared the end of
major combat operations in Iraq on May 1, 2003,'13 and this marked the be-
ginning of the coalition's role as an occupying power. 14 Initial responsibility
for the provision of humanitarian assistance and the coordination of recon-
struction in Iraq was assigned to the Office of Reconstruction and Humani-
tarian Assistance (ORHA) led by retired General Jay M. Garner.' 5
The United States and the United Kingdom sought to ground their
occupation in international legal authority. In connection with these efforts,
the United States and the United Kingdom delivered a letter to the United
Nations Security Council on May 8, 2003, outlining their intention to estab-
lish an authority to exercise temporary governing power in Iraq. 16 The letter
" Following the onset of military operations in Iraq, the United States claimed forty-nine
countries were publicly committed to the coalition. Press Release, The White House, Who
Are the Current Coalition Members? (Mar. 27, 2003), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/iraq/news/20030327-10.htm. The United States expan-
sively defined the commitment of coalition members to include direct military participation
or the provision of logistical and intelligence support, specialized chemical/biological re-
sponse teams, over-flight rights, humanitarian and reconstruction aid, or political support. Id.
However, the vast majority of troops that participated in the invasion were provided by the
United States and the United Kingdom. For further discussion of the political, diplomatic and
military buildup to the invasion and its ramifications for international relations, see GEORGE
PACKER, THE ASSASSINS' GATE 39-135 (2005). The faulty assumptions and excessive unilat-
eralism that marked the period prior to the invasion informed the direction of post-conflict
justice efforts in Iraq as well.
12 United States military forces first entered Baghdad, the Iraqi capital, on April 9, 2003.
The DOD declared an end to major hostilities in Iraq on April 14, 2003. Gregory H. Fox, The
Occupation of Iraq, 36 GEO. J. INT'L L. 195, 202 (2005).
13 See President George W. Bush, Remarks by the President from the USS Abraham Lin-
coln (May 1, 2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/05/
20030501-15.html.
14 Determining the exact moment when the occupation began is perhaps impossible and
not particularly helpful. As Adam Roberts points out, "[t]he occupation had already begun
during the course of fighting, when progressively more areas of Iraq came under coalition
control." Adam Roberts, Transformative Military Occupation: Applying the Laws of War
and Human Rights, 100 AM. J. INT'L. L. 580, 609 (2006).
15 ORHA was established pursuant to National Security Presidential Directive 24, which
was issued in January 2003. This document has not been released to the public. ORHA was
later dissolved or subsumed by the Coalition Provisional Authority. See L. ELAINE HALCHIN,
CONG. RESEARCH SERv., THE COALMON PROVISIONAL AumoRITY (CPA): ORIGIN,
CHARACTERISTICS, AND INSTITUTIONAL AuTHoRITms 1-3 (2004).
16 Letter from Jeremy Greenstock, the Permanent Representative of the U.K., & John D.
Negroponte, the Permanent Representative of the U.S., to the President of the Security
[Vol. 39:21
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stated that the occupying powers had established the Coalition Provisional
Authority (CPA). 17 The United Nations Security Council then passed Reso-
lution 1483, which acknowledged the letter sent to the United Nations Secu-
rity Council and recognized the United States and the United Kingdom as
temporary occupying powers under international law. 18 The resolution af-
firmed the applicability of international humanitarian law and its binding
obligations on the occupying powers until the establishment of an interim
government.' 9 The CPA later issued Regulation No. 1, which established
the CPA's basic authority and the scope of its obligations. 20 CPA Regula-
tion No. 1 stated that the CPA was "vested with all executive, legislative
and judicial authority necessary to achieve its objectives, to be exer-
cised under relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions, including
Resolution 1483 (2003), and the laws and usages of war.",2' The regu-
lation also established that CPA Regulations and Orders would "take
precedence over all other laws and publications to the extent such
other laws and publications are inconsistent., 22 CPA Regulation No. 1
did not identify how the CPA was established, and it is unclear under what
Council, U.N. (May 8, 2003). The U.N. document number for this letter is U.N. Doc.
S/2003/538. Id.
17 Id. ("[T]he United States, the United Kingdom and Coalition partners, acting under
existing command and control arrangements through the Commander of Coalition Forces,
have created the Coalition Provisional Authority, which includes the Office of Reconstruc-
tion and Humanitarian Assistance, to exercise powers of government temporarily, and, as
necessary, especially to provide security, to allow the delivery of humanitarian aid, and to
eliminate weapons of mass destruction.").
18 S.C. Res. 1483, U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4761st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483 (May 22,
2003). For a discussion of the relationship between Security Resolution 1483 and the author-
ity of the occupying powers, see generally Thomas D. Grant, The Security Council and Iraq:
An Incremental Practice, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 823 (2003).
19 See S.C. Res. 1483, supra note 18, 5 (highlighting the obligations of the occupying
powers under the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Hague Regulations of 1907).
20 Coalition Provisional Authority Regulation No. 1, CPA/REG/16 May 2003/01 (May 16,
2003) [hereinafter CPA Reg. No. 1], available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/
regulations/20030516_CPAREGI TheCoalitionProvisionalAuthority_.pdf. As Gregory
Fox has pointed out, the timing of events leading to the establishment of the CPA is unclear:
"CPA Regulation No. 1 bears a date of May 16, 2003, but it makes reference to Security
Council Resolution 1483, which was passed almost one week later on May 22, 2003. I will
assume that Regulation No. 1 was back-dated for reasons not explained in official CPA
documents." Fox, supra note 12 at 203 n.28; see also Roberts supra note 14, at 612 (noting
that the contradiction of dates could have resulted from the fact that the principal terms of
Resolution 1483 had been discussed for two weeks prior to its adoption).
21 CPA Reg. No. 1, supra note 20, § 1(2).
22 Id. § 3(1).
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authority the establishment took place. While questions have persisted
with respect to the CPA's organizational status, 24 the civilian administrator
of the CPA, Ambassador L. Paul Bremer II, reported to the DOD, and the
CPA's activities in Iraq were closely linked to the DOD .
On July 13, 2003, the CPA issued CPA Regulation No. 6, which
recognized the formation of the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC).26 In accor-
dance with Security Council Resolution 1483, the CPA established the IGC
"as the principal body of the Iraqi interim administration, pending the estab-
lishment of an internationally recognized, representative government by the
people of Iraq. 27 The members of the IGC were selected after intense nego-
tiations among representatives of the major political, ethnic and religious
groups of Iraq and the CPA.28 The authority of the IGC to issue orders and
directives and to appoint personnel was subject to the CPA's approval; as
such, the IGC functioned as a subordinate local administrative body operat-
ing under the authority of an occupying power. Shortly after the establish-
ment of the IGC, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution
1500, which welcomed "the establishment of the broadly representative
Governing Council of Iraq. '29 While the actual powers of the IGC were
fairly limited in scope and practice, Security Council Resolution 1511,
adopted in October 2003, reaffirmed Security Council Resolution 1483's
recognition of the CPA as the temporary occupying authority under interna-
tional law and determined that the Governing Council and its ministers were
"the principal bodies of the Iraqi interim administration, which, without
23 See HALCHIN, supra note 15, at 4. Questions surrounding the organizational status of the
CPA remained unclear throughout its existence as the temporary governing authority in Iraq.
These questions persisted and impacted oversight of CPA expenditures. Id. at 8; see also
Roberts, supra note 14 (discussing questions regarding the process by which the CPA
emerged and was established). A federal lawsuit brought under the False Claims Act further
clouded the issue. The federal district court ruled that that the authority was not a federal
agency and was instead an international entity. Erik Eckholm, On Technical Grounds, Judge
Sets Aside Verdict of Billing Fraud in Iraq Rebuilding, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2006, at A6.
24 See HALCHIN, supra note 15, at 35.
25 See NOAH FELDMAN, WHAT WE OWE IRAQ: WAR AND THE ETmics OF NATION BUILDING
4 (2004).
26 Coalition Provisional Authority Regulation No. 6, CPA/REG/13 July 2003/06 (July 13,
2003), available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20030713_CPAREG_6_
GoverningCouncil ofIraq_.pdf (establishing the Iraqi Governing Council).
27 Id. § 1.
28 Patrick E. Tyler, Iraqis Set to Form an Interim Council with Wide Power, N.Y. TIMES,
July 11, 2003, at Al.
29 S.C. Res. 1500, U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4808th mtg., T 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1500 (Aug.
14,2003).
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prejudice to its further evolution, embodies the sovereignty of the State of
Iraq during the transitional period. 3°
Perhaps the most significant task delegated to the IGC was the
preparation of the Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transi-
tional Period, commonly referred to as the "TAL.' ' 31 The TAL served as an
interim constitution to guide the governance of Iraq following the restora-
tion of sovereignty on June 30, 2004, and until legislative elections were
held and a permanent constitution was drafted and adopted.32 The TAL was
approved by the IGC on March 8, 2004 and published by the CPA.33 Not-
withstanding the approval of the TAL, the CPA continued to exercise the
full mandate laid out in CPA Regulation No.1 and exercised a veto power
over all IGC decisions and appointments. 34
The formal occupation of Iraq lasted for thirteen months and ended
on June 28, 2004.35 Security Council Resolution 1546, which was unani-
30 S.C. Res. 1511, U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4844th mtg., 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1511 (Oct.
16, 2003). As Gregory H. Fox has pointed out, "[n]either the CPA nor the Security Council
described with any precision how the Governing Council would fit into the governing struc-
ture of the occupation. No public document states whether the CPA or the Governing Coun-
cil (or both) would initiate changes in Iraqi law, whether the approval of both bodies was
necessary, or how conflicts between the two bodies would be resolved." Fox, supra note 12,
at 205. However, as CPA Regulation No. 1 remained in effect even after the creation of the
IGC, the CPA's executive, legislative and judicial authority was undiminished. See CPA
Reg. No. 1, supra note 20, § 1. Fox goes on to explain that unconfirmed sources endorsed
this description of the CPA's "'veto' power over all Governing Council actions." Fox, supra
note 12, at 206 (citing Iraq's Governing Council, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL., May 17, 2004,
http://www.cfr.org/publication/7665/).
31 LAW OF ADMINISTRATION FOR THE STATE OF IRAQ FOR THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD [Con-
stitution] (Iraq), available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/governmentfTAL.html.
32 While the TAL functioned as an interim constitution, the law was not referred to as such
for important symbolic and political reasons. As His Excellency Feisal Amin al-Istrabadi, the
Ambassador and Deputy Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations, explains,
"nothing became law in Iraq unless it was signed by U.S. Ambassador L. Paul Bremer, the civil
administrator of Iraq. It was the Civil Administrator, not the IGC, who had the power to legis-
late. No Iraqi wanted the American Civil Administrator to sign a document called an Iraqi
constitution. Thus the rather cumbersome title for what in fact is Iraq's interim constitution."
Feisal Amin al-Istrabadi, Reviving Constitutionalism in Iraq: Key Provisions of the Transitional
Administrative Law, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 269,270 (2005) (footnotes omitted).
33 NATHAN J. BROWN, TRANSITIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: COMMENTARY AND ANALYSIS
(2004), http://www.geocities.com/nathanbrownI/interimiraqiconstitution.html. An Annex to
the TAL was approved by the IGC on June 1, 2004, prior to the IGC's dissolution. The An-
nex attempts to define the structure and powers of the interim Iraqi government. ANNEX TO
THE LAW OF ADMINISTRATION FOR THE STATE OF IRAQ IN THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD [Consti-
tution], available at http://www.cpa-iraq.org/government/TALAnnex.html.
34 See CPA Reg. No. 1, supra note 20.
35 The much-anticipated deadline for the transfer of sovereignty was June 30, 2004, how-
ever, sovereignty was formally transferred in a surprise ceremony conducted by Bremer on
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mously adopted by the United Nations Security Council on June 8, 2004,
endorsed the transfer of sovereignty and approved a detailed plan for Iraq's
transition to full sovereignty and future legislative elections. 36 Representa-
tives of the major political, ethnic and religious groups of Iraq; the United
States and the United Kingdom, as the principal occupying powers; and the
Special Adviser on Iraq to the Secretary General of the United Nations,
Lakhdar Brahimi undertook extensive negotiations to appoint the Interim
Iraqi Government (H1G). 37 The negotiations process resulted in the appoint-
ment of a president, two vice presidents, a prime minister, and cabinet offi-
cers. 38 Under Resolution 1546, the HG was appointed until such time as
June 28th. Adam Roberts, The End of Occupation: Iraq 2004, 54 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 27, 37
(2005).
36 S.C. Res. 1546, U.N. SCOR, 59th Sess., 4987th mtg., 1, 9, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1546
(June 8, 2004) (endorsing a June 30, 2004 transfer of sovereignty and authorizing a U.S.-led
multinational force). In characterizing the transfer of sovereignty, Adam Roberts writes:
The new situation after June 28, 2004, was not just an occupation by another name.
There were real differences, including the fact that the Interim Government had an ex-
plicitly recognized right to demand the withdrawal of the U.S.-led forces in Iraq....
Yet the prospect that there would be continuing significant similarities with an oc-
cupation found reflection in certain provisions of the [Security Council] resolution
[1546] about the application of international rules. A preambular clause inserted
fairly late in the long negotiations over the text recognized the continued applica-
tion of international humanitarian law .... The inclusion of this clause can be in-
terpreted as one way of conceding that, even if the occupation was theoretically
over, the likelihood remained that uses of force, perhaps even exercises of adminis-
trative authority, that closely resembled a situation of occupation would occur.
Roberts, supra note 35, at 617 (footnotes omitted).
37 Brahimi was first invited to visit Iraq in February 2004 by the IGC to conduct a fact-
finding mission to determine whether national elections could be held by June 30, 2004. The
need for the visit was precipitated by Grand Ayatollah 'Ali al-Sistani's rejection of the cau-
cus system that had been proposed by the CPA to create an Iraqi interim government and his
subsequent demand that elections be held to choose the representatives of an Iraqi interim
government. Brahimi determined that it would not be possible to hold national elections prior
to the June 30, 2004 transfer of sovereignty. The Bush Administration later welcomed the
intercession of the United Nations to help oversee the process by which the IGC would be
dissolved and replaced by the IIG, which was appointed by the United Nations after consul-
tations with the United States, the IGC and other Iraqis. See Steven R. Weisman & David E.
Sanger, U.S. Open to Plan That Supplants Council in Iraq, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 16, 2004, at Al.
38 The major appointees in the Iraqi interim government were Dr. 'Iyad 'Allawi, Prime
Minister, Sheikh Ghazi Ajil al-Yawar, President, Dr. Ibrahim Ja'afari, Deputy President, Dr.
Rowsch Shaways, Deputy President, Dr. Barham Salih, Deputy Prime Minister, Hazem
Sha'alan, Minister of Defense, Hoshyar Zebari, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Falah al-
Nakib, Minister of Interior. For a description of the negotiations leading to the appointment
of the IIG and the frustrations of Brahimi with the approach of the CPA, see Rajiv
Chandrasekaran, Envoy Bowed to Pressure in Choosing Leaders, WASH. POST, June 3, 2004,
at A10. In August 2004, a National Conference was held to elect a 100-member Interim
National Council that largely served as an advisory body for the HG. While over a thousand
delegates attended the conference, significant political groups chose not to attend.
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national elections could be held.39 The resolution specified that national
elections would be held on December 31, 2004, if possible, and in any
event, no later than January 31, 2005.40 As Adam Roberts points out, the
resolution implicitly recognized the limitations of the HG by acknowledging
that it would "assume full responsibility and authority ...for governing
Iraq while refraining from taking any actions affecting Iraq's destiny be-
yond the limited interim period until an elected Transitional Government of
Iraq assumes office ....
During this interim period, the Independent Electoral Commission
of Iraq was vested with exclusive jurisdiction over the organization, man-
agement and oversight of elections for the Transitional National As-
sembly (TNA), eighteen governorate councils and a Kurdistan Na-
tional Assembly. 42 The Commission oversaw the elections of January
30, 2005, which produced a 275-member TNA. The TNA was tasked
with drafting a permanent constitution by August 15, 2005, 4 3 to be pre-
sented for general referendum no later than October 15, 2005.44 Following
the general referendum, elections for a permanent government were to be
held by December 15, 2005. 45
The constitutional drafting process and the submission of a perma-
nent constitution were marked by considerable confusion and procedural
39 S.C. Res. 1546, supra note 36, 1.
40 Id. I 4(c).
41 Roberts, supra note 35, at 617 (quoting S.C. Res. 1546, supra note 36, 1). It should
also be noted that this same limiting language was based on the text of the TAL Annex.
ANNEX TO THE LAW OF ADMINISTRATION FOR THE STATE OF IRAQ IN THE TRANSITIONAL
PERIOD art. 1, available at http://www.cpa-iraq.org/government/TALAnnex.html.
42 Richard Soudriette, What Iraq's Elections Teach Us About Democracy Building, 32
HUM. RTS. MAG. 22, 23 (2005), available at http://www.abanet.org/irr/hr/spring05/iraq.html.
The Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq comprised nine members including "seven
voting members and two nonvoting members (the chief electoral officer and an international
member)." Id. The Commission received training and assistance from various organs of the
United Nations, including the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), which
was established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1500. See S.C. Res. 1500, U.N.
SCOR, 58th Sess. 4808th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1500 (Aug. 14, 2003).
43 Under Article 61 (F), the TNA could request a six-month extension of the constitutional
drafting process. LAW OF ADMINISTRATION FOR THE STATE OF IRAQ FOR THE TRANSITIONAL
PERIOD art. 61 (F), available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/government/TAL.html.
44 Under Article 61(C) of the TAL, a referendum for a permanent constitution would be
defeated if it were rejected by two-thirds of the voters in three or more of Iraq's eighteen
governorates. Id. art. 61(C). This provision was widely seen as protecting the interests of
regional minorities, particularly the Kurds. U.S. INST. OF PEACE, IRAQ'S CONSTITUTIONAL
PROCESS: SHAPING A VISION FOR THE COUNTRY'S FUTURE 2-3 (2005), available at
http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/srl 32.html.
4' LAW OF ADMINISTRATION FOR THE STATE OF IRAQ FOR THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD art.
61 (D), available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/govemment/TAL.html.
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irregularities, largely as a result of the Sunni Arabs' January 2005 election
boycott46 and the short timeframe in which a permanent constitution was to
be drafted. The boycott resulted in the election of only seventeen Sunni Ar-
abs to the TNA.47 This figure is far below the proportion of Sunni Arabs in
Iraq, estimated at fifteen to twenty percent of the general population.48 In an
attempt to remedy this lack of proportionate representation, the fifty-five-
member Constitution Drafting Committee, formed in May of 2005 without
substantial Sunni Arab representation, was expanded to include Sunni Arab
political representatives. However, as Jonathan Morrow notes, "[ilt was late
June [2005] before the fifteen Sunni Arab members of the committee had
been invited onto the committee, and it was later still, July 8, before they
attended their first meeting. 4 9 Under intense diplomatic pressure from the
United States to meet the August 15th deadline, the committee did not re-
quest a six-month extension to continue the drafting process, 50 and the TNA
was then forced to enact an ad hoc one-week extension when the committee
was unable to agree upon a draft constitution. 5 1 Following several additional
ad hoc extensions,52 the committee approved a draft constitution on August
46 Sunni Arab participation was further suppressed by the campaign of intimidation of
Sunni Arab voters by insurgents. JONATHAN MORROW, IRAQ'S CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS II:
AN OPPORTuNmr LOST, U.S. INST. OF PEACE 6 (2005) available at http://www.
usip.org/pubs/specialreports/srl 55.html.
47 Id.
48 Id. Not surprisingly, the major Shi'a and Kurdish parties were over-represented in the
TNA. The Shi'a coalition, the United Iraqi Alliance, held one hundred and forty seats, while
the Kurdistan Alliance held seventy-five seats. The party led by interim Prime Minister 'Iyad
'Allawi held forty seats, with the remaining twenty seats held by nine smaller parties.
49 Id. at 9. The role of the Sunni Arab representatives was further complicated by the July
19th assassination of two Sunni Arab committee members, which resulted in a temporary
boycott of the committee by its Sunni Arab members. Edward Wong, Sunnis Boycott Panel
Drafting Charter for Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2005, at Al.
50 See supra note 43; see also Dexter Filkins & Joel Brinkley, Iraqis Promising a Consti-
tution by the Deadline, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2005, at Al.
51 The TNA extended the August 15 deadline by amending the TAL. While this amend-
ment was technically legal under Article 3(A), which allows amendment of the TAL, the ad
hoc nature of the amendment process raised questions as to the legality of the extension. This
perception was further reinforced since the extension seemed to contradict the spirit of the
text, which states that "[ilf the National Assembly does not complete writing the draft
permanent constitution by 15 August 2005 and does not request extension of the deadline in
Article 61(F) above, the provisions of Article 61(E), above, shall be applied." LAW OF
ADMINISTRATION FOR THE STATE OF IRAQ FOR THE TRANSITONAL PERIOD art. 6(G), available
at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/governmentfTAL.html. Article 6(E) directs that the TNA be
dissolved. Id. art. 6(E).
52 An ad hoc three-day extension was enacted on August 22nd and an indefinite extension
was enacted on August 25th. See Morrow, supra note 46, at 2, 15. Additionally, it appears
that these extensions were not enacted through a formal amendment of the TAL by the TNA,
which would render such actions illegitimate. Id.
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28th, which was then submitted to the TNA.53 The October 15th constitu-
tional referendum subsequently approved the constitution.
54
H.THE IRAQI SPECIAL TRIBUNAL
Prior to assessing the IHCC statute, it is helpful to review the estab-
lishment of the IST, the predecessor tribunal to the IHCC. The manner in
which the IST was created and the extensive debate over its shortcomings
and merits highlight the ways that the IHCC subsequently improved upon
certain discrete flaws in the statute, yet failed to remedy the major deficien-
cies that plagued the IST and undermined its credibility.
A. The Establishment of the Iraqi Special Tribunal
The issue of post-conflict justice in Iraq and the debate about how
to best reckon with the repressive legacy of the Ba'athist regime were topics
that had been discussed extensively by Iraqi expatriates, international ob-
servers, non-governmental organizations, and others for many years prior to
the invasion of Iraq. 55 After the U.S.-led coalition forces took control of
53 NATHAN J. BROWN, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT'L PEACE, THE FINAL DRAFT OF THE
IRAQI CONSTITUTION: ANALYSIS AND COMMENTARY (2005), available at
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=17423. On Sep-
tember 13th and September 18th, modified drafts of the constitution were submitted to the
TNA, and the final draft was then submitted to UNAMI for printing in preparation for the
October 15th referendum. INT'L CRISIS GROUP, UNMAKING IRAQ: A CONSTITUTIONAL
PROCESS GONE AWRY (2005), available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/homc/
index.cfm?id=3703; Morrow, supra note 46. Prior to the referendum, in an effort to gain
greater support among Sunni Arabs, an agreement was reached with a number of Sunni Arab
political parties to allow for amendment of the constitution following elections for a perma-
nent National Assembly. The draft constitution was amended by the TNA to reflect this
revision. Dexter Filkins, After Changes to Iraqi Charter, Sunni Leaders Still Differ on Sup-
port, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2005, at A10.
54 While the constitution was approved by sixteen of Iraq's eighteen governorates, two of
the governorates rejected the constitution by more than two-thirds of the vote.
55 For a brief summary of the evolution of thought on post-conflict justice in Iraq from the
first Gulf War to the March 2003 invasion of Iraq by coalition forces, see Bassiouni, Post-
Conflict Justice in Iraq, supra note 8, at 338-42. In the buildup to the U.S.-led military ac-
tion, officials in the Department of State brought attention to the issue of post-conflict justice
as part of the Department's Future of Iraq Project. This yearlong effort involved over one
hundred Iraqi expatriates and a group of non-Iraqi experts. One of the authors of this article,
M. Cherif Bassiouni, served as an expert to one of the project's working groups, the "Work-
ing Group on Transitional Justice," which comprised forty-one Iraqi expatriate jurists and a
number of U.S. experts. In this capacity, Bassiouni prepared a comprehensive post-conflict
justice plan in January 2003. See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, IRAQ POST-CONFLICT JUSTICE: A
PROPOSED COMPREHENSIVE PLAN (2004) [hereinafter BASSIOUNI, IRAQ POST-CONFLICT
JUSTICE: A PROPOSED COMPREHENSIVE PLAN], available at http://www.law.depaul.edu/
institutescenters/ihrli/_downloads/IraqProposal_04.pdf. For further discussion of the work
of the Future of Iraq Project, see James Fallows, Blind into Baghdad, ATLANTIC MONTHLY,
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Iraq, it became increasingly clear that some form of tribunal would have to
be established to properly address the crimes and atrocities of the Ba'athist
regime. The Bush administration, the United Nations, and the NGO com-
munity considered three major proposals for establishing a tribunal56: (i) an
international tribunal established by the United Nations Security Council
similar to the ad hoc international criminal tribunals for the former Yugo-
slavia and Rwanda;57 (ii) a hybrid international and national tribunal similar
to the Special Court for Sierra Leone, which was established jointly by the
Government of Sierra Leone and the United Nations Security Council; 58 and
(iii) a national Iraqi tribunal, which would receive some degree of interna-
tional support and assistance. The Bush administration favored the last-
named option.59
The NGO community overwhelmingly favored some form of inter-
national tribunal to deal with the atrocities of the Ba'ath era.6° Indicative of
this outlook were meetings among NGOs held in New York during April
and June 2003 to discuss post-conflict justice options for Iraq. The meetings
were led by Human Rights Watch and the Open Society Institute, with in-
formal participation by United Nations representatives, and the preference
of most of the attendees was for an ad hoc international criminal tribunal
established by the United Nations Security Council with jurisdiction over
crimes committed against Iraqis, crimes committed during the Iran-Iraq War
of 1980 to 1988, and crimes committed during the invasion and occupation
Jan.-Feb. 2004, at 56-58; Packer, supra note 11, at 124-26; David Rieff, Blueprint for a
Mess, N.Y. TIMEs MAG. Nov. 2, 2003, at 28; Eric Schmitt & Joel Brinkley, State Department
Study Foresaw Trouble Now Plaguing Iraq, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 19, 2003, at Al.
56 These three proposals with respect to prosecuting former high-ranking Ba'athists mir-
rored the alternatives proposed by the Working Group on Transitional Justice. See
BASSIOUN, IRAQ POST-CONFLICT JUSTICE: A PROPOSED COMPREHENSIVE PLAN, supra note
55, at 48.
51 See S.C. Res. 827, U.N.SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25,
1993); S.C. Res. 955, U.N.SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8,
1994).
58 See Agreement Between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the
Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, U.N.-Sierra Leone, Jan. 16, 2002, 2178
U.N.T.S. 138, available at http://www.sierra-leone.org/specialcourtagreement.html. For a
general discussion of the features and advantages-of hybrid tribunals, see Laura A. Dickin-
son, The Promise of Hybrid Courts, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 295 (2003).
59 Bassiouni, Post-Conflict Justice in Iraq, supra note 8, at 342.
60 See, e.g., Letter from Richard Dicker, Director Int'l Justice Program, Human Rights
Watch, & Hanny Megally, Executive Director Middle East and North African Division,
Human Rights Watch, to Colin J. Powell, U.S. Sec'y of State (Apr. 15, 2003), available at
http://www.hrw.orglpress/2003/04/iraqtribuna10415031tr.htm (endorsing the creation of an
international tribunal for Iraq as the best option to prosecute past crimes in Iraq and indicat-
ing that a "mixed" national-internaional tribunal would be a second-best alternative).
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of Kuwait from 1990 to 1991.61 The NGO community believed that the
scope and severity of the crimes committed by the Ba'athist regime required
the creation of a specialized international tribunal and also expressed seri-
ous reservations about the capacity of the degraded Iraqi judiciary to under-
take such complex prosecutions.
62
While the Bush administration intended to prosecute Hussein and
other high-ranking Ba'athists, the issue of post-conflict justice was over-
shadowed by the quickening pace of events in Iraq, particularly, the search
for Hussein and other high-ranking Ba'athists, the beginnings of anti-
coalition violence, and the ultimately unsuccessful search for weapons of
mass destruction. While the issue of post-conflict justice suffered from a
lack of high-level attention, within the CPA the Office of Human Rights and
Transitional Justice (OHRTJ) initially took responsibility for addressing the
63
major issues arising out of the crimes of the Ba'athist regime. The initial
research conducted by the U.S. and British civilian and military staff of the
OHRTJ indicated a clear preference by Iraqis for an Iraqi national court that
would have the authority to try Hussein and other high-level Ba'athists.64
Further complicating these initial efforts, the significant preparatory
work of the Future of Iraq Project was overlooked due to political consid-
erations and institutional rivalries.65 As a result, the Bush administration and
the CPA wholly ignored the recommendations of the Future of Iraq Pro-
61 A hybrid international and national tribunal was also seen as a viable alternative by
some of the participants. See OPEN SOC'Y INST. & THE U.N. FOUND., IRAQ IN TRANSITION,
POST-CONFLICT CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 85-87 (2004); Bassiouni, Post-Conflict
Justice in Iraq, supra note 8, at 343.
62 See, e.g., Press Release, Human Rights Watch, Iraq: Justice Needs International Role
(July 15, 2003), available at http://hrw.org/press/2003/07/iraq071503.htm.
63 Tom Parker, Prosecuting Saddam: The Coalition Provisional Authority and the Evolu-
tion of the Iraqi Special Tribunal, 30 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 899, 899-900 (2005).
64 Id. at 900-01. Research conducted during the summer of 2003 by the International
Center for Transitional Justice and the Human Rights Center at the University of California,
Berkeley indicated that Iraqi participants in their study expressed a "clear and emphatic
preference for any court to be established in Iraq and to operate under Iraqi control. Interna-
tional 'assistance' was seen as desirable, even welcome, but most respondents found interna-
tional participation that might derogate from Iraqis' final decision-making power to be unac-
ceptable." Nehal Bhuta, Iraqi Voices: Attitudes Toward Transitional Justice and Social Re-
construction, INT'L CENTER FOR TRANSITIONAL JUST., May 2004, at 31, available at
http://www.ictj.org/images/content/1/0/108.pdf.
65 The hostility of the Bush Administration to the work of the Future of Iraq Project is
exemplified by the removal of Thomas Warrick, the coordinator of the Project, from the
ORHA planning team by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld despite his extensive
knowledge of conditions in Iraq and his experience dealing with Iraqi expatriates throughout
the Future of Iraq Project. Jay M. Garner, the retired general who briefly headed ORHA prior
to being replaced following the establishment of the CPA, was specifically told to ignore the
work of the Future of Iraq Project. See Rieff, supra note 55, at 32; Fallows, supra note 55, at
72.
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ject's "Working Group on Transitional Justice" for a comprehensive plan
for post-conflict justice.66 Additionally, the possibility of establishing an
international or hybrid tribunal under U.N. auspices was limited as a result
of a confluence of factors, namely, the limited role in Iraq afforded the
United Nations by the Bush administration67; the opposition of the United
Nations to the death penalty for convicted perpetrators, a position at odds
with the views of the vast majority of Iraqis68; the reluctance of the United
Nations to engage in Iraq following the August 2003 killing of Sergio
Vieira de Mello, 69 the U.N. Secretary General's Special Representative in
66 This comprehensive plan for post-conflict justice included, in addition to prosecuting
Hussein and the senior leaders of the Ba'ath party, prosecuting lesser offenders before one or
more specialized chambers of the Iraqi criminal court system, providing reparations for vic-
tims of Ba'athist atrocities and crimes, and empanelling a commission to help establish an
objective historical record of the political violence experienced by Iraqis during the reign of
Hussein and the Ba'ath party. See BASSIOUNI, IRAQ POST-CONFLICT JUSTICE: A PROPOSED
COMPREHENSIVE PLAN, supra note 55. An anecdotal account of the fate of this comprehen-
sive plan is provided by George Packer, who recalls that during his meeting in Baghdad with
Iraqi-American lawyer and member of the Future of Iraq Project's Working Group on Tran-
sitional Justice, Sermid al-Sarraf, al-Sarraf "was carrying a copy of its 250-page report, try-
ing to interest occupation officials. No one seemed to have seen it." PACKER, supra note 11,
at 125. al-Sarraf had summarized the initial 700-page report of the Working Group, which
was publicly released on May 15, 2003. al-Sarraf previously served as IHRLIs Chief of Party
in Iraq and oversaw IHRLI's "Raising the Bar" Project," a broad-based legal-education re-
form project that completed its work in 2004.
67 See generally LARRY DIAMOND, SQUANDERED VICTORY: THE AMERICAN OCCUPATION
AND THE BUNGLED EFFORT TO BRING DEMOCRACY TO IRAQ 55 (2005) (stating that Bremer
welcomed the United Nations' presence in Iraq "as long as [the United Nations] supported
what the CPA was doing"); Eric Stover et al., Bremer's "Gordian Knot": Transitional Jus-
tice and the US Occupation of Iraq, 27 HuM. RTS. Q. 830, 839 (2005).
68 While the death penalty is an extraordinarily controversial topic and both authors of this
article are personally opposed to its imposition, the punishment has long been an accepted
facet of the Iraqi criminal justice system. As an international issue, the trend has been to-
wards abolition of the death penalty in law and in practice. See Amnesty Int'l, Abolitionist
and Retentionist Countries, http://web.amnesty.org/pages/deathpenalty-countries-eng (last
visited May 4, 2007). However, the vast majority of Iraqis favored, and continues to favor,
imposition of the death penalty for Hussein and other senior Ba'athists. At the time of draft-
ing the IST Statute, the Iraqis themselves had vehemently insisted on the death penalty. See
Michael P. Scharf, Background: Introduction, in SADDAM ON TRIAL: UNDERSTANDING AND
DEBATING THE IRAQI HIGH TRIBUNAL 3, 6-7 (Michael P. Scharf & Gregory S. McNeil eds.,
2006). As Tom Parker has also pointed out, "[o]ne can also make an argument that the inclu-
sion of the death penalty is fully consistent with Iraqi criminal justice practice and that it is a
regional norm. All Iraq's neighbors, with the relatively recent exception of Turkey, retain the
death penalty." Parker, supra note 63, at 908. Further complicating the issue is the question
of Iraqi sovereignty. Christopher Greenwood argues that "[i]t is paradoxical that some of
those who have been loudest in calling for the early return of sovereignty to the people of
Iraq are unwilling to see this element of sovereignty returned at all." Christopher Green-
wood, Trying Saddam, GUARDIAN, Dec. 17, 2003, at 21.
69 Diamond, supra note 67, at 46, 57-59.
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Iraq, and several U.N. staffers; and the widespread distrust of the United
Nations among Iraqis as a result of the devastating effects of U.N.-enforced
sanctions. 70 In light of the foregoing, the public position of the Bush ad-
ministration favoring the establishment of an Iraqi tribunal bolstered by
international support was the only option that had any prospect of being
realized. The Bush administration's view was also in harmony with the
preferences of the IGC,7' which would have the responsibility of drafting
the statute in close consultation with CPA advisors and subject to the final
approval of the CPA.72
The IST Statute was drafted by the IGC and the CPA between Sep-
tember and December 2003. 73 The IGC approved a decree on December 9,
2003, establishing the IST, and on the same day, the CPA issued CPA Order
No. 48, which contained the IST Statute. 74 On December 10th, CPA Admin-
istrator Paul Bremer signed the order and it was published in the CPA's
Official Gazette, making the IST an official institution.75 Article 48 of the
TAL subsequently confirmed the IST Statute.76 The statute granted the IST
jurisdiction over all Iraqi citizens for genocide, crimes against humanity,
70 Parker, supra note 63, at 900 ("[A]fter more than a decade of punitive sanctions and
widespread rumors of venal corruption in the Oil for Food Program, the Iraqis did not regard
the United Nations as an honest broker.").
71 See id. at901.
72 See Ash U. Bali, Justice Under Occupation: Rule of Law and the Ethics of Nation-
Building in Iraq, 30 YALE J. INT'L L. 431, 457 (2005).
73 See CPA Order No. 48, supra note 6, § 1(1). The drafting of the IST Statute was led by
IGC member Judge Dara Nur al-Din and Salem Chalabi, acting General Counsel to the IGC
and member of the Future of Iraq Project's Working Group on Transitional Justice. In Sep-
tember of 2003, Chalabi's uncle, Ahmed Chalabi, a member of the IGC who was then serv-
ing as the rotating President of the IGC, requested that Salem Chalabi prepare a draft statute
for the Iraqi tribunal that would undertake prosecutions of Hussein and other high-level
Ba'athists. The draft prepared by Chalabi was largely based on a model statute prepared by
one of the authors of this article, M. Cherif Bassiouni, in March of 2003 as part of the efforts
of the Future of Iraq Project. This model statute was intended to serve as guidance in the
event that the United Nations Security Council authorized the establishment of an interna-
tional tribunal to prosecute the crimes of the Ba'athist regime. By attempting to employ this
model statute, Chalabi ignored the fact that the proposed tribunal was national in character
and would require a statutory basis that differed in substantial ways from the model statute.
Among the major infirmities of the statute was the fact that the draft was modeled on an
adversary-accusatorial model, while the Iraqi legal system is inquisitorial. See infra Part
[II.F.5. In response to these shortcomings, a meeting to review the draft IST Statute was
organized by the International Institute of Higher Studies in Criminal Sciences, Siracusa,
Italy. The meeting, which was to be held from December 7-12, 2003, was cancelled at the
behest of the CPA, which then directed that the statute be promulgated on December 10th.
74 CPA Order No. 48, supra note 6.
75 For a discussion of the CPA's authority to establish the IST, see infra Part H.B.
76 LAW OF ADMINISTRATION FOR THE STATE OF IRAQ FOR THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD art. 48
(Iraq), available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/governmentfTAL.html.
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war crimes, and other crimes specified under Iraqi law.77 The IST Statute
also established that this jurisdiction had extra-territorial application for
crimes covered by the statue committed in Iran and Kuwait. 78
The IST was originally administered by Salem Chalabi, 9 who was
appointed to the post by the IGC on May 8, 2004; Chalabi was tasked with
setting up the organization and structure of the IST and selecting and vetting
sitting judges, investigative judges and prosecutors. 80 The appointment of
Chalabi and his association with the controversial profile of his uncle, Ah-
med Chalabi, a member of the IGC and later a cabinet member who was
closely identified with the DOD and neo-conservative elements in the Bush
administration, had an adverse effect on the perception of the IST in Iraqi
and Arab public opinion. As a result, the IST began to be seen by many
Iraqis and other Arabs as an illegitimate process tailored by the Americans
to seek revenge upon Ba'athists and bolster support for the war effort fol-
lowing the unsuccessful search for weapons of mass destruction.
The CPA was also intimately involved in supporting the early ef-
forts of the IST. The Crimes against Humanity Investigations Unit (CAHIU)
was established within the OHRTJ by the CPA to provide investigative and
operational assistance and support to the IST, in an effort to overcome the
lack of institutional or professional capacity to deal with an investigation of
this scope.81 In January 2004, the State Department's Ambassador-at-Large
for War Crimes Issues, Pierre-Richard Prosper, led a team of legal advisors
on an assessment mission to Baghdad that resulted in more organized and
direct U.S. involvement in supporting the IST. Bremer subsequently
pledged that the United States would provide the nascent institution with
seventy-five million dollars.83 The DOJ dispatched a team of prosecutors
and investigators to Iraq in March 2004 to assist in the gathering of evi-
dence to be used in prosecutions, to help organize the IST's efforts, and to
77 Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal arts. 10-14.
78 Id.
79 Chalabi had previously served on the Future of Iraq Project's Working Group on Tran-
sitional Justice and provided the draft of the IST statute. See supra note 73.
80 Michael Rubin, Salem Chalabi: Judging Saddam, 11 MIDDLE E.Q. 325 (2004), avail-
able at http://www.meforum.org/article/664.
81 Parker, supra note 63, at 903. Parker, who was the head of the CAHIU, recounts that his
unit discussed investigative strategy with the IGC members and IST staff and recommended
that investigations be limited to a short list of twenty to twenty-five high profile perpetrators.
He also notes that the CAH1U recommended that investigations and prosecutions for initial
cases should "broadly involve incidents that reflect the temporal and geographical spread of
the regime's crimes . I... Id.
82 See Stover et al., supra note 67, at 841.
83 L. Paul Bremer, Adm'r, Coalition Provisional Auth., Turning the Page (Apr. 23, 2004),
available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/transcripts/20040423-pageturn.html.
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provide training to the IST's judges and prosecutors. 84 These advisors be-
came part of the Regime Crimes Liaison Office (RCLO), which was estab-
lished in May 2004 and evolved out of the CAHrU.85
While these U.S. prosecutors and investigators had significant ex-
perience with complex investigations and prosecutions, as representatives of
domestic prosecutorial and law enforcement agencies they had limited ex-
perience with international criminal law and little knowledge of local fac-
tors or of the Iraqi judicial system and its legal culture. The very visible and
direct role assumed by U.S. advisors at this juncture furthered the percep-
tion that the occupation authorities largely orchestrated the investigatory
process. The prominent role of the RCLO and the lack of appreciation or
understanding of Iraqi legal procedures were on display during the dis-
jointed "arraignment" of Hussein and eleven of his co-defendants on July 1,
2004.86 The arraignment, which took place at Camp Victory under intense
U.S. security, lacked legal clarity and had the air of an ad hoc procedure.
Arraignments do not exist under the Iraqi legal system; the proceedings
were carried out in the fashion of a court hearing held in the United States,
with the reading of an indictment and a query to the defendant as to his plea
of guilty or not guilty. While the investigative judge handled the proceed-
ings with poise and dignity, the lack of legal clarity and the unfamiliarity
with this type of proceeding undermined its credibility. The fact that the
proceedings were held under the jurisdiction of the Central Criminal Court
of Iraq and applied the Iraqi Criminal Procedure Law further exemplified
the ad hoc nature of the proceedings.87
In August of 2004 Zuhair Maliki, an investigative judge from the
Central Criminal Court of Iraq, indicted Salem Chalabi and his uncle, Ah-
med Chalabi, and forced Salem Chalabi to resign his post as administrator
of the IST and flee to London. Chalabi's absence prompted the RCLO to
assume an even greater role in determining prosecutorial strategy, training
judges and prosecutors, providing resources and personnel for conducting
investigations, gathering evidence, and establishing the IST's infrastruc-
ture.88 In this context, even necessary assistance and support contributed to
84 Neil A. Lewis & David Johnston, U.S. Team Is Sent to Develop Case in Hussein Trial,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2004, at Al.
85 See Parker, supra note 63, at 903; Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Attorney Gen-
eral Gonzales Travels to Baghdad to Visit DOJ Personnel, Military Troops, and Iraqi Offi-
cials (July 3, 2005), available at http:lwww.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2005/July/05-ag.360.htm
(noting that the RCLO is an independent office of the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad and was
established in May of 2004 as the lead U.S. government agency for support of the IST).
86 For a description of the proceedings, see Bums, supra note 1.
87 Stover et al., supra note 67, at 842 (arguing that the proceedings were carried out in this
fashion as a result of the fact that the IST's rules and procedures had not yet been finalized).
88 See Rajiv Chandrasekaran & Carol D. Leonnig, Chalabi Back in Iraq, Aide Says: For-
mer U.S. Client Charged with Counterfeiting Currency, WASH. POST, Aug. 12, 2004, at A19;
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wariness regarding the role of the occupation authorities in the functioning
and administration of the IST.
Various intensive training programs were held for officials involved
in establishing the IST and the judges and prosecutors of the IST. The
United States Institute of Peace and the Institute for International Criminal
Investigation hosted the first such training program at the request of the
RCLO in March of 2004 in Amsterdam. 89 In October of 2004, the RCLO
held a weeklong training program in London for a large number of the IST's
judges and prosecutors. 90 In February of 2005, an extensive technical train-
ing seminar for the entire team of IST judges, investigative judges and
prosecutors took place with the support of the RCLO at the International
Institute for Higher Studies in Criminal Sciences (ISISC) in Siracusa, It-
aly.91
As the IST judges and prosecutors gained experience, confidence
and familiarity with the substantive and procedural framework governing
the IST, they gradually took more ownership of the process. However, the
initial perceptions of the maximal role of the occupying powers and the
Jim Krane, Politics Afoot in a Bid to Rush Saddam Trial, Ousted Tribunal Director Says,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 24, 2004; Jackie Spinner, Premier Warns Gunmen in Naaf; Arrest
Warrants Issued for Chalabi, Nephew, WASH. POST, Aug. 9, 2004, at Al. The charges
against Ahmed Chalabi were publicly dropped due to a lack of evidence in September of
2004, and the charges against Salem Chalabi were dropped for lack of evidence in December
of 2004. Salem Chalabi did not reassume his position on the IST or participate in the prose-
cutions later conducted by the IHCC. Iraqi Judge Drops Chalabi Charges, BBC NEWS, Sept.
28, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middleeast/3698444.stm.
89 See U.S. INST. OF PEACE, BUILDING THE IRAQI SPECIAL TRIBUNAL: LESSONS FROM
EXPERIENCES IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 2 (2004). The training program was held
for Iraqis involved in the establishment of the IST and focused on legal and technical issues
in connection with the implementation of the IST Statute.
90 See Stover et al., supra note 67, at 843. The trainers for the program included Michael
Scharf, who served in various capacities in the Office of the Legal Adviser, U.S. Department
of State; Geoffrey Robertson, Judge of the Special Court for Sierra Leone; Christopher
Greenwood, professor at the London School of Economics; Joanna Korner, former senior
prosecutor at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia; and Michael
Newton, the former Senior Advisor to the Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues, U.S.
Department of State.
91 One of the authors of this article, M. Cherif Bassiouni, is the President of ISISC and
helped coordinate the training seminar. Prior to the training seminar, Bassiouni published a
book in Arabic that detailed many of the deficiencies of the IST Statute. See M. CHERIF
BASSIOUNI, AL-MAHKAMA AL-JINA'IYA AL-'IRAQIYA AL-MUKHTASSA BIL-JARA'IM DED AL-
INSANIYA (THE IRAQI SPECIAL CRIMINAL COURT FOR CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY) (2004).
The book was distributed to the Iraqi participants in the training seminar and was the focus of
extensive discussions on various ways in which the IST Statute could be amended to further
buttress the legitimacy of the tribunal. The amendments of the IST Statute by the IHCC
Statute fell far short of the legislative prescriptions that were discussed in detail during the
training seminar. See infra Parts IH.C-F.
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flaws of the IST Statute helped to undermine the credibility and legitimacy
of the tribunal.
B. Legitimacy of the Iraqi Special Tribunal's Establishment
The need for a post-conflict judicial process to deal with the crimes
and atrocities of the Ba'athist regime was clear prior to the fall of the re-
gime, 92 and the prosecution of key Ba'athist leaders continues to be a neces-
sary endeavor on the path to establishing the rule of law in Iraq. The argu-
ment for establishing a domestic tribunal to undertake this task is well-
grounded in international law: Article 17 of the International Criminal Court
Statute recognizes the complementarity between national and international
legal systems, giving priority to the national criminal jurisdictions of states
parties that are willing and able to undertake prosecutions. 93 Several practi-
cal considerations also militated in favor of a domestic tribunal: Iraqi soci-
ety and the legal system would benefit from the institutional capacity build-
ing that would inevitably result from the establishment of a domestic tribu-
nal and the holding of trials in Iraq would increase the potential for effective
community outreach programs. Additionally, the experiences of the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) suggested that a domestic tri-
bunal would avoid the exorbitant costs and extreme delays plaguing ad hoc
international tribunals.94
92 See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
93 See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 17, opened for signature July
17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICC Statute], available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/library/about/officialjournal/RomeStatute_120704-EN.pdf. In the event that a state
party is "unable" or "unwilling" to prosecute, the International Criminal Court may assert
jurisdiction. See also THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed. 1998). For a legislative history of the ICC,
see M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT 123-91 (2005) [hereinafter BASSIOUNI, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE ICC]. For a
discussion of the concept of complementarity, see John T. Holmes, The Principle of Com-
plementarity, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE,
ISSUES, NEGOTIATIONS, RESULTS 41-78 (Roy S. Lee ed., 1999); M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI,
INTRODUCTION To INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 15-18 (2003) [hereinafter BASSIOUNI,
INTRODUCTION To ICL].
94 For example, the budgets for ICTY and the ICTR in 2004-2005 alone were $298.23
million and $235.32 million respectively. Press Release, U.N. General Assembly, General
Assembly Adopts $3.16 Billion 2004-2005 Budget as It Concludes Main Part of Fifty-
Eighth Session, U.N. Doc. GA/10225 (Dec. 23, 2003), available at
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2003/galO225.doc.htrL Cumulatively ICTY and ICTR
have cost over $1 billion. See id. Both ICTY and ICTR have been criticized for their exorbi-
tant costs and the slow pace of the trials. See, e.g., INT'L CRISIS GROUP, INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL JUSTICE FOR RWANDA: JUSTICE DELAYED (2001), available at
http://www.icg.org/home/index.cfm?id=1649&I=1.
2006-2007]
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
However, the establishment of the IST in the context of post-war
Iraq under the authority of an occupying power involved serious complica-
tions. Numerous observers and scholars have questioned the overall scope
of the CPA's authority as an occupying power 95 and the legitimacy of the
IST's establishment by such an occupying power. 96 The order of an occupy-
ing power provided the IST's legislative basis; no norm or precedent exists
in international law that would validate the establishment of an exceptional
national criminal tribunal by an occupying power. This point raises the
question as to whether an occupying power has the legal authority to create
such a tribunal.
As a threshold issue, it should be noted that the United States did
not have subject matter jurisdiction to prosecute Hussein following his cap-
ture by U.S. forces on December 13, 2003. Following his designation as a
prisoner of war 97 under the Third Geneva Convention,98 the United States
could not have prosecuted Hussein under U.S. domestic law or international
law for pre-capture violations of either body of law except by asserting uni-
versal jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes.
Under the Genocide Convention Implementation Act of 1987, 99 prosecu-
tions for genocide are limited to genocidal acts committed by a U.S. na-
tional or acts committed in the United States. No federal statute covers
crimes against humanity committed overseas by non-U.S. nationals and
there is no other basis for prosecuting such acts in the United States.' 0 Fi-
95 See e.g., Bassiouni, Post-Conflict Justice in Iraq, supra note 8, at 358-66; Roberts,
supra note 14, at 604-18; Roberts, supra note 35; Fox, supra note 12; David J. Scheffer,
Beyond Occupation Law, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 842 (2003); Bali, supra note 72; Conor
McCarthy, The Paradox of the International Law of Military Occupation: Sovereignty and
the Reformation ofIraq, 10 J. CoNFLICT & SEcuRrrY L. 43 (2005). But see Brett H. McGurk,
Revisiting the Law of Nation-Building: Iraq in Transition, 45 VA. J. INT'L L. 451 (2005).
96 See e.g., Bali, supra note 72; Danillo Zolo, The Iraq Special Tribunal: Back to the Nur-
emberg Paradigm?, 2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 313, 315-16 (2004); Farhad Malekian, Emasculat-
ing the Philosophy of International Criminal Justice, 38 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 673, 720 (2005);
Ruti Teitel, The Law and Politics of Contemporary Transitional Justice, 38 CORNELL INT'L
L. J. 837, 843-44 (2005); But see Michael A. Newton, The Iraqi Special Tribunal: A Human
Rights Perspective, 38 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 863 (2005).
97 See Douglas Jehl, Hussein Given P.O.W. Status; Access Sought, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10,
2004, at Al.
98 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva III]. Under article 4 of Geneva In, Hus-
sein was determined to be a member of the armed forces because of his formal position as
the leader of the Iraqi military. See id. art. 4.
99 Genocide Convention Implementation Act of 1987, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1091-93 (2000).
1oo See JENNIFER K. ELsEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., OPTIONS FOR TRYING SADDAM HussEIN
FOR INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 6 (2004).
101 Although torture, which is a crime against humanity, committed by non-U.S. nationals
may be prosecuted in U.S. federal courts, such prosecutions are dependent upon the presence
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nally, the War Crimes Act of 1996102 extends jurisdiction only to war
crimes committed by or against U.S. nationals. 0 3 Hence, prosecution under
Geneva 11tl 4 for grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions 05 or prosecu-
tions for genocide or crimes against humanity would have required an asser-
tion of universal jurisdiction, a practice that has not yet been embraced by
U.S. courts.
In light of these jurisdictional limitations, the legitimacy of the es-
tablishment of the IST is solely dependent on the authority of the United
States as an occupying power. The United States is bound by the Fourth
Geneva Convention of 1949'06 and the Hague Regulations of 1907,107 as
well as subsequent developments of customary international law. 0 8 Accord-
ing to these sources of applicable law, the United States is an occupying
power, and it cannot, inter alia, do the following: (a) change the functioning
of the administration of the occupied territory;1°9 (b) change the existing
legal system;"10 (c) alter the status of public officials and judges;"' (d)
change the penal legislation;" 2 (e) issue new penal provisions;" 3 (f) intern
of the alleged offender in the United States. See Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal
Years 1994 and 1995 § 506(b)(2), 18 U.S.C. § 2340(A)(b)(2) (2006).
102 War Crimes Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2006).
103 See ELSEA, supra note 100, at 6.
104 Geneva III, supra note 98, art. 129.
105 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Ge-
neva I]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick, and
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S.
85 [hereinafter Geneva II]; Geneva III, supra note 98; Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S.
287 [hereinafter Geneva IV].
106 The Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War applies to
the civilian population and the administration of occupied territories. Geneva IV, supra note
105.
107 Hague Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its An-
nex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat.
2295, 1 Bevans 631 [hereinafter Hague IV].
108 For the proposition that the United States is bound by customary international law, see
JORDAN J. PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW As LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (2nd ed. 2003). For a
challenge to this position, see Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary Interna-
tional Law As Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modem Position, 110 HARv. L. REV.
815 (1997).
109 See Hague IV, supra note 107, arts. 43, 48; Geneva IV, supra note 105, arts. 51, 54, 64.
"o See Hague IV, supra note 107, art. 43.
111 Geneva IV, supra note 105, art. 54.
112 id. art. 64.
13 id.
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civilian populations other than on the basis of POW; 114 (g) change the tribu-
nals of the occupied territory;11 5 (h) prosecute inhabitants for acts commit-
ted before the occupation; 1 6 or (i) enter into agreements with the governing
authority of the occupied territory or make agreements on behalf of the oc-
cupied territory that "shall adversely affect the situation of the protected
persons, as defined by the present Convention, nor restrict the rights which




An exception to the above restrictions is that the penal laws of the
occupied territory may be repealed or suspended by the occupying power in
cases where they constitute a threat to its security or an obstacle to the ap-
plication of the Geneva Conventions," 8 or if the laws introduced by the
occupying power are more favorable measures to the civilian population.
Protocol I, Article 4119 confirms the above limitations on the occupying
power. Although the United States has not ratified Protocol I, it is deemed
to be part of customary international law.1
20
In light of the foregoing, it is reasonably clear that certain aspects of
the IST's establishment ran afoul of the laws governing the scope of an oc-
cupying power's authority. This is not to state that all aspects of the IST
Statute were necessarily illegitimate. The procedures and guarantees of the
rights of the defense in the IST Statute are arguably more favorable than
existing Iraqi laws on criminal procedure under the Iraqi Criminal Proce-
dure Law, 121 and are therefore in conformity with international humanitarian
law. However, these reforms cannot overcome the incongruities arising out
of the co-mingling of procedural aspects of the adversary/accusatorial
model of criminal procedure with those of the inquisitorial model that nega-
tively impacted the fundamental fairness of the IHCC's proceedings; fur-
thermore, the limitation of these reforms to a specialized forum highlights
114 Id. arts. 79-135.
115 id. art. 64.
116d. ar 70.
117 Id. art. 7.
118 Id. art. 64.
119 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflict, June 8, 1977, art. 4, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3.
120 See PAUST, supra note 108.
121 Qanun Usul al-Muhakamat al-Jaza'iya [Iraqi Criminal Procedure Law], No. 23, 1971.
For international human rights law standards, see M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, THE PROTECTION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE: A COMPENDIUM OF UNITED
NATIONS NORMS AND STANDARDS (1994); CHRISTOPHER GANE & MARK MACKAREL, HUMAN
RIGHTS AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE: INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS (1997); ANNE
F. BAYEFSKY, THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY SYSTEM: UNIVERSALITY AT THE CROSSROADS
(2001).
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the "exceptional" nature of the IST.12 2 As such, it is clear that the establish-
ment of the IST contradicted the strict limitations imposed by the Geneva
Conventions.
Various arguments can be posited to justify the establishment of the
IST; however, even the strongest of these arguments cannot overcome the
transformative aspects of this facet of the CPA's work and the negative per-
ception created by the establishment of the IST during the early stages of an
occupation. First among these arguments is that the IGC was substantially
representative of the major political movements in Iraq. As Haider Ala
Hammoudi has argued, the major figures on the IGC are leaders of their
ethnic and religious communities and have dominated the electoral politics
of Iraq. 123 However, in spite of the representative nature of the IGC, Ham-
moudi points out that the authority to legally issue orders resided solely
with the CPA. 124 This disparity in formal authority cannot be overlooked in
determining the validity of actions undertaken during the CPA's exis-
tence. 125 A correlative argument has focused on the extent of Iraqi participa-
tion in the drafting of the IST Statute. 126 However, the very fact that the
122 See infra Parts m.F.5-6; see also Bassiouni, Post-Conflict Justice in Iraq, supra note 8,
at 363-66.
123 Haider Ala Hamoudi, Money Laundering Amidst Mortars: Legislative Process and
State Authority in Post-Invasion Iraq, 16 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 523, 529
(2007). Hammoudi writes:
Among the Governing Council Members were Jalal Talabani and Mas'ud
Barazani, the leaders of the two dominant Kurdish political parties in Iraq, whose
alliance won fifty-three of 275 seats in the last Iraqi election; Abdul Aziz al Hakim
and Ibrahim al-Ja'fari, the two most prominent leaders of the United Iraqi Alli-
ance,,the dominant Shi'i organization, which won 128 seats in the last election;
Ayad Allawi, the former Prime Minister, and Adnan Pachachi, whose secular, na-
tionalist, and nonsectarian alliance won twenty-five seats in the last election; and
the Sunni Arab leader Mohsen Abdul Hameed, former head of the Iraqi Islamic
Party, whose party was a central part of the Sunni alliance that won forty-four seats
in the last election.
Id. Hammoudi worked in Iraq for two years as a staff member on IHRLI's rule of law pro-
ject.
124 Id.
125 In attempting to understand the exact legal position of the IGC, it is instructive to ana-
lyze the language used by the United Nations Security Council following the IGC's creation.
Security Council Resolution 1500 welcomed "the establishment of the broadly representative
Governing Council of Iraq," but considered its creation only "a step towards the formation
by the people of Iraq of an internationally recognized, representative government that will
exercise the sovereignty of Iraq." S.C. Res. 1500, supra note 29, 1 1. Implicit in this lan-
guage is a recognition that the IGC cannot exercise sovereignty over Iraq.
126 Michael P. Scharf and Ahran Kang have cited the inclusion of the crime of aggression
as an instance where Iraqi preferences overcame U.S. objections and have used this episode
to highlight the extensive role of Iraqis in creating the IST Statute. See Michael P. Scharf &
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Iraqis who participated in the drafting process were dependent on the CPA's
acceptance of their positions with respect to the contents of the IST Statute
further highlights their actual reliance on the legal authority vested in the
CPA.
The IHCC offered a similar, yet belated argument in defense of the
legitimacy of the IST's establishment as part of the al-Dujail Trial Opin-
ion. 127 Relying on Security Council Resolution 1511,128 the IHCC implied
that the IGC was vested with the sovereign authority to enact such a stat-
ute. 129 This argument is fundamentally flawed in two key respects. First, this
argument ignores the very description of the IGC by the Security Council
Resolution that it quotes, namely, that the IGC "embodies the sovereignty of
Iraq during the transitional period .... ,,130 This description falls far short of
recognizing the sovereign authority of the IGC. Second, as previously dis-
cussed, the IGC did not exercise sovereign authority, as the CPA was the
only body vested with the authority to issue legal orders.' 3 ' Taken together,
these two points clearly establish that the IGC was not a sovereign national
authority as implied by the al-Dujail Trial Opinion.
It could also be argued that the TAL, which served as an interim
constitution, subsequently ratified the IST Statute and that the TAL is im-
plicitly recognized in Security Council Resolution 151 1.132 However, the
fundamental issue as to whether the IST was established by the CPA and the
IGC during a period of occupation remains. Furthermore, ratification in the
TAL did not fully remedy the issue of legitimacy because the TAL largely
grew out of the efforts of the IGC, an unelected body, in consultation with
the CPA.
Ahran Kang, Errors and Missteps: Key Lessons the Iraqi Special Tribunal Can Learn from
the ICTY, ICTR, and SCSL, 38 CORNELL INT'L. L.J. 911, 912 (2005). Michael Newton has
described the drafting process as "an extensive and genuine partnership that entailed months
of debate, drafting, and consideration of expert advice solicited from the Coalition Provi-
sional Authority." Newton, supra note 96, at 864.
127 See al-Mahkama al-Jina'iya al-'Iraqiya al-'Uliya [The Iraqi High Criminal Court], al-
Dujail Trial Opinion (Part One), available at http://www.iraq-iht.org/ar/doc/finalcour.pdf,
translated in Grotian Moment: The Saddam Hussein Trial Blog, English Translation of Du-
jail Judgment Part 1 (Dec. 2006), at 30, [hereinafter al-Dujail Trial Opinion Part 1], available
at http://www.law.case.edu/saddamtrial/documents/dujail-opinion-ptl.pdf.
128 See S.C. Res. 1511, supra note 30.
129 See al-Dujail Trial Opinion Part 1, supra note 127, at 30.
130 See S.C. Res. 1511, supra note 30.
131 See CPA Reg. No. 1, supra note 20, § 1.
132 See S.C. Res. 1511, supra note 30. The al-Dujail Trial Opinion positively notes the
inclusion of the IST in the TAL but fails to offer any further argument to support the proposi-
tion that this inclusion affected the legal status of the IST. See al-Dujail Trial Opinion Part 1,
supra note 127, at 30.
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Other arguments with respect to the CPA's mandate could con-
ceivably rely on the breadth of the Security Council Resolutions recogniz-
ing the status of the United States and the United Kingdom as temporary
occupying powers under international law. 133 However, although certain
language in these resolutions appears to contradict the provisions of the
Fourth Geneva Convention and Hague Regulation IV respecting the obliga-
tions of an occupying power,' 34 these obligations cannot be amended
through Security Council Resolutions, and the existence of imprecise lan-
guage cannot justify any interpretation that is inconsistent with both con-
ventional and customary international humanitarian law. 135
Lastly, it has been argued that the establishment of the IST was
within the scope of the CPA's authority as an occupying power as defined
by its treaty obligations under the Fourth Geneva Convention. 136 However,
the CPA did not fundamentally need to transform Iraq's legal and judicial
institutions to ensure that it was able to fulfill its obligations as an occupy-
ing power. Similarly, it cannot be argued that respecting existing Iraqi legal
and judicial institutions would have interfered with the CPA's ability "to
maintain the orderly government of the territory, and to ensure the security
of the Occupying Power, of the members and property of the occupying
forces or administration, and likewise of the establishments and lines of
communication used by them."' 137 The CPA's establishment of the IST did
not implicate any of the legitimate exceptions outlined by the Fourth Ge-
neva Convention, as it was not an absolute necessity within the context of
the CPA's role as an occupying power.
133 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1483, supra note 18; S.C. Res. 1511, supra note 30.
134 Adam Roberts notes this disjunction and states that "the purposes of the occupation as
outlined in Resolution 1483 went beyond the confines of the Hague Regulations and the
Fourth Geneva Convention. Yet the resolution did not explain the relation between the trans-
formative purposes of this occupation and the more conservative purposes of the existing
body of law on occupations." Roberts, supra note 14, at 613.
135 Beyond the necessary legal arguments regarding the inability of the United Nations
Security Council to displace conventional and customary international humanitarian law,
Conor McCarthy has chosen to analyze the often contradictory impulses of the relevant Se-
curity Council Resolutions by reference to the historical record surrounding the adoption of
these resolutions. McCarthy rejects the argument that these resolutions provide supervening
authority to the occupying power, relying on the views expressed by members of the United
Nations Security Council with respect to the scope of the relevant resolutions and the reports
of the Secretary General and the United Nations/World Bank Joint Iraq Needs Assessment
made pursuant to Security Resolution 1483. See McCarthy, supra note 95, at 66-70.
136 Newton has argued that Articles 47 and 64 of the Fourth Geneva Convention make clear
that an occupying power may, in its efforts to fulfill its positive obligations, enact "sweeping
changes to the domestic legal and governmental structures." Newton, supra note 96, at 874-
75.
137 Geneva IV, supra note 105, art. 64.
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In retrospectively assessing the IST's establishment, it now seems
clear that such momentous decisions dealing with the country's domestic
legal structures and institutions would have been more properly grounded in
the deliberations of a truly representative government. Even if one were to
accept the novel legal arguments made in support of the IST's establish-
ment, it is equally clear that the choice to undertake this venture during a
foreign occupation was a miscalculation that inevitably undercut support for
the IST and bolstered the perception that it was beholden to the United
States. The IGC and the CPA could have limited their role to undertaking
preparatory work to provide the future parliamentary government with suit-
able and well-crafted options for addressing post-conflict justice issues.
Instead, by overreaching and foreclosing future decisions with respect to
these essential issues, the IGC and the CPA exposed the IST to serious
questions regarding its legitimacy and hampered its ability to operate as an
effective institution.
III. THE IRAQI HIGH CRIMINAL COURT STATUTE
A. The Adoption of the Iraqi High Criminal Court Statute
Many of the Iraqis involved with the establishment of the IST were
aware of the flaws of the tribunal's statutory framework at an early stage.'
38
One of the authors of this article raised many of these flaws during exten-
sive discussions with the judges, investigating judges and prosecutors of the
IST, and members of the RCLO during a technical training seminar con-
ducted in Siracusa, Italy. 139 Perhaps most disappointing is the fact that many
of the questions surrounding the legitimacy of the IST's establishment and
the legal shortcomings of the IST Statute could largely have been remedied
if the TNA had revisited the issue in a procedurally sound and thoughtful
manner, abrogated the IST Statute, and promulgated an amended law con-
sistent with the precepts of the Iraqi legal system. 4° This effort would also
have benefited from the issuance by the TNA of an explanatory memoran-
dum (mudhakkira tafsiriya), as is customary in the legislative processes of
138 See supra note 91. See also, M. Cherif Bassiouni, Hawla Qanun Insha'a al-Mahkama
al-Jina'iya al-'Iraqiya al-Mukhtassa bi Jara'im al-Nizam al-'Iraqi al-Sabiq, AL-SIYASSA AL-
DAWLIYA (July 2004), available at http://www.siyassa.org.eg/asiyassa/Ahram/
2004/7/l/Stud l.htm (urging that the law establishing the IST be revisited and debated by a
truly representative government that could promulgate a statute that addresses those issues
that undermine the legitimacy and credibility of the IST, such as the manner in which the law
was passed and the form and procedures of the IST).
139 See supra note 91.
140 See Bassiouni, Post-Conflict Justice in Iraq, supra note 8, at 360-61 (describing how an
amended statute should have been promulgated).
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most Arab states.' 41 In this instance, an explanatory memorandum would
have allowed the TNA to thoroughly describe the contents and context of
the law, reflect upon its legislative intent, and provide guidance to the
judges of the IHCC and the parties before the court. Such an explanatory
memorandum could have also addressed the legacy of the IST Statute by
making explicit that the transfer of sovereignty and the election of a legiti-
mate national legislative authority necessitated the establishment of a more
appropriate statutory basis upon which to operate. 142 Instead, the successor
statute 43 did not address many of the major flaws of the IST Statute, did not
include an explanatory memorandum, and was promulgated in a manner
inconsistent with the procedural requirements of Iraqi law.
Following the elections of January 30, 2005,'" which produced
a popularly elected TNA that clearly enjoyed greater legitimacy than
the appointed HG, the TNA was vested with the necessary lawmaking
authority and credibility to promulgate a successor statute.1 45 Al-
though the TNA was transitional in nature, the wide mandate it en-
joyed as a popularly elected body was exemplified by the fact that it
was entrusted with the task of drafting a permanent constitution.146
141 In addition to describing the contents of the law and providing a clear record of legisla-
tive intent, such an explanatory memorandum would have provided guidance to judges,
defendants and defense counsel and would also have helped to ensure uniformity in the ap-
plication of the IHCC Statute.
142 See infra Part III.A.
143 See Statute of the Iraqi High Criminal Court.
144 Due to the poor security situation in Iraq, international election monitors were forced to
monitor the elections from Amman, Jordan. The International Mission for Iraqi Elections
(IMIE) was formed with the support of the United Nations and the Independent Electoral
Commission of Iraq and is composed of various independent electoral management bodies.
The IMIE found that the elections generally met recognized standards of election law, plan-
ning and preparations and that voter turnout was approximately 58%. See International Mis-
sion for Iraqi Elections, Final Report: Assessment of the January 30, 2005, Election Process
(Aug. 12, 2005), http://www.imie.ca/repJan30.html.
145 Article 48 of the TAL confirms the IST Statute and thereby continued its legal effect.
The TAL also made clear that the IST Statute "exclusively defines the [IST's] jurisdiction
and procedures, notwithstanding the provisions of [the TAL]." As Christopher Rassi ex-
plains, "the Iraqi Transitional Government has the power to replace the 2003 Statute with a
revised Statute without amending the TAL itself," since the TAL specifically referred "back
to the 2003 Statute itself for exclusive interpretive authority." See Christopher Rassi, Legiti-
macy of the August 11, 2005 Revised Iraqi High Tribunal Statute, Scharf, Saddam at Trial,
101-02. Article 37 of the IST Statute, in combination with Article 32 of the IST Statute,
which endows the executive authority in any future government with the powers conferred
on the Governing Council, grants the Governing Council or the successor government "pow-
ers to establish other rules and procedures in order to implement this [2003] Statute." Id.
146 LAW OF ADMINISTRATION FOR THE STATE OF IRAQ FOR THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD arts.
60-61, available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/government/TAL.html.
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Further, whereas Security Council Resolution 1546 specifically lim-
ited the lG's mandate for governing, the language of that Resolution
clearly implied that once elections were held the TNA could take "ac-
tions affecting Iraq's destiny." 147 As such, it must be considered a legiti-
mate national legislative authority endowed with lawmaking powers.
Two caveats must be noted with respect to the legitimacy of
the TNA. First, the declared boycott of the elections by the majority
of Sunni Arab political leaders, widespread political instability, and
precarious security situation combined to limit the level of Sunni
Arab participation in the elections. 48 While the lack of proportionate
representation of Sunni Arabs was unfortunate, the high level of
overall voter participation and the legal platform provided by Security
Resolution 1546 provided a solid foundation for the legitimacy of the
TNA. Second, it must be noted that the extent of Iraqi sovereignty
was, and continues to be, quite obviously limited by the presence of
over 125,000 members of the multinational forces under separate
command and with wide decision-making latitude.1 49 However, vari-
ous Security Council Resolutions establish the legal authority for the
presence of such troops, and their continued presence is dependent on
the agreement of the Iraqi government. "0
147 See S.C. Res. 1546, supra note 36.
148 See Dexter Filkins, Iraqis Vote Amid Tight Security and Scattered Attacks, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 30, 2005, at Al (noting that in the majority Sunni Arab provinces of Anbar, Nineveh and
Salahuddin voter turnout was extremely low); Lawrence Smallman, AMS Critical of Iraq
Elections, AL-JAZEERA, Jan. 30, 2005, http://english.aljazeera.net/English/archive/
archive?Archiveld=9233.
149 Adam Roberts distinguishes the continued presence of foreign troops from previous
historical examples of foreign forces being based in client states:
Three features of the foreign troop presence in Iraq suggest that it is different from
such cases as that of Hungary in 1956-7. (1) The presence of the multinational
force in Iraq has been specifically approved in UN Security Council resolutions,
including Resolution 1546, which lays down key provisions for the post-
occupation phase. (2) The prime stated purposes of the coalition forces include as-
sisting the process of establishing a constitutional order in the country and assisting
the Iraqi people to exercise their right of self-determination. (3) Not only has the
Interim Government invited the coalition forces to remain, but also the coalition
States have agreed that their forces are there by invitation and would leave if re-
quested to do so.
Roberts, supra note 35, at 43.
150 Id.
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As discussed above, the TNA was tasked with the drafting of a
permanent constitution, 51 which included an article dealing with the IHCC.
Article 134 of the constitution that was approved through the constitutional
referendum held on October 15, 2005 states that, "[tihe Iraqi High Criminal
Court shall continue its duties as an independent judicial body, in examining
the crimes of the defunct dictatorial regime and its symbols. The Council of
Representatives shall have the right to dissolve by law the Iraqi High
Criminal Court after the completion of its work."'152 Including the IHCC in
the constitution is important as a matter of Iraqi law because it establishes
the IHCC as an independent judicial body. '53
However; constitutional reference to the "Iraqi High Criminal
Court" is incongruous, as the successor statute to the IST Statute had not yet
been promulgated. This raises a broader point regarding the manner in
which the IHCC Statute was adopted. The TNA first considered and
adopted the law in August 2005.154 In September of 2005, the TNA adopted
further amendments to the law.155 The law was then presented to the Presi-
dency Council, which reviewed the legislation and ratified Law No. 10 on
October 9, 2005.156 Law No. 10 and the revised Rules of Procedure and
Evidence were then published in the Official Gazette of Iraq (al-Waqai'i al-
'Iraqiya) on October 18, 2005.
The version of the IHCC Statute published in the Official Gazette of
Iraq on October 18th clearly incorporates revisions to the version of Law
No. 10 approved by the TNA and then later adopted by the Presidency
Council on October 9th. Most glaring among the various revisions, which
were not substantive in nature, was the fact that the original Arabic version
of Law No. 10 contained forty-two articles, whereas Law No. 10 as pub-
lished in the Official Gazette contained only forty articles. 157 The revised
legislation was not resubmitted to the TNA for approval, and the process by
which Law No.10 was enacted was clearly in violation of the legislative
151 See LAW OF ADMINISTRATION FOR THE STATE OF IRAQ FOR THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD
arts. 60-61, available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/govemment/TAL.html.
152 DUSTUR JUMHURIATAL-'IRAQ [Constitution] art. 134 (Iraq).
153 See infra Part I1B.
154 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE FORMER IRAQI GOVERNMENT ON TRIAL 3 n.8 (2005),
http://hrw.org/backgrounder/mena/iraq 1005/iraq 1005.pdf.
155 id.
156 The Presidency Council ratified the law in accordance with Article 37 of the TAL. See
LAW OF ADMINISTRATION FOR THE STATE OF IRAQ FOR THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD art. 37,
available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/govemment/TAL.html.
'57 Mohamed 'Abd al-Aziz Gad al-Haq Ibrahim, al-Mahkama al-Jina'iya al-'Iraqiya al-
'Uliya fi Do' al-Damanat al-Muhakamat al-Munasafa, Shabakat al-Ma'lumat al-Qanuniya al-
'Arabiya (2006), available at http://www.eastlaws.com/iglc/research/research-
show.php?id=174.
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procedures established by both the TAL, which continued to govern prior to
the approval of the constitution, and the newly adopted Iraqi constitution.1
58
This haphazard approach to the establishment of the IHCC encapsulates the
sloppiness and inexactitude of this legislative process and betrays a lack of
respect for the procedural formalities that are the basis of the rule of law. 1
59
While the adoption of the IHCC Statute was intended to render
moot any further questions regarding the IHCC's legitimacy, the manner in
which the Statute dealt with the IST Statute raised the question of prior le-
gitimacy anew. Article 37 of the IHCC Statute revokes the IST Statute and
its Rules of Procedure and Evidence and Article 38 states that "[a]ll deci-
sions and Orders on Procedure issued under the Iraqi Special Tribunal Law
No.1 for the year 2003 are correct and conform to the law."' 60 To further
insulate the Court from continued questions regarding its legitimacy, it
would have been prudent to reissue indictments; reappoint judges, investi-
gative judges, prosecutors, and other personnel; and re-examine evidence
based on the IHCC Statute. 161 While this type of de novo approach may
appear unnecessarily formalistic, it would have provided a further legal
buffer against any remaining questions or qualms regarding the IST's le-
gitimacy.
B. The Iraqi High Criminal Court as a Component of the Iraqi Legal
System
As was discussed above, Article 134 of the Iraqi constitution recog-
nizes the IHCC as an independent judicial body within the Iraqi judiciary.162
Accordingly, the IHCC is subject to general constitutional principles appli-
cable to the judiciary and the exercise of judicial power. Article 19 of the
constitution lays out a series of general principles related to the judiciary
and several of these principles are critical to understanding many of the
IHCC's shortcomings within the context of Iraqi law:
First: The judiciary is independent and no power is above the judiciary ex-
cept the law.
Second: There is no crime or punishment except by a stipulation. The pun-
ishment shall only be for an act that the law considers a crime when perpe-
158 Id.
159 The legislative irregularities connected with the adoption of the IHCC Statute were not
addressed by the al-Dujail Trial Opinion. See al-Dujail Trial Opinion Part 1, supra note 127,
at 30-31.
160 See Statute of the Iraqi High Criminal Court arts. 37-38.
161 The al-Dujail Trial Opinion did not offer any serious consideration of the potential
negative effects arising out of Article 38 of the IHCC Statute. See al-Dujail Trial Opinion
Part 1, supra note 127, at 30-31.
162 Id. art. 134.
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trated. A harsher sentence than the applicable sentence at the time of the
offense may not be imposed....
Fourth: The right to a defense shall be sacred and guaranteed in all phases
of investigations and trial....
Tenth: Criminal law does not have a retroactive effect, unless it is to the
benefit of the accused. 1
63
These articles enshrine the independence of the judiciary and the principles
of legality' 64 as guiding constitutional principles.
The constitution also specifically addresses the independence of the
judiciary in those sections defining the characteristics and competencies of
the judicial authorities. 165 Among the articles most relevant to the estab-
lishment of the IHCC are Article 95, which prohibits the establishment of
special or exceptional courts166; Article 96, which mandates that the courts,
their jurisdiction, and the methods of appointing, disciplining and removing
judges and prosecutors are to be established by law' 67; and Article 97 that
bars the removal of judges except in those instances specified by law.' 68
While the constitution establishes the IHCC as an independent judi-
cial body, nowhere does the constitution or the contemplated implementing
legislation governing the establishment and functioning of the court dele-
gate to the IHCC the power to derogate from the general constitutional prin-
ciples governing the judicial authority. The hierarchy of laws compels that
these constitutional principles be given precedence in determining the legal-
ity of various provisions of the IHCC Statute. As will be discussed in
greater detail below, it is clear that aspects of the IHCC Statute violate the
Iraqi constitution.
C. Positive Revisions in the Iraqi High Criminal Court Statute
1. Language
Under CPA Regulation No. 1, CPA Regulations and Orders were to
be promulgated in the relevant languages. 169 Accordingly, CPA Order No.
163 DUSTUR JUMHURIAT AL-'IRAQ [Constitution] art. 19 (Iraq).
164 For a discussion of the principles of legality, see infra notes 244-50 and accompanying
text.
165 DUSTUR JUMHURIAT AL-'IRAQ [Constitution] arts. 87-88 (Iraq).
166 Id. art. 95.
167 Id. art. 96.
168 Id. art. 97.
169 See CPA Reg. No. 1, supra note 20. The CPA issued Regulations and Orders in the
English language first, with Arabic translations issued subsequently. In certain instances the
gap in time between the issuances was significant. In the case of CPA Order No.10 regarding
the Management of Detention and Prison Facilities, the English version was issued on June
5, 2003, and the Arabic version was not issued until October 29, 2003. Coalition Provisional
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48 promulgated the original IST Statute in English and Arabic.170 However,
CPA Regulation No. 1 went on to state that "in the case of divergence, the
English text shall prevail."' 17' This clearly violated Article 7 of the Provi-
sional Iraqi Constitution of 1970, which stipulates that Arabic is the official
language of Iraq, 172 and was inconsistent with Article 34 of the IST Statute,
which designated Arabic as the official language of the Tribunal. 73 Apart
from its legality, this designation also amplified the role of the occupation
authorities and undermined the credibility of the IST as an Iraqi institution.
It also created a situation where Iraqi jurists who were not fluent in English
could not be certain of the exact contents of a statute they were required to
interpret, apply and uphold. Further, the proceedings and judgments took
place entirely in Arabic.
The dissolution of the CPA and the subsequent promulgation of the
IHCC Statute cured this infirmity, as Article 32 of the IHCC Statute desig-
nates Arabic as the official language of the Court.
174
2. Title of the tribunal
The IST's title in the Arabic version of the IST Statute is al-
Mahkama al-Mukhtassa. The appropriate translation of this title would have
been the "Specialized Tribunal" or the "Competent Tribunal." Instead, the
title of the tribunal was translated as the "Special Tribunal," which is more
properly translated into Arabic as al-Mahkama al-Khassa. This incorrect
translation from Arabic into English was compounded by the fact that, as
Authority Regulation No.10, CPA/REG/8 June 2003/10 (June 8, 2003), available at
http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20030605_CPAORD 10_Management-of_Detentio
n-andPrisonFacilities.pdf. For further discussion of this issue, see Amnesty Int'l, Iraq:
Memorandum on Concerns Related to Legislation Introduced by the Coalition Provisional
Authority, Al Index MDE 14/176/2003, Dec. 4, 2003, available at
http://web.amnesty.org/library/pdf/MDE141762003ENGLISH/$File/MDE 1417603.pdf.
170 The Arabic text was quite clearly a poor translation from the original English, indicating
that the IST Statute was originally drafted in English.
171 CPA Reg. No. 1, supra note 20, §3(1).
172 Article 7 also designates Kurdish as an official language along with Arabic in the Kurd-
ish region. AL-DUSTUR AL-MO'AKAT [Provisional Constitution] (1970) (Iraq), available at
http://www.mallat.com/iraq%20const%201970.htm (English translation). The 1990 draft
constitution was never promulgated and is of no legal effect. MASHRO' AL-DUSTUR AL-'IRAQ,
[Draft Iraqi Constitution] (1990) (Iraq), in AL-DASATEER AL-'IRAQYA, available at
http://www.iraqfoundation.orglprojects/constitutionllocal-iraq1990.pdf. Subsequent to the
adoption of the IST Statute, the TAL designated Arabic and Kurdish as the official languages
of Iraq. See LAW OF ADMINISTRATION FOR THE STATE OF IRAQ FOR THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD
art. 9, available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/govemmentfTAL.html.
173 See Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal, supra note 6, art. 34. While Arabic and Kurd-
ish are the official languages of Iraq, legal education and practice is almost exclusively car-
ried out in Arabic throughout Iraq, including in Kurdistan.
174 See Statute of the Iraqi High Criminal Court art. 32.
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discussed above, CPA Regulation Number 1 designated English versions of
CPA Regulations or Orders as controlling in the event of inconsistencies or
conflicts. 1
75
The issue of the IST's title is not merely a cosmetic one as the no-
tion of a "special" or "exceptional" tribunal violates Article 95 of the Iraqi
constitution176 and contravenes the spirit of Article 14 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 177 which requires states to
guarantee the fair and public trial of individuals by a competent, independ-
ent and impartial tribunal established by law and discourages the establish-
ment of exceptional tribunals. 178 An exceptional tribunal would also violate
Article 5 of the 1985 United Nations' Principles of the Independence of the
Judiciary, which provides that individuals have the right to be tried by ordi-
nary courts or tribunals using established legal procedures. 179
Article 1 of the IHCC Statute designates the court as al-Mahkama
al-Jina'iya al-'Iraqiya al-'Uliya, which translates to the "Iraqi High Crimi-
nal Court."'180 While revising the title of the tribunal is not in and of itself
sufficient to overcome objections to the extraordinary character of the tribu-
nal, 181 it is nonetheless a positive and necessary revision.
3. Appointment of Non-Iraqi "Experts" and "Observers"
Under the IST Statute, the President of the Tribunal was required to
appoint non-Iraqi nationals to "act in advisory capacities or as observers to
the Trial Chambers and to the Appeals Chambers."' 182 Similar provisions
applied to the appointment of advisors or observers with respect to investi-
gative judges and prosecutors.183
The IHCC Statute revised these provisions to allow for the discre-
tionary appointment of non-Iraqi experts to act in advisory capacities with
175 CPA Reg. No. 1, supra note 20, §3(2).
171 See DUSTUR JUMHURIATAL-'IRAQ [Constitution] art. 95 (Iraq).
177 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, art. 14, U.N.
GAOR, 21st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 19, 1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter
ICCPR]. Iraq signed the ICCPR on March 23, 1976.
178 See infra Part III.F.5.
179 See Seventh United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of
Offenders, Aug. 26-Sept. 6, 1985, Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, art.
5, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.121/22/REV.1 (1985). For an Arab perspective on the independence
of the judiciary, see FAROUK EL-KILANI, ISTIQLAL AL-QADA'A [INDEPENDENCE OF THE
JUDICIARY] (Center for Arab Publications, Beirut, 2nd. ed. 1999).
180 See Statute of the Iraqi High Criminal Court art. 1.
181 For further discussion of the issue of characterization as an "extraordinary" tribunal, see
infra Part III.F.5.
182 Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal art. 6(b).
183 Id. arts. 7(n), 8(j).
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respect to the Criminal Court, the Cassation Panel, the investigative judges
and the public prosecutors. 184 The IHCC Statute does not provide for the
discretionary appointment of non-Iraqi observers with respect to any of the
foregoing institutions or personnel. The Statute defines the role of such ex-
perts as providing "assistance with respect to international law and the ex-
perience of similar Courts (whether international or otherwise)," and does
not include the broader role envisioned by the IST Statute, which also in-
cluded monitoring the protection of general due process of law standards.1
8 5
The foregoing revisions bring the IHCC Statute back in line with existing
Iraqi law, as Article 166 of the Iraqi Criminal Procedure Law provides for
the appointment of non-Iraqi experts. 
186
This is not to disparage the potential role of non-Iraqi experts on the
IHCC, as the appointment of non-Iraqi experts by the IHCC could have a
positive impact on the work of the IHCC by assisting Iraqi jurists with com-
plex issues of international law. The appointment of such experts could also
counter the perception that the IHCC is a U.S.-dominated institution without
sacrificing Iraqi control of the proceedings. However, the current formula-
tion is more appropriate as it is in keeping with Iraqi law and is respectful of
Iraqi sovereignty.
While the revisions discussed above are wholly appropriate and re-
moved what were arguably the most offensive provisions in the IST Stat-
ute, 187 the IHCC Statute does not include any guidelines or explanation as to
184 See Statute of the Iraqi High Criminal Court arts. 7(Second), 8(Ninth), 9(Seventh).
185 Id.
186 Article 166 of the Iraqi Criminal Procedure Law allows for the appointment of "one or
more experts in relation to matters which require an opinion, and determine his [sic] com-
pensation without excess, which shall be borne by the Treasury." See Iraqi Criminal Proce-
dure Law art. 166.
187 Many international commentators have endorsed the opposite view. The views of Hu-
man Rights Watch are emblematic of this approach:
We believe that advisors and observers can play an important role in supporting the
work of the Special Tribunal....
We also believe that the advisors and observers appointed to the Chambers and
Tribunal Investigative Judges should provide as much substantive assistance as
possible to ensure that the Special Tribunal applies the most fully developed stan-
dards of international law....
We recommend that Articles 6(b) and 7(n) of the Statute be amended to require
that the advisors and observers provide assistance specifically on international hu-
man fights, criminal, and humanitarian law to the Chambers, and to the Tribunal
Investigative Judges in addition to assistance in investigations and prosecution of
cases. We believe that this will help enable the advisors and observers to more
fully support the Special Tribunal.
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, MEMORANDUM TO THE IRAQI GOVERNING COUNCIL ON 'THE STATUTE
OF THE IRAQI SPECIAL TRiBUNAL' (2003), http://www.hrw.orglbackgrounder/menal
iraq121703.htm.
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the nature of or procedures relating to the advisory role that such experts
would undertake if appointed by the IHCC. Defining the role of such ex-
perts and how they are to be employed by the IHCC would have made the
revisions more complete.
4. Providing Legal Basis for Procedures for Removal of Judges and
Prosecutors
The removal of judges under Iraqi law was the province of the Judi-
cial Council. 88 However, the IST Statute delegated this authority to a deci-
sion by the majority of permanent judges of the tribunal after having con-
ducted an appropriate investigation. 189 No appeals procedures for such deci-
sions were provided. The IHCC Statute has created uniform procedures to
deal with disciplinary matters related to the service of judges and prosecu-
tors,190 and has established a five-member disciplinary committee com-
prised of judges and prosecutors from the Court.' 9' A committee decision to
terminate service is appealable to the Federal Court of Cassation. 192 While
these procedures represent an innovation in Iraqi law, they represent a le-
gitimate delegation of authority by the TNA and do not contradict Iraqi con-
stitutional provisions on the organization of the judiciary. 93
As a final note, the validity of this delegation of authority and the
propriety of the statutory provisions with respect to the removal of IHCC
personnel are distinct from actual practice. The overt influence of political
actors in prompting the removal of judges is a major flaw in the IHCC's
record. 94 However, it is a flaw that cannot be imputed to the actual provi-
sions of the IHCC statute.
5. Qualifications for Appointments of Judges and Public Prosecutors
The IST Statute did not establish uniform professional qualifica-
tions for the appointment of judges and prosecutors. Articles 5(a) and 7(d)
of the IST Statute provided that the permanent and reserve judges and in-
vestigative judges "shall be persons of high moral character, impartiality
188 See Qanun al-Tanzim al-Qada'i [Iraqi Judicial Organization Law], No. 160 arts. 58-59
(1979); Qanun al-Khas bi Wizarat al-'Adi [Regarding the Ministry of Justice Law], No. 101
art. 4(2)(a) (1977).
189 See Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal art. 5(0(2).
190 See Statute of the Iraqi High Criminal Court art. 6(First).
191 Id.
192 id.
193 See DUSTUR JUMHURIAT AL-'IRAQ [Constitution] arts. 87-101 (Iraq).
194 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, JUDGING DuJAtL: THE FIRST TRIAL BEFORE THE IRAQI HIGH
TRIBUNAL, supra note 3, at 37-42 (discussing undue Iraqi political interference and pressure
resulting in the removal of judges and personnel from the IHCC).
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and integrity who possess the qualifications required for appointment to the
highest judicial offices."'195 The IST Statute did not clearly link the ap-
pointment of judges and investigative judges to the satisfaction of the legal
requirements for appointment to the judiciary stipulated under the Iraqi Ju-
dicial Organization Law.196 Further, no professional qualifications were
provided for the appointment of prosecutors. 197 The only requirement speci-
fied by the IST Statute with respect to the appointment of prosecutors was
that they be nominated and appointed by the IGC or the successor govern-
ment after consultation with the Judicial Council. 1
98
The IHCC Statute has created uniform professional qualifications
for the appointment of judges and prosecutors. Article 4(First) states that
"[j]udges and public prosecutors shall be of high moral character, integrity,
and uprightness. They shall possess experience in criminal law and shall
fulfill the appointment requirements stipulated in the Judicial Organization
Law No. 160 of 1979 and the Public Prosecution Law No. 159 of 1979. 199
6. Providing Legal Basis for the Appointment of Non-Lawyers
to the IHCC
The appointment of practicing lawyers as judges was problematic as
the practice violated established Iraqi laws governing judicial appoint-
ments.200 However, Article 4(Second) of the IHCC Statute specifically ad-
dressed this issue by creating an exception to this Iraqi legal requirement for
Iraqi lawyers who satisfy the specific professional requirements established
by the statute.2°' While these procedures contradict previously established
Iraqi law, this type of revision is in line with the provisions of the Iraqi con-
stitution establishing the IHCC as an independent judicial body, and a le-
gitimate national parliamentary authority has promulgated these revisions.
As important, these specific revisions do not contradict the constitutional
provisions governing the judiciary.2 °2
195 See Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal arts. 5(a), 7(d).
196 Id. arts. 5(e), 7(1). These separate articles both state that with respect to judges and in-
vestigative judges the "conditions and terms of service" shall be the conditions and terms of
service established by the Iraqi Judicial Organization Law. Id. However, this language is
vague and does not specifically address legal requirements for appointments.
197 See Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal art. 8.
"9' Id. art. 8(d).
199 See Statute of the Iraqi High Criminal Court art. 4(First).
200 Iraqi law requires that judges be graduates of the Judicial Institute. See Iraqi Judicial
Organization Law.
201 See Statute of the Iraqi High Criminal Court art. 4(Second).
202 See DusTuR JUMHURIAT AL-'IRAQ [Constitution] arts. 87-101 (Iraq).
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7. Deletion of Provision for Removal of Tribunal's President
Article 5(f)(3) of the IST Statute authorized the IGC or the succes-
sor government to remove the IST president.0 3 This provision represented a
serious breach of the independence of the IHCC as a judicial institution. The
provision would have allowed the removal of the IST's president on politi-
cal grounds. As a matter of existing Iraqi law, the Judicial Council has the
prerogative to remove and discipline judges.204 Furthermore, the attempt to
delegate this authority to a political organ under the IHCC Statute would
have violated the Iraqi constitution.2 5 This procedure also violates Article
18 of the 1985 United Nations' Basic Principles of the Independence of the
Judiciary, which provides that judges shall be subject to suspension or re-
moval only for reasons of incapacity or behavior that renders them unfit to
discharge their duties.206 Deletion of this provision was a necessary revision
in the IHCC Statute.
D. Technical Drafting Errors in the Iraqi High Criminal Court Statute
The IHCC Statute contains several technical drafting errors. While
these types of errors do not directly undermine the legitimacy of the IHCC,
they nonetheless indicate a level of carelessness and haste in the promulga-
tion process.
Article 3(Fifth), which deals with the appointment of non-Iraqi
judges, states that such judges may be appointed who "have experience in
conducting criminal trials stipulated in this law, and who are of very high
moral character, honest and virtuous to work in the Court, in the event that a
State is one of the parties in a complaint .... , The last clause is nonsen-
sical as the IHCC Statute does not contemplate the possibility of states be-
coming parties to prosecutions undertaken by the IHCC.208 The error is not
attributable to the soundness of the translation as the clause appears in both
the official Arabic text and the English translation.
Article 8(Tenth) refers to "non-Iraqi experts and observers referred
to in paragraph (Ninth).,,209 However, the cross-reference is incorrect as
there is no mention of non-Iraqi observers in the paragraph referenced. Arti-
cle 8(Ninth) contemplates that the Chief Investigative Judge has the right to
203 See Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal art. 5(f)(3).
204 See Iraqi Judicial Organization Law arts. 58, 59; Regarding the Ministry Of Justice Law
art. 4(2)(a).
205 See DUSTUR JUMHURIAT AL-'IRAQ [Constitution] arts. 19, 87-88 (Iraq).
206 See Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, supra note 179, art. 18.
207 See Statute of the Iraqi High Criminal Court art. 3(Fifth).
208 See Ibrahim, supra note 157.
209 See Statute of the Iraqi High Criminal Court art. 8(Tenth).
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appoint non-Iraqi experts to assist the investigative judges in carrying out
investigations conducted under the authority of the IHCC Statute.210 No
reference is made to the possibility of appointing international observers in
this particular sub-section or in any other section or subsection of the IHCC
Statute.
Article 29(Fourth) of the IHCC Statute also includes an incorrect
cross-reference. The text states that "[alt any stage of the proceedings, the
Court may demand of any other Iraqi court to transfer any case being tried
by it involving any crimes stipulated in Articles 13, 14, 15, and 16 of this
statute .... ." The cross-reference to Articles 13, 14, 15 and 16 is incorrect
as the substantive crimes of the Statute are defined in Articles 11, 12, 13,
and 14.211
E. Problematic Revisions in the Iraqi High Criminal Court Statute
1. Procedures for Appointment of Judges and Prosecutors
Under the IST Statute, the IGC had the power to appoint judges,212
investigative judges,213 and prosecutors,214 and the Judicial Council had only
a limited advisory role.215 As the IGC was a political body, this arrangement
severely compromised the IST's independence and ran contrary to Iraqi
law. 216 Article 4(Third) of the IHCC Statute now provides for judges and
prosecutors to be nominated by the Higher Judicial Council and for such
nominations to be approved by the Council of Ministers.217 The effort to
more prominently involve the Higher Judicial Council in the appointment of
IHCC personnel is laudable and more consistent with the established proce-
dures of the Iraqi legal system. However, these revisions are compromised
by the unfortunate decision to subject the nominations of the Higher Judicial
Council to the further approval of the Council of Ministers.21 8 This approval
process endows political actors with the final authority over judicial ap-
pointments, a procedure contradicting constitutional principles of judicial
independence. 219 These revised procedures are not wholly negative though,
210 See id. art. 8(Ninth).
211 See Ibrahim, supra note 157.
212 See Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal art. 5(c).
213 Id. art. 7(b).
214 Id. art. 8(d).
215 Id. arts. 5(c), 7(b), 8(d).
216 See Iraqi Judicial Organization Law arts. 58-59.
217 See Statute of the Iraqi High Criminal Court art. 4(Third).
218 See id.
219 See DusTUR JUMHURIAT AL-'IRAQ [Constitution] arts. 19(First), 87-88 (Iraq). This pro-
cedure also potentially runs afoul of the United Nations' Basic Principles on the Independ-
ence of the Judiciary, which disfavor having judicial appointments subject to a political
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as they limit the level of political involvement in judicial appointments, and
create a level of transparency regarding such appointments that was wholly
lacking with the appointment procedures under the IST Statute.22°
2. Compensation of Judges, Investigative Judges and Prosecutors
Pursuant to Articles 5(e), 7(1), and 8(i) of the IST Statute, the IGC
was solely responsible for determining the compensation for judges and
prosecutors.221 As a temporary political authority, the IGC was not the ap-
propriate body to determine compensation. The determination of compensa-
tion for judges and investigative judges was further complicated by a provi-
sion that allowed the IGC to determine such compensation "in light of the
increased risks associated with the position. 222
In an effort to correct this shortcoming, the IHCC Statute mandated
that all "salaries and rewards be specified by guidelines issued by the Coun-
cil of Ministers. 223 This alternative procedure for determining compensa-
tion is inadequate and does not ensure that such determinations are made on
fair and justifiable grounds. Council of Ministers proceedings lack the
transparency associated with legislative decisions, and it is unclear whether
any guidelines issued by the Council of Ministers would be subject to public
scrutiny.
3. Transfer of Judges and Prosecutors
Under Article 4(Fourth) of the IHCC Statute, the Presidency Coun-
cil, upon receipt of a proposal from the Council of Ministers, is granted an
unlimited right to transfer judges and prosecutors from the IHCC to the
Higher Judicial Council for any reason whatsoever.224 The ability to transfer
IHCC personnel in this manner is tantamount to granting these political
actors the unfettered right to remove judges and prosecutors for political
reasons. Such unlimited oversight of the affairs of a judicial body violates
the independence of the IHCC225 and contravenes Articles 19(First), 87, and
authority. See Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, supra note 179, arts. 1-
7.
220 Following the dissolution of the IGC, the Prime Minister made appointments, as the
head of the successor government, presumably based on decisions made by the Council of
Ministers in consultation with members of the Higher Judicial Council.
221 See Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal arts. 5(e), 7(1), 8(i).
222 Id. arts. 5(e), 7(l).
223 See Statute of the Iraqi High Criminal Court art. 4(Third)(A).
224 Id. art. 4(Fourth).
225 See Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, supra note 179, arts. 1-7,
18; ICCPR, supra note 177, art. 14 (providing that everyone indicted with a criminal charge
be entitled to a "fair and public hearing by a competent, independent, and impartial tribunal
established by law") (emphasis added).
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88 of the Iraqi constitution, which establish the independence of the judici-
ary and judicial officers. This type of transfer would expose the judges and
prosecutors of the Court to political retribution and control. Further, the
provision does not provide for any sort of review of this type of decision.
The political intent of this provision is apparent since the executive
authority could nominate judges or prosecutors from the IHCC for a posi-
tion on the Higher Judicial Council without resort to this statutorily-
mandated transfer. With respect to disciplinary and removal procedures, the
IHCC Statute includes specific procedures to deal with instances where
judges and prosecutors have not fulfilled the requirements of their office.226
While this provision does not technically contravene the IHCC Statute's
provisions limiting the circumstances under which the service of a judge or
prosecutor may be terminated, 7 it clearly violates the spirit of these provi-
sions.
4. Revision of Article 12(First) Defining Crimes Against Humanity
Article 12(First)(H) of the IHCC Statute departs from the definition
previously included in the IST Statute and revises the accepted definition of
crimes of persecution under customary international law. 228 The IHCC Stat-
ute links various types of persecution with acts "referred to as a form of
sexual violence of comparable gravity, 229 whereas the provision was previ-
ously linked with acts "referred to in this paragraph or any crime within the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal., 230 This revision appears to be a technical draft-
ing mistake as the language appears to be incorrectly taken from the previ-
ous provision dealing with crimes of sexual violence.231 However, this revi-
sion cannot simply be categorized as a technical drafting mistake, because
the provision implicates the substantive definition of one of the core interna-
tional crimes within the subject matter jurisdiction of the IHCC and departs
from customary international law.
Section 3 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides
wide latitude to interpret treaty provisions in instances where the textual
interpretation leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure or leads to a result
226 See DusTu JUMHURIAT AL-'IRAQ [Constitution] arts. 19(First), 87-88 (Iraq).
227 See Statute of the Iraqi High Criminal Court art. 5.
228 See id. art. 12(First)(H); Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal art. 12(a)(8). The defini-
tion in the Iraqi Special Tribunal Statute tracks the definition contained in the ICC Statute.
See ICC Statute, supra note 93, art. 7(h).
229 See Statute of the Iraqi High Criminal Court art. 12(First)(H).
230 See Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal art. 12(a)(8).
231 See Statute of the Iraqi High Criminal Court art. 12(First)(G) (defining "rape, sexual
slavery, forcible prostitution, forced pregnancy, or any other form of sexual violence of com-
parable gravity" as a crime against humanity) (emphasis added).
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that is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.232 In the context of interpreting an
Iraqi statute, however, resort to this type of interpretation is not applicable,
as the error is of a substantive nature and the rigid positivism of the Iraqi
system does not allow judges to engage in this type of statutory interpreta-
tion. Hence, an amendment to the IHCC Statute is necessary to remedy this
error.
F. Statutory Shortcomings Inherited from the Iraqi Special Tribunal
1. The Jurisdictional Gap and the Lack of a Status of Forces Agreement
IHCC jurisdiction is specifically limited to Iraqi nationals and non-
Iraqi residents of Iraq, and does not extend to all individuals who may be
accused of the crimes established in Articles 11-14 of the Statute.233 All
sovereign states possess the right to exercise territorial jurisdiction; gener-
ally all national criminal legal systems recognize that national criminal
courts may exercise jurisdiction over all individuals committing a crime
within the territory of the state, irrespective of the nationality or residence
status of the offenders. 34 This lack of jurisdiction is conspicuous in light of
the fact that serious evidence 235 has emerged indicating incidents where
232 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, arts. 31-33, opened for signature May
23, 1969, 115 U.N.T.S. 331, available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/
conventions/1 1 969.pdf.
233 Statute of the Iraqi High Criminal Court art. l(Second).
234 These jurisdictional restraints undermine the sovereignty of the Iraqi government. See
Michael Kirby, Universal Jurisdiction and Judicial Reluctance, in UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION:
NATIONAL COURTS AND THE PROSECUTION OF SERIOUS CRIMES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
240, 246 (Stephen Macedo ed., 2004) [hereinafter UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION] (describing the
international postulate regarding sovereignty and the exercise of jurisdiction by noting "ju-
risdiction is ordinarily 'an incident of an independent nation.' The ultimate foundation for
territorial jurisdiction is sovereignty." (quoting Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 603
(1889))).
235 See, e.g., ANTHONY R. JONES & GEORGE R. FAY, INVESTIGATION OF INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES AT ABU GHRAIB (2004), available at http://news.findlaw.com/nytimes/
docs/dod/fay82504rpt.pdf (declaring that "[c]learly abuses occurred at the prison at Abu
Ghraib"); INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF THE ARMY, DETAINEE OPERATIONS INSPECTION, THE
MIKOLASHEK REPORT (2004), at ii, available at http://www4.army.mil/ocpa/reports/
ArmylGDetaineeAbuse/DAIG%20Detainee%200perations%20Inspection%20Report.pdf
(explaining that while U.S. military personnel committed abuses in Iraq, these abuses "are
not representative of policy, doctrine, or soldier training); ANTONIO M. TAGUBA, MAJOR
GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF THE ARMY, ARTICLE 15-6 INVESTIGATION OF THE 800TH MILITARY
POLICE BRIGADE, reprinted in THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAB 405,416-17
(Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel eds., 2005) (describing in detail the types of abuse
committed by U.S. military personnel at the prison at Abu Ghraib); JAMES R. SCHLESINGER,
U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, FINAL REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT PANEL TO REVIEW DOD
DETENTION OPERATIONS 80 (2004), available at http://defenselink.mil/news/Aug2004/
d20040824finalreport.pdf ("[Plursuant to the commencement of combat operations in [Op-
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coalition forces in Iraq have violated the Geneva Conventions236 and the
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading
23Treatment.  This issue has been further exacerbated by the immunity of
coalition forces from Iraqi legal process under CPA Order No. 17,238 and the
lack of a status of forces agreement between the coalition forces and the
Iraqi government. While there are legal questions surrounding the continued
application and validity of CPA Orders following the official transfer of
sovereignty,239 the Iraqi government has, in practice, not contested the or-
eration Enduring Freedom], the Commander... issued an order instructing the Geneva Con-
ventions were to be applied to all captured individuals in accordance with their traditional
interpretation."). Evidence of other serious violations occurring in Haditha, Hamdania and
Mahmudiya also has recently emerged. See Edward Wong, G.L 's Investigated in Slayings of
4 and Rape in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2006, at Al; Paul von Zielbauer, U.S. Inquiry Backs
Charges of Killing by Marines in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2007, at 16; David S. Cloud,
Inquiry Suggests Marines Excised Files on Killings, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2006, at Al. The
most notorious of these incidents occurred in the village of Haditha in 2005 and involved the
alleged illegal killing of 24 Iraqi civilians by Marines. See von Zielbauer, supra note 235, at
16. The U.S. military undertook two separate inquiries into the events in question. According
to widespread press reports, the inquiry by the Naval Criminal Investigative Service deter-
mined that evidence supported the allegations by military prosecutors that marines had ille-
gally killed Iraqi civilians during the incident. Id. Another inquiry revealed that the investiga-
tion undertaken by U.S. Army Major General Eldon Bargewell found serious fault with the
initial investigation into the incident by Marine commanders. Cloud, supra note 235, at A].
Military prosecutors charged four marines with murder as a result of the incident and four
Marine officers were charged with violations stemming from their initial investigation of the
incident. Von Zielbauer, supra note 235. For a listing of the charges brought by military
prosecutors, see United States Marine Corps, List of Charges and Specifications, Haditha,
Iraq Investigation (Dec. 21, 2006), http://www.usmc.milapa/raq/Haditha/Haditha-
Preferred-Charges-061221 .htm.
236 Geneva I, supra note 105; Geneva II, supra note 105; Geneva III, supra note 98; Ge-
neva IV, supra note 105. For details of the parties to the Geneva Conventions, see Interna-
tional Committee of the Red Cross, State Parties to the Following International Humanitarian
Law and Other Related Treaties (June 5, 2007), http://www.icrc.org/IHL.nsf/(SPF)/party-
main treaties/$file/IHL.and otherrelatedTreaties.pdf.
237 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations Dec. 10, 1984, 108 Stat.
382, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter CAT]. U.S. domestic law has adopted elements of the
Convention Against Torture. See 18 U.S.C. §§2340-2340(B) (2006).
238 Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 17 (Revised), CPA/ORD/27 June 2004/17
(June 27, 2004), http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20040627_CPAORD 17
Status ofCoalitionRevwithAnnexA.pdf. Immediately prior to the transfer of sover-
eignty on June 28, 2004, CPA Order No. 17 granted coalition forces immunity from Iraqi
legal process. See id. §2(1).
239 Article 26(c) of the TAL states: "The laws, regulations, orders, and directives issued by
the Coalition Provisional Authority pursuant to its authority under international law shall
remain in force until rescinded or amended by legislation duly enacted and having the force
of law." LAW OF ADMINISTRATION FOR THE STATE OF IRAQ FOR THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD art.
26(c), available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/government/TAL.htm. This provision is
analogous to situations where the laws of a predecessor state are applied by a successor state.
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der's continued validity. 24° Since the CPA did not previously address the
issue of jurisdictional immunity, the coalition forces must conclude a status
of forces agreement with the government of Iraq, clearly explicating the
obligation of Coalition Forces' governments to prosecute alleged offend-
ers.24' This type of treaty arrangement could successfully address the issue
of selective enforcement created by the truncated territorial jurisdiction of
the IHCC Statute.
2. Ba'ath Party Membership Disqualification
Article 33 of the IHCC Statute mandates that "[n]o person who was
previously a member of the disbanded Ba'ath party shall be appointed as a
judge, investigative judge, public prosecutor, an employee or any of the
personnel of the Court., 242 The rationale behind this exclusion is that judi-
cial appointments made by the Ba'athist regime favored those jurists who
were members of the party. However, this blanket exclusion does not con-
sider that many Ba'ath party members were only registered as a matter of
expediency and did not have active roles within the party. Many jurists who
For a discussion of the doctrine of state succession, see M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI,
INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION IN U.S. LAW AND PRACTICE 142-47 (4th ed. 2002); DANIEL
PATRICK O'CONNELL, STATE SUCCESSION IN MUNICIPAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (1967); L.
OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, A TREATISE 156-69 (1955); Mathew C. R. Craven, The
Problem of State Succession and the Identity of States under International Law, 9 EUROPEAN
J. INT'L L. 142-62 (1998); Malcolm Shaw, State Succession Revisited, 6 FINN. Y. INT'L L. 34
(1995). The doctrine of state succession could be relied upon based on the assumption that
the CPA was the de facto state successor of the Ba'ath regime or based on the fact that the
CPA exercised national sovereignty as an "occupying power" pursuant to the Geneva Con-
ventions. However, the Iraqi constitution stipulates that the TAL will be annulled following
the seating of a permanent government, weakening arguments for the continued validity of
CPA Orders. See DUSTUR JUMHURIAT AL-'IRAQ [Constitution] art. 143 (Iraq).
240 In response to accusations that U.S. forces have committed atrocities in Iraq, the order's
continued validity is being publicly questioned. Accordingly, Iraqi political leaders an-
nounced their intent to revisit the validity of CPA Order No. 17 during negotiations over the
renewal of the coalition forces' mandate in Iraq as provided by Security Council Resolution
1637, which expired at the end of 2006. S.C. Res. 1637, U.N. SCOR 60th Sess., 5300th mtg.,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1637 (Nov. 11, 2005). Despite this public announcement, however, in a
November It, 2006 letter addressed to the President of the United Nations Security Council
from the Prime Minister of Iraq, Nuri Kamal al-Maliki, requesting the extension of the man-
date of the multinational force, the issue of immunity was not publicly raised, and the subse-
quent resolution adopted by the United Nations Security Council extending the mandate of
the multinational force until December 31, 2007, did not address the issue. See S.C. Res.
1723, U.N. SCOR 61th Sess., 5574th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1723 (Nov. 28, 2006) (Letter
reproduced in Annex I).
241 For an example of a status of forces agreement, see Agreement Between the Parties to
the North Atlantic Treaty Regarding the Status of their Forces, June 19, 1951, 4 U.S.T. 1792,
199 U.N.T.S. 67.
242 See Statute of the Iraqi High Criminal Court art. 33.
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joined the party did so only as a means to maintain their source of liveli-
hood.243 The indiscriminate record of persecution under the Ba'athist regime
also indicates that membership in the Ba'ath party did not immunize mem-
bers from the political repression meted out by the regime. As only non-
Ba'athists were qualified for appointment, the ethnic composition of IHCC
personnel was severely skewed in favor of Shi'a and Kurds, which created,
at the very least, an appearance of bias and a perceived lack of impartiality.
Blanket exclusions also potentially impinge on the IHCC's inde-
pendence from undue political interference. This issue is further clouded by
a lack of clarity with respect to the role of the National De-Ba'athification
Commission and its relationship to the Court. While the office of former
Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Ja'afari has publicly stated that the IHCC is not
subject to the rulings of the De-Ba'athification Commission, 244 the commis-
sion has clearly attempted to exercise authority over the IiCC,245 and the
IHCC Statute does not clarify how commission determinations are to be
treated. Furthermore, the Iraqi constitution is vague as to the exact parame-
ters of the relationship between the commission and the judiciary, stating
only that the commission would coordinate with the judiciary. 246 Addition-
ally, the IHCC Statute does not provide appeals procedures for commission
decisions.
This process also raises practical questions regarding the compe-
tence of potential appointees, as the experience of de-Ba'athification
throughout the post-war period has resulted in the "evisceration of existing
[Iraqi] institutions., 247 The negative ramifications of these policies are now
being reconsidered by the National Assembly, which has received a pro-
243 For a discussion of many of the issues presented by de-Ba'athification, see Doug
Struck, My Hands Are Not Stained in Blood, WASH. POST, Feb. 3, 2005, at A21. The experi-
ence of de-Ba'athification has been highly controversial throughout all sectors of Iraqi soci-
ety and has specifically affected the work of the IHCC. Nine individuals were removed from
the IST at the insistence of the De-Ba'athification Commission, and in July 2005 the Com-
mission announced that it intended to purge 19 other members of the IST. See Edward
Wong, Iraqi Leader Vows to Block Purges on the Hussein Tribunal, N.Y. TIMES, July 29,
2005, at A9. The announcement prompted a response from President Jalal Talabani, who
stated that he would personally defend the existence of the IST and its work. Id. The contro-
versy over removal of judges continued after the resignation of Rizgar Muhammad Amin, the
Kurdish judge who had initially presided over the al-Dujail trial but had stepped down in
January 2006. His deputy, Said al-Hammashi, was expected to replace Amin but was passed
over for the post following accusations from the De-Ba'athification Commission that he was
a member of the Ba'ath party. See Robert F. Worth, Hussein Trial Delayed as Judges Dis-
pute Appointment, N.Y. TMEs, Jan. 25, 2006, at A3.
244 See Worth, supra note 243.
245 See Wong, supra note 243.
246 See DUSTURJUMHURIAT AL-'IRAQ [Constitution] art. 135 (Iraq).
247 Ruti Teitel, The Law and Politics of Contemporary Transitional Justice, 38 CORNELL
INT'L. L.J. 837, 843 (2005).
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posal to amend the laws on de-Ba'athification to mitigate the excessive ef-
fects of earlier purges.248
3. Transfer of Cases to the IHCC
Article 29(First) of the IHCC Statute grants the IHCC concurrent
jurisdiction for the prosecution of crimes stipulated in Article 14,249 and
Article 29(Second) grants the IHCC primacy regarding prosecution of
crimes listed in Articles 11 through 13.250 Article 29(Third) extends this
jurisdictional reach by providing that "[at] any stage of the proceedings, the
Court may demand of any other Iraqi court to transfer any case being tried
by it involving any crimes stipulated in Articles 11, 12, 13, and 14 of this
statute, and such court shall be required to transfer such case upon de-
mand., 251 This provision arose out of the IHCC participants' concern that
other Iraqi criminal courts would attempt to preemptively exercise jurisdic-
tion over such cases in an effort to diminish the effectiveness of the IHCC.
However, this provision is overly broad, endangers the impartiality of the
Iraqi judiciary, and contravenes the Iraqi constitution. 2  Article 84 of the
Iraqi constitution establishes that the judicial authority is independent and
that the various courts shall assume this authority.2 53 Article 85 states that
judges are independent and that no authority shall have the right to interfere
in the judiciary and the affairs of justice. 54 The language of these provi-
sions is not limited to interference by political actors and would apply
equally to undue interference in the affairs of an Iraqi court by other Iraqi
courts.
248 Ali Faysal al-Lami, the executive director of the De-Ba'athification Commission, has
publicly stated that the proposals submitted to the National Assembly will reduce the number
of senior ex-Ba'athists excluded from participation in public life from thirty thousand to
fifteen hundred. See Alternet.org, Iraqi Draft Law Would Reinstate Most Ex-Ba'athists,
REUTERS, Nov. 7, 2006, http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/PAR733102.htm (last
visited May 22, 2007). In keeping with the realization that the de-Ba'athification process had
had a negative impact on Iraqi society, the De-Ba'athification Commission allowed 700
former Ba'athists to return to their old government positions. See Damien Cave, Iraqis An-
swer Global Critics by Tackling Troubling Issues, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2007, at A 10. Presi-
dent Jalal Talabani has gone as far as calling for the De-Ba'athification Commission to be
abolished. See Interview with Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, DAR AL-HAYAT, Jan. 1, 2007,
http://64.26.31.21:2010/Spec/01-2007/Article-20070122-491d86e7-c0a8-1Oed-009d-
421b8e6c550a/story.html.
249 See Statute of the Iraqi High Criminal Court art. 29(First).
250 Id. art. 29(Second).
251 Id. art. 29(Third).
252 DUSTUR JUMHURIATAL-'IRAQ [Constitution] arts. 84-85 (Iraq).
253 Id. art. 84.
254 Id. art. 85.
2006-2007]
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
The fact that a request for a transfer could occur at any stage of ju-
dicial proceedings exemplifies the nature of this provision, which would
allow the IHCC to make a transfer request based upon its impressions of the
progress or the lack thereof regarding a specific case or trial. Furthermore,
based on the vague wording of the provision, one could argue that such a
transfer could occur even after the rendering of a verdict or at any time prior
to final resolution of the appeals process. Hence, the IHCC could intercede
in any case where the trial outcome ran contrary to its perceptions of the
proper course of justice. Coupled with the nearly limitless expansion in the
IHCC's jurisdiction under Article 14(Fourth),255 this provision would enable
the IHCC to intercede in any case taking place in any Iraqi criminal court.
4. Substantive Issues of Legality
Articles 11 through 14 of the IHCC Statute define the IHCC's sub-
ject matter jurisdiction.25 6 Under Articles 11 through 13, the three interna-
tional core crimes are genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.
257
Article 14 extends the IHCC's jurisdiction to certain crimes under Iraqi
law.258 The jurisdiction extends to commission of these crimes by Iraqi na-
tionals or non-Iraqi residents of Iraq from July 17, 1968 until May 1,
2003.259 The jurisdictional reach of the Court is not limited geographically
and extends to crimes committed outside of Iraq.
260
The definitions of the three international core crimes are modeled
on and closely follow the definitions of those crimes in the ICC Statute.26'
The expansive subject matter jurisdiction of the IHCC is problematic, as it
brings the IHCC Statute in conflict with the "principles of legality" defined
255 See infra Part MI.F.4.b.
256 See Statute of the Iraqi High Criminal Court arts. 11-14.
257 See id. at arts. 11-13. The definitions of the three international core crimes are nearly
identical to the corresponding definitions in the ICC Statute. See ICC Statute, supra note 93,
arts. 6-8 (defining the crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes).
258 See Statute of the Iraqi High Criminal Court art. 14.
259 Id. art. l(Second).
260 The IST Statute had specifically mentioned crimes committed by Iraqi nationals and
non-Iraqi residents of Iraq related to the Iran-Iraq War and the invasion and occupation of
Kuwait. See Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal art.l(b). This specific reference was unnec-
essary under the stated jurisdictional reach of the IST Statute and under existing Iraqi law,
which contemplates extraterritorial jurisdiction. Article 7 of the Iraqi Criminal Code extends
Iraq jurisdiction to "foreign territories occupied by the Iraqi army in relation to crimes which
affect the army's safety or interests." Qanun al-'Uqubat [Iraqi Criminal Code], No. 111 art. 7
(1969). Similarly, Article 53(b) of the Iraqi Criminal Procedure Law states that, "if a crime is
committed outside Iraq, the investigation thereof will be performed by one of the investiga-
tive judges [selected] by the Minister of Justice." Iraqi Criminal Procedure Law, art. 53(b).
261 See ICC Statute, supra note 93, arts. 6-8.
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by the legal maxims nulla poene sine lege and nullum crimen sine lege.
262
The principles of legality enhance the certainty of the law, provide justice
and fairness for the accused, establish the deterrent function of criminal
sanctions, prevent the abuse of power, and strengthen the application of the
rule of law. These principles require that public notice of a crime be pro-
vided prior to the commission of the criminalized acts. Article 15 of the
International Convention on Civil and Political Rights,263 Article 7 of the
European Convention on Human Rights,264 and Article 9 of the American
Convention on Human Rights embody these principles of legality. 65 They
266
are foundational principles in many constitutional systems. The U.S.
Constitution specifically includes prohibitions against "ex post facto" laws
262 See M. CHERiF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAW 150-58 (2d ed. 1999) [hereinafter BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY]; BASSIOUNI,
INTRODUCTION TO ICL, supra note 93, at 198-204; see also George P. Fletcher, Parochial
Versus Universal Criminal Law, 3 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 20, 21 (2005) ("The undisputed pre-
requisite for legitimate punishment in all modern systems of criminal law is legislative defi-
nition prior to the commission of the offence, captured in the maxim: nullum crimen sine
lege. The legislation might come in many forms-a statute, an international treaty or a Secu-
rity Council Resolution defining the powers of an ad hoc tribunal."). For a survey of these
principles, see JULLIOT DE LA MORANDIERE, DE LA REGLE NULLA POENA SINE LEGE (1910);
Stefan Glaser, Le principe de la ligalitg en matihre pinale, notamment en droit codifig et en
droit coutumier, 46 REVUE DE DROIT PENAL ET DE CRIMINOLOGIE 899 (1966); Jerome Hall,
Nulla Poena Sine Lege, 47 YALE L.J. 165 (1937); Giuliano Vassalli, Nullum crimen sine
lege, in [APPENDICE MAGI-OB] Nuovo DIGESTO ITALIANO 1173 (1939); Giuliano Vassalli,
Nullum crimen sine lege, in [APPENDICE MIN-PROC] NovIssIMo DIGESTO ITALIANO 292
(1984). For national approaches, see ROGER MERLE & ANDRE VITu, TRAITE DE DROrr
CRIMINEL 108 (1967) (documenting the historical right of the judge in the French criminal
justice system to interpret principles of law); id. at 113 (acknowledging the decline in the
20th century of the rigid positivist approach to "principles of legality"); see also Marc Ancel,
La r~gle "nulla poena sine lege" dans les lIgislations modernes, in ANNALES DE L'INSTITUT
DE DROrr COMPARE 245 (1936); Pietro Nuvolone, Le principe de la ligalitj et les principes
de la ddfense sociale, in REVUE DE SCIENCE CRIMINELLE ET DE DROIT PENAL COMPARE 231
(1956); Sebastian Soler, La formulation actuelle du principe "nullum crimen," REVUE DE
SCIENCE CRIMINELLE ET DE DROIT PENAL COMPARE (1952).
263 See ICCPR, supra note 177, art. 15; see also ICC Statute, supra note 93, art. 22 (Nullum
Crimen Sine Lege); id. art. 23 (Nulla Poena Sine Lege).
264 See Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms art. 7, Nov. 4, 1950, 312 U.N.T.S. 221.
265 See Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights art. 9,
Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123.
266 See e.g., The 1980 Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt, art. 66; 1958 CONST. art.
7-8 (Fr.); COST. arts. 25-26 (Italy); see generally CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE
WORLD (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds., 1993) (collecting and translating the
constitutions of many countries).
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and against "Bills of Attainder,, 267 and its fifth and fourteenth amendments
have been interpreted to prohibit statutes that are vague and ambiguous.268
The Iraqi legal system has traditionally been strictly positivist and
stringent with respect to the principles of legality. 269 The Iraqi Constitution
reaffirms the positivist tradition of the Iraqi legal system, which enshrines
the principles of legality in two separate provisions of Article 19. Article
19(Second) states that "[t]here is no crime or punishment except by a stipu-
lation. The punishment shall only be for an act that the law considers a
crime when perpetrated. A harsher sentence than the applicable sentence at
the time of the offense may not be imposed., 270 Article 19(Tenth) states that
"[c]riminal law does not have a retroactive effect, unless it is to the benefit
of the accused. 271 Furthermore, Iraq is a dualist state where treaties, even if
ratified, must be incorporated through the adoption of national implement-
ing legislation, which must then be published in the Official Gazette prior to
domestic applicability.27 2 This dualist approach is not atypical and has been
the predominant strand in the international system. 273
The three international core crimes under Articles 11 through 13 of
the IHCC Statute are not contained in the Iraqi Criminal Code and have not
been separately promulgated by an Iraqi legislature.274 The IHCC has at-
267 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
268 See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
269 The "principles of legality," which prohibit crime or penalty without a specific legal
textual description that is clear (i.e., not vague or ambiguous), and the retroactive application
of criminal laws and penalties, are recognized in the Iraqi Criminal Code and the Provisional
Constitution of 1970. Iraqi Criminal Code, arts. 1-2; Provisional Constitution art. 21 (Iraq).
The TAL also included the principles of legality. See LAW OF ADMINISTRATTON FOR THE
STATE OF IRAQ FOR THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD art. 15(A), available at
http://www.iraqcoalition.org/government/TAL.html.
"' See DUSTUR JUMHURIAT AL-'IRAQ [Constitution] art. 19(Second) (Iraq).
271 Id. art. 19(Tenth).
272 For a discussion of the differences between monist and dualist approaches to the incor-
poration of treaty obligations, see 1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 52-86 (Robert
Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992).
273 See Louis HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND VALUES 66 (1995). Debates
about the incorporation of international law in the United States are far from resolved and are
indicative of the reluctance of many countries to adopt a monist approach that would require
domestic courts to give effect to international law even in such instances when domestic law
conflicts with the mandates of international law. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, International
Law as Part of Our Law, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 43 (2004) (arguing that U.S. legal tradition spe-
cifically contemplates the internalization of international law into U.S. domestic law); Curtis
A. Bradley, Breard, Our Dualist Constitution, and the Internationalist Conception, 51 STAN.
L. REv. 529 (1999) (arguing that long-standing principles of U.S. jurisprudence and case law
conflict with scholarly arguments urging the more receptive incorporation of international
law).
274 See Iraqi Criminal Code.
[Vol. 39:21
CEDING THE HIGH GROUND
tempted to incorporate these crimes into the IHCC Statute without establish-
ing proper foundation for their application by an Iraqi court. In so doing, the
IHCC Statute arguably violates the principles of legality in the context of
the Iraqi legal system.
27 5
a. Genocide, War Crimes, and Crimes Against Humanity
If an international crime exists in the national criminal law of an in-
dividual's state of nationality or residence, ignorance of international crimi-
nal law cannot overcome the presumption of knowledge regarding that par-
ticular crime. 6 However, crimes of genocide and war crimes have not been
incorporated into Iraqi law through inclusion in the Iraqi Criminal Code or
through the promulgation of national implementing legislation. To remedy
this violation of the "principles of legality," the IHCC must rely on the fact
that Iraq has previously ratified conventions containing war crimes and
genocide,277 even though they were not included in the Iraqi Criminal Code
or established as domestic crimes through national Iraqi legislation pub-
lished in the Official Gazette of Iraq.
This approach requires that the IHCC interpret the principles of le-
gality in a manner distinguishing the formal aspects of these "principles"
discussed above and the substantive intent of the principles of legality,
namely, ensuring that the public has notice of such crimes prior to commit-
ting the criminalized acts. In this light, the formal aspects of the principles
of legality may be set aside in favor of the substantive intent. These crimes
were publicly known in Iraq, and the IHCC can assume that prospective
275 The ICTY was forced to deal with similar questions. The Report of the Secretary Gen-
eral in connection with the establishment of the tribunal specifically chose not to rely on the
application of domestic law and instead noted that "international humanitarian law... pro-
vides a sufficient basis for subject-matter jurisdiction .... See Report of the Secretary Gen-
eral Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May
3, 1993), 32 I.L.M. 1159 (1993). Regardless of this assertion, as a matter of legality, the
tribunal's position with respect to this question was certainly buttressed by the fact that the
Yugoslav federal criminal code included the crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity,
and war crimes and corresponding penalties. See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI & PETER MANIKAS,
THE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 689-
705 (1996); VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, AN INSIDER'S GUIDE TO THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER-YUGOSLAVIA 274-76 (1995).
276 See BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, supra note 262, at 363-64.
277 See Geneva I, supra note 105; Gevena II, supra note 105; Geneva III, supra note 98,
Geneva IV, supra note 105. Iraq acceded to all of the Geneva Conventions on February 14,
1956. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9,
1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention]. Iraq acceded to the Genocide
Convention on January 20, 1959. For details of state parties to the Convention, see Office of
the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Ratifications and Reservations to
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Apr. 19, 2007),
http://www.ohchr.org/english/countries/ratification/l.htm.
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defendants and others in the upper echelons of the regime leadership had
278knowledge of these crimes.
To overcome challenges to the legality of these provisions though,
the IHCC Statute would have had to clearly establish the basis for the inclu-
sion of these jurisdictional provisions by issuing an Explanatory Memoran-
dum that specifically referenced Iraq's ratification of the Genocide Conven-
tion279 and the four Geneva Conventions of 1949280 and cross-referenced the
definitions of these crimes to specific contents in the Iraqi Criminal Code
281
and the Iraqi Military Penal Law.282 This approach would have allowed the
IHCC to rely upon these crimes in prosecutions, despite the fact that the
inclusion of genocide and war crimes in the IHCC's jurisdictional provi-
sions fails to satisfy the formal requirements of the principles of legality,
namely, the inclusion of these crimes in a national law and its publication in
the Official Gazette.
The IHCC Statute definition of war crimes also poses a problem
due to its reliance on the broad definition of war crimes in the ICC Statute,
which adopts the position that such crimes should include serious violations
of international humanitarian law whether they are committed during inter-
national or non-international armed conflicts.283 This definition is problem-
atic in the instant context because the commission of such crimes in non-
international armed conflicts has only recently become an indisputable tenet
of customary international law. The Geneva Conventions regulate conflicts
of a non-international character by a single article, common to all four con-
ventions-common Article 3, which does not categorically establish that
278 This conclusion was in substance what the Nuremburg judgment established with re-
spect to crimes against humanity. See BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, supra note
262, at 525.
279 See Genocide Convention, supra note 277; for evidence of Iraq's ratification of the
Genocide Convention, see Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human
Rights, Ratifications and Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide (Apr. 19, 2007), http://www.ohchr.org/english/
countries/ratification/1 .htm.
280 See Geneva I, supra note 105; Geneva II, supra note 105; Geneva III, supra note 98,
Geneva IV, supra note 105; for evidence of Iraq's ratification of the Geneva Conventions,
see International Committee of the Red Cross, State Parties to the Following International
Humanitarian Law and Other Related Treaties (June 5, 2007),
http://www.icrc.org/IHL.nsf/(SPF)/partymain-treaties/$file/IHL-and-otherrelatedTreatie
s.pdf.
281 See Iraqi Criminal Code.
282 Qanun al-'Uqubat al-Askariya [Iraqi Military Penal Law], No. 13 (1940).
283 The ICC Statute includes as war crimes serious violations of article 3 common to the
four Geneva Conventions that take place in armed conflicts not of an international character.
See ICC Statute, supra note 93, art. 8, 2(c)-(e).
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violations of this provision are war crimes. While scholarly opinion 284 and
ICTY and ICTR decisions have overcome this jurisdictional gap and have
firmly established that such violations are war crimes under customary in-
ternational law,285 this provides an insufficient basis on which to argue that
such crimes were part of customary international law during the entire pe-
riod covered by the IHCC's temporal jurisdiction.
Including crimes against humanity in the IHCC Statute presents
more challenging issues than those presented by war crimes and genocide,
as the Iraqi Criminal Code does not include this category of international
crimes, and crimes against humanity have not been the subject of a special-
286ized international convention. Hence, unlike the crimes of genocide and
war crimes, Iraq has no treaty obligations regarding this category of crimes.
However, most crimes in this category are separately included in
the Iraqi Criminal Code.287 As such, the IHCC could establish its jurisdic-
tion with respect to all three international core crimes and avoid violating
the principles of legality by dividing the above three crimes into several
lesser crimes that are found in most domestic criminal codes, including the
Iraqi Criminal Code and the Iraqi Military Penal Law. For example, the
Iraqi Criminal Code criminalizes: (i) unlawful detention; 288 (ii) use of per-
son as object of mockery; 289 (iii) cruelty; 290 (iv) torture;291 (v) intentional
damage of public property; 292 (vi) burning of petroleum wells; 293 (vii) inten-
tional spreading of dangerous diseases; 294 (viii) persecution based on reli-
284 See, e.g., Theodor Meron, International Criminalization of Internal Atrocities, 89 AM. J.
INT'L L. 554, 576 (1995) (arguing that many violations of common article 3 "though not
explicitly listed as grave breaches, are of universal concern and subject to universal condem-
nation").
285 See M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Normative Framework of International Humanitarian
Law: Overlaps, Gaps and Ambiguities, in 1 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 205, 221-24 (M.
Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2d ed. 1999) [hereinafter Bassiouni, The Normative Framework of
International Humanitarian Law].
286 See M. Cherif Bassiouni, "Crimes Against Humanity": The Need for a Specialized
Convention, 31 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 457, 457 (1994) (noting that there have been no
specialized conventions on "Crimes Against Humanity" since the London Charter, where the
term first received definition).
287 See, e.g., Iraqi Criminal Code, art. 325 (prohibiting slavery); id. art. 333 (prohibiting
torture); id. art. 421 (prohibiting illegal detention and torture). Despite these prohibitions,
Iraq has not signed the Convention Against Torture. CAT, supra note 237.
288 Iraqi Criminal Code, art. 322.
289 Id. art. 325.
290 Id. art. 332.
291 Id. art. 333.
292 Id. art. 340.
293 Id. art. 342(b).
294 Id. art. 368.
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gious affiliation;295 (ix) rape;296 (x) killing two people or more;297 (xi) caus-
ing the disappearance of bodies;298 (xii) embezzlement; 299 and (xiii) destroy-
ing real estate.300 The Iraqi Military Penal Law references, inter alia, the
following war crimes30 1: (i) ordering an inferior to commit a crime; 302 (ii)
the destruction of property;303 (iii) the destruction of property through the
use of force;3°4 (iv) the unlawful taking of the property of the prisoners,
wounded, and deceased; 305 and (v) overlooking criminal acts. 3° 6 Accord-
ingly, the IHCC could properly refer to these crimes as defined by Iraqi law
and rely upon them as elements of the three international core crimes.30 7
While crimes against humanity have not been the subject of a spe-
cialized international convention, this category of crimes has been defined
in various international instruments308 and various components within this
category are jus cogens.3°9 As such, another alternative approach to estab-
lishing the jurisdiction of the IHCC with respect to crimes against humanity,
295 Id. art. 372.
296 Id. art. 393.
297 Id. art. 406(0.
298 Id. art. 420.
299 Id. art. 444.
'0 Id. arts. 447, 478.
30 1 The procedures relating to the trial of military personnel under Iraqi law are governed
by Iraqi Law No. 13 of 1940. Qanun Usul al-Muhakamat el-Askariya [Military Trials Proce-
dural Law], No. 13 (1940).
302 Iraqi Military Penal Law, art. 98.
303 Id. art. 113.
31 Id. art. 114.
305 Id. art. 115.
'06 Id. art. 123.
307 See Preparatory Comm'n for the Int'l Criminal Court, Finalized Draft Text of the Ele-
ments of Crimes, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2 (Nov. 2, 2000) (establishing the "Ele-
ments of Crimes" for the International Criminal Court).
308 International Military Tribunal: Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Ma-
jor War Criminals of the European Axis Aug. 8, 1945, 58 Stat. 1544, 1546, 82 U.N.T.S. 279,
284 art. 6(c); Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Jan. 19, 1946,
art. 5(c), 4 Bevans 20 (amended on Apr. 26, 1946) [hereinafter IMTFE Agreement]; Statute
of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, May 25, 1993, 32 I.L.M.
1192 [hereinafter ICTY Statute], available at http://www.un.org/ictyflegaldoc-
e/basic/statut/statute-feb06-e.pdf. Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, Nov. 8,
1994, 33 I.L.M. 1598 [hereinafter ICTR Statute], available at
http://69.94.11.53/ENGLISH/basicdocs/statute/2004.pdf; ICC Statute, supra note 93, art. 7.
For a discussion of these and other formulations see BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY,
supra note 243.
309 For a detailed discussion on crimes against humanity and other jus cogens crimes, see
generally BAssiotNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANTY, supra note 262, at 210-17; BASSIOUNI,
INTRODUCTION TO ICL, supra note 90, at 684-704.
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as well as genocide and war crimes, which are also jus cogens,310 is to rely
on this status to argue that these international crimes penetrate national law
and cannot be derogated from because they are peremptory norms of inter-
national law.3 11 However, state practice has not clearly supported this posi-
tion even though numerous scholars and publicists have eagerly adopted
it.312 The innovative nature of these arguments within a domestic setting
310 See BASS1OUNI, INTRODUCTION TO ICL, supra note 93, at 171.
311 The role of customary international law in international criminal law has yet to be fi-
nally resolved, and the approach of scholars and commentators has often broken down based
upon disciplinary background with traditional penahsts and positivists at odds with interna-
tional lawyers. George P. Fletcher and Jens David Ohlin argue that customary international
law should not be relied upon as "means of inculpation in criminal prosecutions, whether in
domestic courts or international courts." George P. Fletcher & Jens David Ohlin, Reclaiming
Fundamental Principles of Criminal Law in the Darfur Case, 3 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 539, 556
(2006). They go on to note that "[clustomary law is anathema in the criminal courts of every
civilized society. The reason for legislation is to drive custom from the system and to create a
regime based on rules and standards declared publicly, in advance, by a competent author-
ity." Id. at 559. International lawyers advocate the opposite approach in addressing the ques-
tion of whether convictions for violations of uncodified customary law can ever meet the
requirements imposed by the nullum crimen standard. Theodor Meron argues that the "legal-
ity principle does not bar such convictions ... if genuine care is taken to determine that the
legal principle was firmly established as custom at the time of the offense so that the offender
could have identified the rule he was expected to obey." See Theodor Meron, Revival of
Customary Humanitarian Law, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 817, 821 (2005).
312 See, e.g., M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Crimes: Jus Cogens and Obligation Erga
Omnes, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63 (1996). In a different context, various European
domestic courts have had the opportunity to assess arguments with respect to the application
of customary international law in the absence of implementing legislation in the course of
extradition hearings, and the results have been decidedly mixed. Although these cases dealt
with novel legal questions arising out of attempts to exercise universal jurisdiction with
respect to international crimes, they nonetheless illustrate the reluctance of certain domestic
courts to rely on customary international law as the sole basis for satisfying the double
criminality requirement in extradition proceedings in the absence of implementing legisla-
tion. First, the final decision of a panel of the British House of Lords in response to the Span-
ish extradition request for the former Chilean head of state, General Augusto Pinochet, was
narrowly framed and focused on the question of statutory authority. As Richard Falk ex-
plains, "the crux of criminality associated with the Pinochet regime, even as to torture, was
not accepted as a valid basis for extradition. The majority rejected the view that there was
any basis for charges of criminality under international law in British courts other than what
was explicitly incorporated into British positive law." Richard Falk, Assessing the Pinochet
Litigation: Whither Universal Jurisdiction?, in UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION, supra note 234, at
97, 113. In dealing with the customary law status of torture in connection with an extradition
request in the Bouterse case, the Dutch Supreme Court rejected a lower court decision estab-
lishing customary international law as an independent basis for criminal prosecution. As
Erika de Wet explains, the Dutch Supreme Court "rejected the decision of the Court of Ap-
peals by curtly determining that even if a torture were a crime according to customary inter-
national law, it would not be able to neutralize the principle of legality contained in Article
16 of the Dutch Constitution and Article I of the Dutch Criminal Code. Thus, despite the
country's monist legal tradition, the Dutch Supreme Court was not willing to accept that
customary international law could serve as an independent basis for criminal prosecution in
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required that they be included in an Explanatory Memorandum, which
would have enabled the IHCC to distinguish between the substantive and
formal aspects of the principles of legality and demonstrate the basis of di-
rect applicability under international law.313
With respect to crimes against humanity two other discrete ques-
tions must be raised. First, prosecution of this category of crimes was origi-
nally linked to their commission during a war as evidenced by Article 6(c)
of the London Charter, which excluded by definition all such crimes com-
mitted prior to the outbreak of World War I.314 The 1950 Report of the
International Law Commission removed this linkage,315 however it is diffi-
cult to conclude that this report embodied the progressive codification of
the Netherlands. Instead, the application of such norms remains dependent on implementing
legislation." Erika de Wet, The Prohibition of Torture as an International Norm of Jus Co-
gens and its Implications for National and Customary Law, 15 EUR. J. INT'L. L. 97, 117
(2004).
313 While the ICTY and the ICTR were able to exclusively rely upon international humani-
tarian law as an independent basis upon which to establish the subject matter jurisdiction of
the respective tribunals, the ICTY and the ICTR were established by the United Nations
Security Council as an enforcement measure under the binding authority of Chapter VII after
the determination had been made that the serious violations of international humanitarian law
that occurred in both conflicts represented a threat to international peace and security. See
BASSIOUNI & MANIKAS, supra note 275, at 202-09; Jose E. Alvarez, Crimes of State/Crimes
of Hate: Lessons from Rwanda, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 365, 371 (1999). As Virginia Morris and
Michael P. Scharf have explained, "[a] tribunal established by the Security Council, acting
on behalf of the international community, to try and punish persons responsible for crimes
under international law should do so on the basis of international rules and standards .... This
approach to applicable law underscores international law as the source of the criminal re-
sponsibility incurred by perpetrators of war crimes and crimes against humanity as well as
the interest of the international community in ensuring respect for the fundamental norms of
international law." VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, AN INSIDER'S GUIDE TO THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 50 (1995). The unique
context and manner in which the ICTY and ICTR were established does not necessarily
translate into an independent basis for overcoming the more stringent positivist national law
tradition that characterizes the Iraqi legal system's approach to incorporating customary
international law. A more analogous situation arose in Ethiopia with respect to the prosecu-
tion of crimes committed by the military junta led by Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam. Diane
Orentlicher has described these criminal proceedings as an example of an "internationalized
national court," and prosecutions were based upon national and international crimes, how-
ever, the latter category was limited to those crimes incorporated by Ethiopian law. See
Diane Orentlicher, The Future of Universal Jurisdiction in the New Architecture of Transna-
tional Justice, in UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION, supra note 234, at 214, 223.
314 See M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Normative Framework of International Humanitarian
Law, supra note 285, at 205.
315 See Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribu-
nal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal, U.N. Int'l Law Comm'n [1LC], U.N. Doc. A/1316
(1950), available at http:/luntreaty.un.orglilcltexts/instruments/englishldraft%20articles/
7 1 1950.pdf (without commentary); http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instrumentslengishl
commentaries/7 11950.pdf (with commentary).
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customary international law,316 and the question of the appropriateness of
requiring a nexus between crimes against humanity and war remained a
topic of contention. While the statute adopted by the United Nations Secu-
rity Council establishing the ICTY preserved the necessary connection be-
tween crimes against humanity and armed conflict, 317 the statute adopted by
the United Nations Security Council establishing the ICTR dispensed with
this connection. 318 Hence, it is unclear as to when the war-connection was
deemed to no longer be a component of the customary international law
definition of crimes against humanity. However, as evidenced by the evolu-
tion of this definition in the time period between the authorization of the
ICTY Statute and the ICTR Statute, the commission of such crimes during a
period when no armed conflict existed cannot be seen as a violation of cus-
tomary international law for the entire period covered by the IHCC's tempo-
ral jurisdiction.
Second, when comparing Article 6(c) of the London Charter with
the definition of crimes against humanity in the ICC Statute, it is clear that
customary international law has evolved with respect to this international
crime. 319 Further, it is also well established that Article 7 of the ICC Statute,
which defines crimes against humanity, reflects the progressive evolution of
316 Bassiouni, The Normative Framework of International Humanitarian Law, supra note
285, at 205-08 (discussing the customary international law status of crimes against humanity
with respect to the requirement that such crimes take place in the context of an armed con-
flict).
317 See ICTY Statute, supra note 308, art. 5 ('The international Tribunal shall have the
power to prosecute persons responsible for the following crimes when committed in armed
conflict, whether international or internal in character, and directed against any civilian popu-
lation ....") (emphasis added). The ICTY provision differed from the London Charter defi-
nition by expanding the definition to include crimes against humanity taking place in con-
flicts of an internal character.
318 ICTR Statute, supra note 308, art. 3 ("The International Tribunal for Rwanda shall have
the power to prosecute persons responsible for the following crimes when committed as part
of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population . ) (emphasis
added).
319 It is puzzling that in critiquing the original IST Statute, Human Rights Watch specifi-
cally urged the tribunal to apply the "most fully developed definitions of serious crimes
under international criminal and humanitarian law," and specifically argued for the inclusion
of a greater number of such crimes consistent with the contents of the ICC Statute. See
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, MEMORANDUM TO THE IRAQI GOVERNING COUNCIL ON 'THE STATUTE
OF THE IRAQI SPECIAL TRIBUNAL,' supra note 187, at C.l. Amnesty International also cri-
tiqued the original IST Statute for the same perceived failing and urged incorporation of "all
crimes under international law." Amnesty Int'l, Iraq Special Tribunal-Fair Trials Not
Guaranteed, Al Index MDE 14/007/2005, May 13, 2005, available at
http://web.amnesty.org/library/pdf/MDE 140072005ENGLISH/$File/MDE 1400705.pdf.
These arguments are flawed and do not account for the many issues with respect to the prin-
ciples of legality that are implicated by the inclusion of such expansive definitions.
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customary international law.32° While the IHCC Statute omits several of the
provisions defining crimes against humanity in the ICC Statute,32' it does
include crimes such as forcible transfer of population, sexual slavery, forced
prostitution, and forced pregnancy, which were not part of customary inter-
national law during the entire period covered by the IHCC's temporal juris-
diction.322
Lastly, as was discussed above, the technical drafting error that re-
sulted in the revision of 12(First)(H) in the definition of crimes against hu-
manity incorrectly revised the accepted definition of crimes of persecution
under customary international law and departed from the definition previ-
ously included in the IST Statute.323
Questions as to whether the provisions of the IHCC Statute dealing
with crimes against humanity violate the principles of legality have taken on
even greater importance in light of the fact that the prosecutions and judg-
ments in the al-Dujail trial were based upon these provisions. It is unfortu-
nate that these questions were not addressed prior to the al-Dujail trial.
The al-Dujail Trial Opinion attempted to address several of these
concerns with respect to crimes against humanity. First, the IHCC argued
that the underlying actions upon which the prosecutions were based are and
have been illegal under the laws of "most, if not all, countries of the world
as Iraq [sic]."'3 24 However, apart from simply stating this fact, the IHCC did
not attempt to establish its jurisdiction with respect to crimes against hu-
manity by referring to the specific underlying lesser crimes found in the
Iraqi Criminal Code and the Iraqi Military Penal Law. Accordingly, the
IHCC did not create a proper basis upon which to define these crimes under
Iraqi law. Second, the IHCC attempted to establish a basis for the direct
applicability of crimes against humanity under customary international law.
While acknowledging that the "definition of crimes under international law
is not [sic] precise as the definition of crimes in the national laws of differ-
ent countries, 32 5 the IHCC argued that the "requirements of justice and
prevention of injustice and guarantee [sic] of individual freedom all require
the applying of said principle in the scope of international crimes. 326 How-
ever, in this effort the IHCC did not attempt to identify those crimes against
humanity that are also jus cogens or marshal strong historical or scholarly
320 See BAssIoUNI, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE ICC, supra note 93, at 150.
321 The definition in the IHCC Statute does not include enforced sterilization or the crime
of apartheid.
322 These expansive provisions defining crimes against humanity were not included in the
ICTY Statute and the ICTR Statute.
323 See supra Part III.E. 1; Statute of the Iraqi High Criminal Court art. 12(First)(H).
324 al-Dujail Trial Opinion Part 1, supra note 127, at 36.
325 Id. at 38.
326 Id. at 39.
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support, but simply argued that international crimes under customary inter-
national law could be directly applied in an Iraqi national forum. 327 Need-
less to say, this analysis is wholly incomplete and is not in keeping with
Iraqi legal traditions or state practice. Lastly, in approaching the issue of
whether there exists a requirement for a nexus between crimes against hu-
manity and war, the IHCC mischaracterizes the evolution and state of cus-
tomary international law with respect to this issue. The IHCC emphatically
states that "crimes against humanity became a part of the [customary] inter-
national law whether during peace or war" 328 as far back as 1982, when the
crimes in question occurred, and earlier. 329 As was discussed above, it can-
not be argued that such crimes occurring during a period when no armed
conflict existed were part of customary international law during the entire
period covered by the IHCC's temporal jurisdiction, and it is fairly clear
that such crimes did not constitute customary international law in 1982.
b. Other Crimes Under Iraqi Law
Article 14 of the IHCC Statute extends the jurisdiction of the Court
to other crimes under Iraqi law. Under Article 14(First), the IHCC has the
power to prosecute persons who have intervened in the judiciary or at-
tempted to influence the functions of the judiciary.330 However, this crime is
given no basis in Iraqi law and this crime does not exist in the Iraqi Crimi-
nal Code. This lack of specificity clearly violates the principles of legality
as this crime has no grounding in Iraqi law.
Articles 14(Second) and (Third) allow the IHCC to exercise its ju-
risdiction over two separate political crimes.33' The first such crime is the
"wastage and squander of national resources" and the second is the "abuse
of position and the pursuit of policies that were about to lead to the threat of
war or the use of the armed forces of Iraq against an Arab country., 332 Both
provisions attempt to define the crimes by reference to Law No.7 of 1958,
however, neither of these crimes is contained in the Iraqi Criminal Code and
Law No.7 of 1958 does not define these political crimes with any level of
specificity that would warrant application of these provisions.
327 The al-Dujail trial opinion mentions in passing that international criminal law has been
applied in the past by other national courts, such as in "England, Australia, France, Italy,
Canada, [and] in Belgium when it prosecuted persons accused in committing ethic extermi-
nation in Rwanda." Id. at 42. This lack of specificity or analysis in dealing with such diver-
gent cases cannot form the proper basis for establishing consistent state practice.
328 Id. at 44.
329 id.
330 Statute of the Iraqi High Criminal Court art. 14(First).
331 Id. arts. 14(Second), 14(Third).
332 id.
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Finally, Article 14(Fourth) extends the IHCC's jurisdiction to in-
stances where "the Court finds there is an absence of a specific element for
any of the crimes stipulated in Articles 11, 12, and 13 of this law and it is
proved to the Court that the act constitutes a crime punishable by the penal
law or any other criminal law at the time of its commission., 333 This provi-
sion appears to be a catch-all that would apply if an element of a crime un-
der Articles 11, 12, or 13 is not met, but a crime could be proved under any
other legal authority of Iraqi criminal law. In effect, this provision greatly
expands the jurisdiction of the IHCC and could allow the Court to prosecute
individuals for a large number of less serious crimes punishable under Iraqi
criminal law. This is clearly an unwarranted extension of the IHCC's juris-
diction because it grants the Court concurrent jurisdiction over a large num-
ber of lesser crimes not specifically included in the IHCC Statute to the det-
riment of the Iraq criminal court system.
c. Establishing Penalties
Article 24(Fifth) of the IHCC Statute provides that "[t]he penalty
for any crimes under Articles 11, 12, and 13, which do no have a counter-
part under Iraqi law shall be determined by the Court taking into account
such factors like the gravity of the crime, the individual circumstances of
the convicted person, guided by judicial precedents and relevant sentences
issued by international criminal courts. 3 34 This approach to determining
penalties runs contrary to Iraqi law and the principles of legality as formally
enshrined in the Iraqi constitution, which does not allow for penalties with-
out an expressed provision in the law.335 Article 19(Second) of the constitu-
tion mandates that penalties be determined by stipulation and does not dele-
gate to the IHCC the legislative authority to determine such penalties.336
The Iraqi system is rigidly positivistic and does not contemplate a delega-
tion of this type of legislative power to the Iraqi judiciary. The drafters of
the Iraqi constitution could have expressly permitted the delegation of this
type of legislative power to the IHCC judges but did not include any such
delegation. This omission is particularly conspicuous as the constitutional
drafting process occurred after the establishment of the IST and prior to the
establishment of the IHCC.
This formulation for the judicial establishment of certain penalties
is borrowed from the experiences and practices of international criminal
tribunals. With respect to the ICTY, the United Nations Security Council
333 Statute of the Iraqi High Criminal Court art. 14 (Fourth).
... Id. art. 24(Fifth). An identical provision was included in Article 24(c) of the IST Statute.
See Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal art.24(c).
335 See DUSTUR JUMHUR1AT AL-'IRAQ [Constitution] art 19(Second) (Iraq).
336 id.
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delegated these legislative tasks, namely, determining such penalties by
analogy, to the judges of the ICTY.337 However, while customary interna-
tional law permits the application of penalties by analogy to similar crimes
and penalties in the national criminal laws of a prosecuting state having
proper jurisdiction,338 this permissive approach is not obligatory and cannot
displace the more stringent requirements of a national legal system.
The al-Dujail Trial Opinion attempts to dispense with the traditions
of the Iraqi legal system and constitutional requirements 339 by reference to
the practice of international criminal tribunals and the practice of other na-
tional courts.340 However, in so doing, the IHCC misconstrues the state of
customary international law with respect to the practice of establishing pen-
alties by analogy.34' As mentioned above, customary international law per-
mits the application of penalties by analogy, 342 but it cannot be said that the
application of penalties in this manner is in and of itself reflective of cus-
tomary international law.
5. Due Process Guarantees
The drafters of the IHCC Statute intended to create rules governing
procedure and evidence that incorporated adversary-accusatorial elements
that have been employed by international and hybrid tribunals. 343 This ap-
proach ignored the context and manner in which the IHCC was established
as a domestic tribunal and needlessly complicated and compromised the
trial proceedings.3 " It also exemplified the ways in which the drafters of the
337 See BASSIOUNI & MANIKAS, supra note 275, at 689-92.
338 See BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, supra note 262, at 107-14 (defining the
minimum standards of the principles of legality in international criminal law).
339 See DUSTUR JUMHURIAT AL-'IRAQ [Constitution] art. 19(Second) (Iraq).
340 al-Mahkama al-Jina'iya al-'Iraqiya al-'Uliya [The Iraqi High Criminal Court], al-Dujail
Trial Opinion (Part Two), available at http://www.iraq-iht.org/ar/doc/finalcour.pdf, trans-
lated in Grotian Moment: The Saddam Hussein Trial Blog, English Translation of Dujail
Judgment Part 2 (Dec. 2006), at 2-3, available at http://www.law.case.edu/saddamtria/
documents/dujail-opinion-pt2.pdf.
341 Id. at 3 ("The evolution of international criminal law bestows legality on the law of the
Iraqi High Tribunal, considering that this forms the latest that has been achieved in the re-
quired [sic] the status of international criminal legislation and its implementation, not only by
international criminal tribunals but also by national international criminal courts that exam-
ine international crimes also.").
342 See supra text accompanying note 338.
343 See, e.g., Newton, supra note 96, at 884 ("International tribunals and the more recent
phenomenon of internationalized domestic tribunals require a complex intermingling of
procedural approaches derived from both civil and common law.").
344 In commenting on the choice to intermingle procedural features based on the adversary-
accusatorial system, Salvatore ZappalA questions the wisdom of such an undertaking by
noting that "these experiments are always difficult, time-consuming and costly." Salvatore
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Statute were not familiar with the Iraqi Criminal Procedure Law345 and the
inquisitorial system upon which it is based. The manner in which adversary-
accusatorial elements were simply grafted onto the existing procedural
structure indicated that the drafters believed that simply including these
more familiar provisions and due process protections would insulate the
IHCC from outside criticism. 346 However, the shortcomings of this ap-
proach have resulted in a great deal of criticism of the conduct of the pro-
ceedings in the al-Dujail trial and have raised fundamental issues regarding
the fairness of the trial proceedings.347
The Iraqi legal system is not an adversary-accusatorial system-it is
an inquisitorial system, modeled after the French legal system. Iraqi crimi-
nal laws and procedure are based on Egyptian law, 348 which is also modeled
on the French legal system. In an inquisitorial system, an investigative
judge conducts the factual investigation independently, including the ex-
amination of suspects, victims and witnesses and the collection of all evi-
dence prior to trial, and also makes findings of fact.349 These findings are
conclusive and are only re-opened at the trial at the trial judge's discretion.
The indictment procedure does not exist in Iraqi law. The investigative
judge, upon being satisfied by the evidence that a crime has been commit-
ted, "refers" (ihala) a case to trial. This is quite different from the Anglo-
American adversary-accusatorial system where in addition to issuing in-
dictments and presenting cases before the courts, the role of the prosecutor
ZappalA, The Iraqi Special Tribunal's Draft Rules of Procedure and Evidence: Neither Fish
nor Fowl?, 2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 855, 861 (2004).
345 See generally Iraqi Criminal Procedure Law.
346 It should also be pointed out that the IHCC, and not the TNA, adopted the Rules of
Procedure and Evidence. As previously discussed, the Iraqi legal system is rigidly positivistic
and does not contemplate a delegation of this type of legislative power to the Iraqi judiciary,
and the constitution granted no such delegation of authority to the IHCC.
347 See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, JuDGING DuJAIL: THE FIRST TRIAL BEFORE THE IRAQI
HIGH TRIBUNAL, supra note 3 (arguing that the verdict should be set aside as a result of the
failure of the tribunal to meet international human rights standards, including procedural
flaws that undermined the fairness of the trial); Wierda & Sissons, Dujail: Trial and Error?,
supra note 3 (arguing that the trial phase in the Dujail proceedings failed to meet internation-
ally-recognized standards of fairness).
348 Qanun al-'Uqubat [Egyptian Penal Law], No. 58 (1957); Qanun al-Ejra'at al- Jina'iya
[Egyptian Criminal Procedure Law], No. 50 (1950).
349 See Mirjan Damaska, Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of Criminal
Procedure: A Comparative Study, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 506, 525 (1973); Mirjan Darnaska,
Structures of Authority in Comparative Criminal Procedure, 84 YALE L.J. 480, 524 (1975);
William T. Pizzi & Luca Marafioti, The New Italian Code of Criminal Procedure: The Diffi-
culties of Building an Adversarial Trial System on a Civil Law Foundation, 17 YALE J. INT'L
L. 1 (1992); John H. Langbein & Lloyd L. Weinreb, Continental Criminal Procedure:
"Myth" and Reality, 87 YALE L.J. 1549, 1551 (1978); Abraham S. Goldstein & Martin Mar-
cus, Comment on Continental Criminal Procedure, 8 YALE L.J. 1570 (1978).
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includes many of the functions performed by an investigative judge under
an inquisitorial system.35°
Article 19 of the IHCC Statute provides the accused with a number
of due process guarantees with respect to their trials that are derived from
international human rights law standards and which, in turn, are derived
from the Anglo-American adversarial-accusatorial system. 35' The drafters of
the IHCC Statute failed to recognize that due to the different systemic roles
of investigative judges and prosecutors, the rights of the defendant differ in
the inquisitorial and adversary-accusatorial systems. The inquisitorial sys-
tem generally, and the Iraqi legal system in particular, do provide rights to
the defense which are equivalent to the due process rights under the adver-
sary-accusatorial system. Such rights do, however, arise at different stages
of the proceedings. As such, procedural guarantees cannot be understood or
applied in the same manner.352
In the inquisitorial system, the questioning of witnesses takes place
mostly before the investigative judge during the investigative stage prior to
trial. If the defense counsel wishes to direct any questions to a witness, it
can be done only through the investigative judge, who would have the dis-
cretion353 concerning whether, and in what form, to pose the questions to the
witness. 354 Accordingly, the adversary-accusatorial system's right of the
accused to confront and cross-examine a witness 355 cannot be applied in the
350 As Mirjan Damaska notes, "the continental criminal judge takes the lion's shares of
factfinding activity, in Anglo-American lands procedural action is to a much greater extent in
the hands of the lawyers for the prosecution and the defense." Mirjan Damaska, The Uncer-
tain Fate of Evidentiary Transplants: Anglo-American and Continental Experiments, 45 AM.
J. CoMp. L 839, 841 (1997).
351 See Statute of the Iraqi High Criminal Court art. 19.
352 For example, at the trial, the defense can ask the presiding judge to direct certain ques-
tions to a witness or to admit expert reports and testimony by the defense that contradict
those of the prosecution. Thus, the presiding judge poses questions to witnesses, and he may
re-formulate them. If the defense's questions are not asked, or not asked in the manner nec-
essary to elicit certain responses, the defense may raise that on appeal. Similarly, the defense
may raise on appeal the presiding judge's failure to respond to its proffer of evidence if it is
deemed prejudicial to the defense's case.
353 The investigative judge is provided with significant discretion under the inquisitorial
system as to how to administer investigations, including who may be allowed to attend any
hearings (Iraqi Criminal Procedure Law art. 57) and how to direct questions (Iraqi Criminal
Procedure Law art. 64). Iraqi Criminal Procedure Law arts. 57, 64.
354 The defense counsel can also pose questions through the president of the court at the
trial stage and, like the investigative judge, the president has the discretion as to whether and
in what manner to direct the questions to a witness. Iraqi Criminal Procedure Law arts. 56-
71.
355 In the Anglo-American adversary-accusatorial system, witnesses are directly confronted
and cross-examined by the defense counsel. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. VI. See also
Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 126 (1968) (citing Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400,
404 (1965)) (confirming that a criminal defendant's right to confront witnesses against him,
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inquisitorial system.356 The investigative judge is seen as representing the
interests of justice, and is neither a partisan in the proceedings nor an um-
pire who referees the sparring of adversaries, namely, the prosecution and
defense. Thus, the assumption is that the investigative judge will pursue all
questions concerning the truth of the matter without partiality, bias, or
prejudice. To ensure that result the Iraqi Criminal Procedure Law requires
the investigative judge to inform the parties concerned of the judge's field
investigations, hearings of witnesses, and findings of certain evidence, and
also allows the defense to be present with counsel and to offer any evidence
it wishes.357 These procedural rights of the defense are the counterparts of
those offered in the adversary-accusatorial model. The fundamental differ-
ence between the two systems is the adversary-accusatorial leaves the evi-
dence-gathering process and its rebuttal, respectively, to the prosecution and
defense, while the rules of evidence demarcate the lines between what is
admissible and what is not, and the judge sits as an impartial arbiter.
The procedural confusion engendered by attempting to adopt pro-
cedural protections at the trial level ignores the fact that such due process
guarantees are more properly addressed to the investigative stage prior to
trial. The inquisitorial trial "places little emphasis on oral presentation of
evidence or on cross-examination by counsel. Instead, the trial is mainly a
public recapitulation of written materials included in a dossier compiled
earlier by an investigating magistrate., 358 To the extent that it is determined
that additional rights and protections are necessary, these should have been
included during the investigative stage and before the investigative judge.
The Iraqi legal tradition and the experience of Iraqi jurists dictated that
much greater emphasis would be placed on the investigative stage of the
proceedings. By ignoring this context and attempting to simply engraft due
process guarantees at the trial level, the drafters of the IHCC Statute helped
to fuel negative perceptions of the Court.
6. "Exceptional" Nature of the Tribunal
Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights requires states to guarantee the fair and public trial of individuals by
as guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, includes the right to
cross-examination).
356 Indeed, not only is the introduction of the rights of confrontation and cross-examination
unnecessary and contrary to established practice and procedure in Iraq, it also provides a
politically motivated defense with an opportunity to intimidate and badger witnesses and turn
the trial proceedings into an extremely contentious and time-consuming farce.
357 See Iraqi Criminal Procedure Law.
358 Abraham S. Goldstein, Reflections on Two Models: Inquisitorial Themes in American
Criminal Procedure, 26 STAN. L. REv. 1009, 1018-19 (1974).
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a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law. 359 The
United Nations Human Rights Committee has considered the boundaries
established by Article 14 and the legitimacy of establishing military or spe-
cial courts to try civilians.36 While noting the existence of such tribunals in
many countries and the fact that Article 14 does not explicitly prohibit such
categories of courts, the committee has pointed out that such tribunals
"could present serious problems as far as the equitable, impartial and inde-
pendent administration of justice is concerned., 361 As such, Article 14 of the
ICCPR clearly discourages, by implication, exceptional tribunals, or more
significantly in French "tribunaux d'exceptions."362 Article 95 of the Iraqi
constitution also prohibits the establishment of "special or exceptional"
courts.363 While the constitution also established the IHCC as an independ-
ent judicial body,364 the statutory framework establishing the IHCC, which
was ratified after the constitutional referendum of October 15, 2005, went
beyond the constitutional mandate by contravening these existing constitu-
tional prohibitions against the establishment of "special or exceptional"
courts. In addition, this constitutional infirmity violates Article 14(1)'s re-
quirement that tribunals be established by law. It should be noted that the
existence of a conflict, whether of an international or non-international
character, does not suspend the applicability of international human rights
law or international humanitarian law.365
359 ICCPR, supra note 177, art. 14(1).
360 See United Nations Human Rights Committee, General Comment 13/21, 1 4,
CCPR/C/2l/Rev.1 (Apr. 12, 1984).
361 Id. The Committee goes on to state that "[q]uite often the reason for the establishment
of such courts is to enable exceptional procedures to be applied which do not comply with
normal standards of justice." Id.
362 See ICCPR, supra note 177, art. 14 (guaranteeing "a fair and public hearing by a com-
petent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law"). The term is more significant
in French because until approximately 1950, most of the countries in the world followed the
Romanist-Civilist system. Between 1945 and 1950, a number of these countries, particularly
in Europe, established tribunaux d' exceptions to try Nazi collaborators. These tribunals were
used by Communist regimes to purge opposition figures and political opponents. In the
1950s and 1960s, France also used similar tribunals to preserve its colonial system. By 1963,
when the ICCPR was adopted, the reference to these types of tribunals was meant to be the
tribunaux d' exceptions. Thus, the French term is more significant than its English counter-
part.
363 DUSTUR JUMHURIAT AL-'IRAQ [Constitution] art. 95 (Iraq).
364 Id. art. 134.
365 The artificial division between these two bodies of law has begun to erode, as they are
in actuality co-extensive. See Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Oc-
cupied Palestinian Territory, 2004 I.C.J. No. 131, 106 (July 9, 2004), available at
http://www.icj-cij.orglicjwww/idocketlimwp/imwpframe.htm; M. Cherif Bassiouni, Humani-
tarian Law, in I ENCYCLOPEDIA OF GENOCIDE AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 467 (Dinah
Shelton et al. eds., 2004).
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The "special or exceptional" nature of the IHCC is implicated by
the major deficiencies of the IHCC Statute, most prominently, the fact that
(i) the independence and impartiality of the IHCC are compromised; (ii) the
temporal existence and jurisdictional scope of the IHCC are limited; (iii) the
expansive subject matter jurisdiction of the IHCC and the manner in which
its jurisdiction was established violate the principles of legality as recog-
nized by the Iraqi legal system; and (iv) the IHCC is not part of the ordinary
system of justice and its rules of procedure and evidence significantly depart
from Iraqi criminal procedure.
ARTICLE I. IV. A COMPARATIVE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Even though all criminal trials are about judging individuals ac-
cused of committing crimes, domestic trials for common crimes are unlike
trials instituted to address international crimes that have caused massive
victimization. The prosecution of persons who commit mass victimization,
whether by an internationally created body,366 a hybrid body, 367 or an ordi-
nary, military or special national tribunal,368 using national law, interna-
tional law, or both, has different goals. The choice of the forum, its compo-
sition, and the applicable laws and procedures are always based on special
considerations. These considerations include: the nature and scope of the
crime, its impact on that society and the international community, the iden-
366 See generally IMTFE Agreement, supra note 308; ICTY Statute, supra note 308; ICTR
Statute, supra note 308; ICC Statute, supra note 93.
367 Such hybrid courts include those of Sierra Leone, Cambodia, and Timor Leste. See
generally Agreement Between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on
the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, U.N.-Sierra Leone, Jan. 16, 2002,
2178 U.N.T.S. 138, available at http://www.sierra-leone.org/specialcourtagreement.html.
368 See generally M. Cherif Bassiouni, From Versailles to Rwanda in 75 Years: The Need
to Establish a Permanent International Criminal Court, 10 HARv. HUM. RTS. J. 11, 19 (1997)
[hereinafter Bassiouni, From Versailles to Rwanda] (discussing the Leipzig trials in post-
World War I Germany); CLAUD MULLINS, THE LEIPZIG TRIALS: AN ACCOUNT OF THE WAR
CRIMINALS' TRIALS AND A STUDY OF GERMAN MENTALITY (1921); Control Council Law No.
10 (Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes Against Peace and Against Hu-
manity) adopted Dec. 20, 1945, Official Gazette of the Control Council for Germany, No. 3,
Berlin, Jan. 31, 1946, reprinted in 1 AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A STEP TOwARD
WORLD PEACE 487 (Benjamin B. Ferencz ed., Oceana Publications 1980) (providing occupy-
ing authorities the power to "arrest and bring to trial persons suspected of having committed
a crime"); Attorney General ofIsrael v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 5 (Dis. Ct. 1962) (Israeli prose-
cution of Nazi war criminal Adolf Eichmann); Attorney General of Israel v. Eichmann, 36
I.L.R. 277 (Sup. Ct. 1962) (dismissing appeal); Regina v. Finta [1994] 1 S.C.R.
701(Canadian prosecution of Nazi war criminal Imre Finta); Leila Sadat Wexler, The Inter-
pretation of the Nuremberg Principles by the French Court of Cassation: From Touvier to
Barbie and Back Again, 32 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT. L. 289 (1994) (discussing the Barbie,
Touvier, and Papon war crimes trials in France), MEMORY, THE HOLOCAUST, AND FRENCH
JUSTICE: THE BOuSQuET AND TOUVIER AFFAIRS (Richard J. Golsan ed., Univ. Press of New
England 1996) (discussing the Bousquet and Touvier trials in France).
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tity of the perpetrators, and the intended goals of the trial at the national and
international levels. Thus, they go beyond simply bringing an accused
criminal to the bar of justice.
Among the goals of such trials are: disclosing the truth and memo-
rializing history,369 providing retributive justice and future deterrence, con-
solidating the rule of law, establishing a legal/moral foundation for a na-
tion's future, responding to the victims' needs for establishing the truth,
providing punishment for the perpetrators and bringing closure, and, in cer-
tain cases, establishing the basis for reconciliation between different ele-
ments of a society or between peoples in neighboring states.370 The Iraqi
process has to be assessed with respect to these goals and how they best
serve Iraq and the international community.
The trials of Hussein and other senior Ba'athist leaders who com-
mitted crimes and atrocities against the Iraqi people for a period over thirty
years and who also participated in crimes committed during the aggressions
against Iran (1980-1988) and Kuwait (1990), were not simply about having
a court issue a judgment to hang or punish those found guilty. If that were
the sole purpose of such trials, it might have been preferable for all the ac-
cused to have been lined up and executed following a summary court-
martial. 371 However, in the judgment of history, such summary techniques
are invariably discredited.
Furthermore, Hussein and the senior Ba'athist leadership were not
tried for the purposes of discovering the truth about the regime's crimes
since these were widely known and publicized. The Iraqi people knew of
these crimes because of their widespread and systematic scope and because
Hussein and those in his regime who ordered and executed these crimes
prided themselves in making them publicly known. The publicizing of these
atrocities terrorized Iraqi society, thus making it easier for the ruling regime
to impose its will without opposition.
The most significant goals of the Iraqi leadership trials were to
demonstrate the triumph of the rule of law over the rule of tyrannical might,
establish the foundation for a democratic state based on the rule of law, and,
not least of all, provide closure to the victims and survivors. Most of these
369 See generally STEPHAN LANDSMAN, CRIMES OF THE HOLOCAUST: THE LAW CONFRONTS
HARD CASES 6-7 (University of Pennsylvania Press 2005) ("A key goal [of the Nuremburg
trials] ... was to establish a definitive record of the evil working of the entire Nazi regime.");
MARTHA MiNOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY AFTER
GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE 50 (Beacon Press 1999) ("Trials can create credible docu-
ments and events that acknowledge and condemn horrors.").
370 See generally POST-CONFLICT JUSTICE (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2002).
371 A suggestion made by Winston Churchill at the Moscow Conference of 1943 in a pro-
posal for prosecuting Hitler and his senior leaders after the war's end. See Bassiouni, From
Versailles to Rwanda, supra note 368, at 23. In that way, there is no pretense of a legal proc-
ess, the accused cannot grandstand in court, and their executions are swift and simple.
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goals have not been achieved, but the fact that Hussein and his senior offi-
cials have been brought to trial, put in the dock reserved for criminals, and
asked to account for their crimes is not a small result.
In assessing the relative successes and failures of the Iraqi leader-
ship trials at this juncture, it is useful to compare them with the achieve-
ments and shortcomings of similar historic causes cdl~bres. The first com-
parison is to the Adolf Eichmann case in Israel.372 That case had an entirely
different purpose and an entirely different outcome. In both cases, the per-
petrators had committed horrendous crimes that were widely known to the
population of the territory wherein these crimes were committed. In both
cases, there was no question that the perpetrators should be prosecuted and
eventually punished for their crimes, and in both cases, there was also
clearly much more at stake. Unlike the crimes committed by Hussein, which
were well known in Iraq and throughout the world, the Eichmann trial
sought to solidify in the minds of Jews and in world public consciousness
that there was such a thing as a Holocaust and that six million Jews had
been wantonly exterminated for no other reason than their Jewishness.
373
The Eichmann trial faced questions with respect to its legitimacy
and the scope of its jurisdictional reach, issues that have surfaced in connec-
tion with the IHCC and the trial of Hussein. The State of Israel was estab-
lished on May 15, 1948, three years after the Nazi regime had fallen, thus,
the crimes committed by Eichmann were committed prior to the establish-
ment of the State of Israel. The majority of these crimes were committed in
Poland and other areas under German occupation and, thus, not under the
territorial jurisdiction of the State of Israel. These crimes were not commit-
ted against Israeli citizens, consequently, there was no jurisdiction in Israel
based on the passive personality doctrine.374 Eichmann was German (by the
time of the trial he had also acquired the citizenship of Argentina, although
under false pretenses) and was not an Israeli citizen, thus, Israel could not
rely on the active personality doctrine.375 This only left universality as a
372 See generally Attorney General of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 5 (Dis. Ct. 1962); At-
torney General of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 277 (Sup. Ct. 1962) (dismissing appeal).
373 In his memoirs on the Eichmann case and trial, Attorney General Gideon Hausner noted
that Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion told him that he was to make this case a record for the
Holocaust. This was needed because the IMT and the Subsequent Proceedings did not con-
solidate in world consciousness the nature and extent of the Holocaust. The IMT had priori-
ties other than establishing the historical record of the Holocaust. It was the great achieve-
ment of the Eichmann case to have crystallized in world public consciousness the figure of
six million deaths that is now associated with the Holocaust. See GIDEON HAUSNER, JUSTICE
IN JERUSALEM (Harper & Row 1966).
374 See Christopher Blakesley, Extraterritorial Extradition, in 2 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAW 33, 40 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2d rev. ed. 1999); M. CHERm BASSIOUNI,
INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION 370 (4th rev. ed. 2002).
375 See BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra note 374, at 373.
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jurisdictional basis, but Israel did not claim jurisdiction on that basis.376
Instead, it claimed passive personality jurisdiction on the basis that the State
of Israel represented all of the Jews of the world-a theory that could not be
validly advocated then and certainly not since then.377 Last, but not least,
Israeli agents kidnapped Eichmann from Argentina, and the United Nations
subsequently condemned Israel for its actions.378 The parallel in both cases
is that serious questions existed as to legitimacy and jurisdiction.
Unlike the al-Dujail trial, Eichmann's trial was conducted with de-
corum. Eichmann stood mainly mute throughout the proceedings, while
Hussein was vociferous, and the proceedings of the IHCC were frequently
out of control. The judges in the Eichmann trial acted professionally, fairly
and independently of the executive branch, which was not the case in the al-
Dujail trial, where the executive branch meddled in the affairs of the IHCC
and compromised its independence. 379 The differences between these cases,
however, are much more significant. The legacy of the Eichmann trial con-
solidated the historical fact of the Holocaust in the world's consciousness,
which far outweighed its legal flaws. This is what would have been ex-
pected in the trials of Hussein and the senior leaders of his regime. Instead,
the trials have so far left a legacy of questionable legitimacy and procedural
unfairness. In time, the Eichmann trial's legal flaws recessed into the foot-
notes of legal history. Unfortunately, it is quite possible that the legal flaws
of the trial of Hussein and other senior Ba'athists might come to obscure the
crimes of his regime.
Another historical comparison is the 1923 Leipzig trials in Germany
for war crimes committed during World War 1.380 At the end of that war, the
Allies included unprecedented and truly extraordinary provisions in the
376 See generally M. Cherif Bassiouni, Universal Jurisdiction for International Crimes:
Historical Perspectives and Contemporary Practice, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 81 (2001) (discussing
the origins and invocation of universal jurisdiction in international criminal cases).
377 For a critique, see PETER PAPADATOS, THE EICHMANN TRIAL (1964) (critiquing the im-
plementation of passive personality jurisdiction); Leslie C. Green, Legal Issues of the
Eichmann Trial, 37 TUL. L. REv. 641 (1962) (discussing Israel's invocation of passive per-
sonality jurisdiction).
378 See generally Michael H. Cardozo, When Extradition Fails, Is Abduction the Solution?,
55 AM. J. INT'L L. 127 (1961) (discussing the implications of Israel's abduction of Eichmann
from Argentina); BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra note 374, at 289 (observ-
ing that the Eichmann case is the most notorious example of state conduct that constitutes
wrongful conduct against another state).
379 See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
380 See generally M. Cherif Bassiouni, World War I: "The War to End all Wars" and the
Birth of a Handicapped International Criminal Justice System, 30 DENY. J. INT'L. L. & POL'Y
244 (2002); JACKSON MAOGOTO, WAR CRIMES AND REALPOLITIK: INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE
FROM WORLD WAR I TO THE 21 ST CENTURY (2004).
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1919 Treaty of Versailles, 381 namely Article 227, which provided for the
prosecution for Germany's Kaiser.382 Unlike the actions of the Allies fol-
lowing World War II, mainly the establishment of the IMT3 83 and the
IMTFE384 and the institution of the subsequent proceedings in each of the
Allies' respective zones of occupation,385 the Allies after World War I did
not prioritize such international criminal prosecutions. Instead, the Allies
decided to allow Germany to use its domestic legal processes to prosecute
those it deemed war criminals. These war criminals were to be prosecuted
under German criminal law and procedure, similar to the stated intention
with respect to the trials of Hussein and other senior members of his regime.
However, for a period of time, between 1919 and 1922, the Allies debated
the establishment of an international criminal tribunal to prosecute the per-
petrators of war crimes. A similar debate occurred during the period be-
tween 2002 and 2003 with respect to post-conflict justice in Iraq.386
In 1919, the Allies established a Commission to investigate the re-
sponsibility of individuals who had committed war crimes.387 At the end of
the investigation, the Commission listed some twenty thousand perpetrators,
all of whom were Germans.388 By 1922, the Allies agreed to reduce the
number of persons to be prosecuted to 845, which was the number that the
victorious Allies' representatives discussed with German authorities when
they sought to have them prosecuted before the German Supreme Court
sitting in Leipzig.389 The Allied diplomatic team, led by Great Britain, did
not know or understand German criminal law and procedure, a similar pre-
dicament to that faced by those in the administration who shaped the con-
tours of post-conflict justice in Iraq.39 Only after signing the agreement
with Germany did the Allies realize that the German code of criminal pro-
cedure granted the Prosecutor General discretion as to whether to proceed
381 Treaty of Peace with Germany (Treaty of Versailles), June 28, 1919, art. 227, 2 Bevans
43, 136-37.
382 This subsequently became known under the IMT Agreement as "crimes against peace"
and in article 228 as "violation of the law and customs of war." See IMTFE Agreement,
supra note 308, art. 228.
383 See id.
4 See id.
385 See supra note 368.
386 See supra text accompanying notes 55-71.
387 Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of
Penalties, 14 AM. J. INT'L L. 95, 127 (1920).
388 See Bassiouni, supra note 380, at 281.
389 See, e.g., MuLLNs, supra note 368.
390 The RCLO was composed of DOJ staff with considerable experience in the U.S. crimi-
nal justice system but lacking the legal, linguistic and practical experience necessary to effec-
tively engage with the realities of the Iraqi legal system.
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with prosecutions. To the unpleasant surprise of the Allies, the Prosecutor
General only accepted to consider forty-five cases, and he indicted only
twenty-two of those forty-five. Just as knowledge of Germany's criminal
procedure could have saved the Allies much embarrassment, an understand-
ing and knowledge of the Iraqi legal system and its traditions could have
guided those in the administration involved with post-conflict justice in Iraq
and helped them to avoid many of the mistakes and flaws that have plagued
the IHCC.
By all accounts, the Leipzig prosecutions were not vigorous and the
penalties were minimal, but the process was carried out with rigid adher-
ence to the German Code of Criminal Procedure and with a great deal of
decorum. 391 The outcome was disappointing, as the most serious penalty
was only three years imprisonment. Crowds outside the courtroom cheered
those convicted, much as crowds mourned Hussein following his execu-
392tion.
From these trials, the German people learned that victors seek to
find ways to humiliate the vanquished. Many Iraqis today have the same
perception. The Leipzig trials never entered German public consciousness,
nor did they serve a purpose in memorializing the war crimes committed by
the defendants. They are in most respects a failure, except with respect to
the legal precedent that they established. Perhaps the al-Dujail trial will be
just that-a legal precedent for trying a tyrant-and that in and of itself,
legal infirmities notwithstanding, is an accomplishment.
Another historical comparison concerns the IMTFE prosecutions.393
Admittedly, the procedures and processes at the Tokyo trials were less than
decorous or fair by comparison to the Nuremberg proceedings, 394 but the
major difference was that the German people accepted the legitimacy of
Nuremberg, whereas the Japanese people never accepted the Tokyo war
crimes trials. To the Japanese people, the proceedings were only another
way to humiliate the Japanese people because they were defeated. In fact,
when the Tokyo trials prematurely ended in 1949, the government of Japan
insisted that all persons sentenced to imprisonment by the IMTFE as well as
other allied forces be transferred to a central prison in Tokyo.395 This was
accomplished in 1953 before the signature of the armistice between the
391 See JAMES F. WILLIS, PROLOGUE TO NUREMBERG: THE POLITICS AND DIPLOMACY OF
PUNISHING WAR CRIMINALS OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR 126-47 (1982).
392 The Americans at Nuremberg were conscious of this possible popular reaction, and
there were no publicized hangings and no public burials. See generally WHITNEY R. HARRIS,
TYRANNY ON TRIAL (1954).
393 See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, The Nuremberg Legacy: A Historical Assessment Fifty Years
Later, in WAR CRIMES: THE LEGACY OF NUREMBERG 291 (Belinda Cooper ed., 1999).
394 See M. Cherif Bassiouni, From Versailles to Rwanda, supra note 368, at 31-38.
391 Id. at 34.
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United States and Japan. Within months, every convicted person was re-
leased, and the following year, two of the major defendants at the Tokyo
trials had become members of the Japanese cabinet in the capacity of Prime
Minister and Minister.396
Unlike the people of Germany, who not only admitted but also un-
derstood that the Nazi regime had committed terrible crimes, the Japanese
people have not fully reconciled with this past and have not accepted full
responsibility for what occurred in World War II or before. 397 Similarly,
most Iraqi Sunnis, as well as other Arabs, view the Iraqi prosecutions as a
way of humiliating the Iraqi people, or at the very least, its Sunni popula-
tion.398 Like the Japanese, they do not feel that these leaders deserved to be
tried and punished in this manner. In Iraq, at least with respect to the Sun-
nis, and in the Arab world, much as for the Japanese people, pride has
trumped justice.
While nearly everyone except unreconstructed Ba'athists will ac-
knowledge that Hussein was a dictator who committed terrible crimes
against his own people and others, they compare his rule to the current
chaos and violence that has overtaken the country in the years since the U.S.
invasion and resulted in the deaths of tens of thousands of civilians.399 This
has had the unfortunate effect for many Iraqis and others in the Arab world
of washing Hussein and the Ba'athist regime clean of their misdeeds. More-
over, in light of the dire situation in Iraq, many in the Arab world have
come to believe that the country is ungovernable and requires ruthlessness
in its rulers to keep the country together. In presenting his defense, Hussein
396 Id. at 35.
397 Such as the invasion of Manchuria in 1932 and the terrible crimes committed by the
Japanese forces in Nanking. See generally IRIS CHANG, THE RAPE OF NANKING (1997).
398 They also see these trials as a way of legitimizing the Shi'a and Kurdish political par-
ties' ascendance and control of Iraq to the exclusion of the Sunnis.
399 The actual number of civilian deaths during the U.S. occupation of Iraq has become a
matter of considerable controversy. At the highest end of the spectrum, a study published in
November 2006 in the British medical journal, The Lancet, estimated that the March 2003
invasion of Iraq has resulted in an additional 655,000 civilian deaths. See Gilbert Burnham et
al., Mortality After the 2003 Invasion of Iraq: A Cross-Sectional Cluster Sample Survey, 368
LANCET 1421 (2006). As of this writing, the Iraq Body Count, an independent public data-
base of media-reported civilian deaths in Iraq, estimates that between 54,432 and 60,098
civilians have been reported killed by military intervention in Iraq. See Iraq Body Count,
available at http://www.iraqbodycount.org. The United Nations has also begun to release
civilian casualty figures based upon information gathered from the Ministry of Health, hospi-
tals, mortuaries and other agencies. See U.N. Marks Soaring Iraq Death Toll, BBC NEWS,
Jan. 16, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle-east/6266393.stm. UNAMI estimates that
34,452 civilians have been violently killed in 2006 alone. UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE
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reflected this notion and pushed the argument that any violence that had
occurred in connection with the incidents in al-Dujail was a necessary re-
sponse in the defense of his country and in the best interests of his people.
These historical precedents make absolutely clear that the architects
of post-conflict justice must consider and understand the experiences of
previous international criminal justice processes and other war crimes
prosecutions, firmly root post-conflict justice in the national legal system of
the country in question, and appreciate the popular culture of the people
they seek to impact. Without such sensitivity and wisdom, the results of
post-conflict justice will inevitably fall short of expectations and goals.
CONCLUSION
The necessity of prosecuting Hussein and other high-ranking
Ba'athists is beyond doubt. Bringing the most serious perpetrators to ac-
count for their crimes and atrocities is in and of itself an important prece-
dent in the Arab world. However, within the highly politicized context of
Iraq, those U.S. and Iraqi officials who participated in the establishment of
the IHCC lost sight of the deeper and far-reaching significance and implica-
tions of these proceedings for the future of the rule of law in Iraq and in the
Arab world. The very importance of the Iraqi proceedings has made the
shortcomings in the establishment of the IHCC and its work that much more
unfortunate. These shortcomings were the products of errors in judgment
that could have been avoided. Admittedly, all concerned were well inten-
tioned and acted in good faith, but in this instance, such intentions cannot
simply overcome the damage that has been wrought as a result of the loss of
confidence in post-conflict justice in Iraq.
The establishment of the IHCC and the trial proceedings have not
been a total failure. The latter stages of the al-Dujail trial and the early por-
tions of the al-Anfal trial have proceeded with a much greater degree of
regularity and propriety. The IHCC has created a forum through which a
number of victims of the former regime have been afforded the opportunity
to accusingly point in open court to Hussein and to his co-defendants-
highly symbolic acts that were broadcast to an entire nation. These powerful
moments and the production of damning evidence have ensured that Hus-
sein and his cronies have not been transformed into martyrs. Further, in
contemplating many of the shortcomings of the trial proceedings, it is nec-
essary to bear in mind that similar institutions have struggled to establish
their credibility at their inception. However, even while bearing in mind the
positive developments associated with the IHCC and the potential for future
improvement in the administration of justice, the legacy of the IHCC will be
marred by the infirmities and shortcomings of its statutory basis.
These shortcomings have also been compounded by several other
factors that will inevitably undermine the legacy of the IHCC. First, the lack
of broad-based post-conflict justice mechanisms to involve victims and
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members of all strata of Iraqi society in the post-conflict justice process has
ensured that support for the IHCC has been limited. A victim compensation
scheme would have helped to create a popular demand for justice in Iraq by
recognizing the widespread nature of repression and abuse among all of the
ethnic and sectarian communities in Iraq. The inclusive nature of a victim
compensation scheme could have supplemented the necessarily limited
scope of the historical record established through prosecutions and would
have assisted in unifying Iraqi society on the basis of a shared legacy of
persecution and repression. A victim compensation scheme could also have
provided the basis for the establishment of a commission tasked with com-
piling an objective historical account of past political violence.
By eschewing a broad approach to achieving post-conflict justice in
Iraq, the United States and the Iraqi government have furthered sectarian
and ethnic tensions and have exacerbated the sense of exclusion among
Sunni Arabs. The ethnic and sectarian biases evident in the selection of
cases involving Shi'a and Kurdish victims to the exclusion of cases of Sunni
victimization have also further aggravated this sense of exclusion and fu-
elled perceptions among Sunni Arabs that the IHCC is a political body that
is bent on exercising victor's justice.
The hasty and chaotic execution of Hussein on the first day of 'Eid
al-Adha for Sunnis cemented the sectarian perceptions of the IHCC.
400
While opinions as to the legality of the timing of the execution have var-
ied,4°' on a political level, the decision must be seen as a serious mistake
and reflects the politicized nature of the IHCC.4°2 The overtly sectarian
manner in which the scenes played out on Arab satellite stations and the
unseemly taunting of Hussein prior to his hanging helped to obscure the
bloody legacy of Hussein and the Ba'athist regime and created an image of
Hussein as a martyr who died with his dignity intact.43 The choice of the
400 See Sabrina Tavemise, For Sunnis, Dictator's Degrading End Signals Ominous Dawn
for the New Iraq, N.Y. TviMEs, Jan. 1, 2007, at A7; Hassan M. Fattah, For Arab Critics, Hus-
sein's Execution Symbolizes the Victory of Vengeance over Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31,
2006, at 13.
401 For divergent opinions regarding the legality of the timing of Hussein's execution under
Iraqi law, compare Grotian Moment: The Saddam Hussein Trial Blog, Dujail Issue #46,
Saddam's Execution: Kevin Jon Heller, Why Saddam's Execution was Unlawful with Mi-
chael P. Scharf, Saddam's Execution was a Fiasco, but its Timing did not Violate the Law, at
http://www.law.case.edu/saddamtrial/.
402 See Press Release, International Center for Transitional Justice, Iraq Tribunal Chooses
Speed over Justice in Final Ruling (Dec. 27, 2006), http://ictj.org/en/
news/press/release/1096.htm (criticizing the speed with which the Cassation Panel rendered
its opinion in a case involving complex international crimes and noting the increased politi-
cization of the IHCC's work).
403 See M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Execution of a Tyrant, Cm. TRIB., Jan. 4, 2007, at 19. The
political fallout from the execution of Hussein continued following the botched and grue-
some execution of Barzan al-Tikriti on January 15, 2007, which resulted in al-Tikriti's de-
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Iraqi government to carry out this sentence prior to the completion of the al-
Anfal trial also betrayed a lack of fidelity to the overarching goals of post-
conflict justice. It is perhaps the ultimate irony that the legacy of excessive
and far-ranging U.S. involvement with the IHCC has created an environ-
ment, particularly in the Arab world, where the United States will continue
to receive blame and condemnation for decisions and mistakes made by the
IHCC and the Iraqi government, even in those instances when such deci-
sions are clearly in contradiction to the wishes of the United States.4°
Finally, the current escalation of violence has also overtaken and
overshadowed the possibilities of post-conflict justice in Iraq. A reporter
recently recounted a conversation with an Iraqi friend in Baghdad following
the announcement of the al-Dujail verdicts in which the Iraqi impatiently
brushed aside questions regarding Hussein's impending death sentence by
stating that "[a] mortar round exploded on the roof of my next-door
neighbour's house, frightening my whole family. We worry about staying
alive, not about ... whether Saddam Hussein lives or dies. 405 It is against
this tragic backdrop that the work of the IHCC will continue. The broader
challenges facing the Court might doom the future of post-conflict justice in
Iraq regardless of the IHCC's future response to legal and technical chal-
lenges.
capitation. See Burns, supra note 3. The execution of al-Tikriti, along with Awad Hamed al-
Bandar, was filmed by the Iraqi authorities and rebroadcast for journalists in Baghdad. See
Hanging of Saddam Aides Filmed, BBC NEWS, Jan. 15, 2007,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middleeast/6263787.stm.
404 For an account of U.S. misgivings with respect to the timing of Hussein's execution, see
John F. Burns & Marc Santora, U.S. Questioned Iraq on the Rush to Hang Hussein, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 1, 2007, at Al; John F. Bums, In Days Before Hanging, a Push for Revenge and
a Push Back from the U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2007, at 12.
405 Patrick Cockburn, We Worry About Staying Alive, Not The U.S. Elections,
INDEPENDENT, Nov. 10, 2006, available at http://comment.independent.co.uk/
commentators/article 1962981 .ece.
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